MARIA LUISA MASSA CISNEROS
v.
CARLOS A. GUINAND
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A motion to disqualify a trial judge is legally sufficient when the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial, and the question focuses on how the judge's message is received rather than the judge's intent.
[1] In evaluating a motion to disqualify a judge, the court must accept the factual allegations as true and determine whether those facts would create in a reasonably prudent…
[2] A writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a motion for judicial disqualification.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the question of disqualification focuses not on what the judge intended, but rather how the message is received and the basis of the feeling.”
Standard for evaluating judicial disqualification motions
Maria Luisa Massa Cisneros filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge in a family law matter. The trial court denied the motion for disqualification…
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PER CURIAM.
A writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a motion for disqualification. See Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 78 (Fla.
2008). “A motion to recuse or disqualify a trial judge is legally sufficient when the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” S.S. v. Dep’t of Children &
Families, 298 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting Colarusso v.
Colarusso, 20 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Fla. R. Jud. Admin.
2.330(d)(1)). “The allegations of fact that are contained in the motion must be taken as true, Masten v. State, 159 So. 3d 996, 997 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015),
and ‘the question of disqualification focuses not on what the judge intended,
but rather how the message is received and the basis of the feeling.’”
Nguyen v. Nguyen, 229 So. 3d 407, 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Great
Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 2000 Island Blvd. Condo. Ass’n, 153 So. 3d 384, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). “[T]hat the findings implicate petitioner[’s] counsel …,
rather than petitione[r] individually, is a distinction without a discernible difference.” JJN FLB, LLC v. CFLB P’ship, LLC, 283 So. 3d 922, 926 (Fla.
3d DCA 2019). As alleged, we find that the trial court’s comments were such that would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. We do not imply that the trial judge would actually be unfair or has an actual prejudice, we simply hold that under these circumstances, the petitioner has met her burden. Petition granted.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Brewer v. Hughes, 390 So. 3d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)…fy. Because we are required to view the facts “from the perspective of the petitioner[s]” rather than the trial judge’s view of the facts contained in the JEAC opinion, we are compelled to grant both petitions. See JJN FLB, LLC v. CFLB P’ship, LLC, 283 So. 3d 922, 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Michaud-Berger v. Hurley, 607 So. 2d 441, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). Petitions granted. 2 We commend the trial judge for his laudable efforts in doing so.…
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Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Heydi Velez, 365 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)
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Murphy v. Jeswyn Collins, 307 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…la. L. Weekly at D114 (quoting Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3E(1)). Circumstances and events immediately preceding or following a lower court’s alleged expression of bias may inform a party’s reasonable fear. See JJN FLB, LLC v. CFLB P’ship, LLC, 283 So. 3d 922, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (finding “close temporal proximity” between trial court’s actions in different proceedings render party’s fear reasonable). Here, the trial judge’s alleged characterization of Murphy’s counsel as engaging in “ploy[s]” and hav…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2008)
- Great Am. Ins. Co. OF NEW York v. 2000 Island Boulevard Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 153 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
- Masten v. State, 159 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
- Colarusso v. Brenna Myers Colarusso, 20 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
- S.S. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 298 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
- Pierre-Jean Nguyen v. Nguyen, 229 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)