KEENYA YOUNG
v.
STATE
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A motion for postconviction relief is barred when filed outside the two-year time limitation under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.850, and a guilty plea waives the right to challenge pre-plea court rulings and constitutional defects.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.850 must be filed within two years, and motions filed outside this period are barred.
[2] A defendant's entry of a guilty plea constitutes an express waiver of defects in the charging information and waives the right to appeal pre-plea court rulings and pre-pl…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a defendant enters a plea of guilty, the only points available for an appeal concern actions which took place contemporaneously with the plea. A plea of guilty cuts off any right to an appeal from court rulings that preceded the plea in the criminal process including independent claims relating to deprivations of constitutional rights that occur prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”
Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 1979), cited for the proposition that guilty pleas waive pre-plea appellate rights.
Keenya Young appealed from the circuit court's denial of a motion for postconviction relief. Young had entered a guilty plea in the underlying crimina…
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PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Tisdale v. State, 282 So. 3d 998, 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Rule 3.850 provides a ‘two-year time limitation for filing motions for postconviction relief.’”) (citation omitted); see also Bradley v. State, 3 So. 3d 1168,
1171 (Fla. 2009) (“[Defendant’s] explicit plea to [the crime as charged] constituted an express waiver of [a] defect in the charging information.”); Robinson v. State,
373 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 1979) (“Once a defendant enters a plea of guilty, the only points available for an appeal concern actions which took place contemporaneously with the plea. A plea of guilty cuts off any right to an appeal from court rulings that preceded the plea in the criminal process including independent claims relating to deprivations of constitutional rights that occur prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”);
Harvin v. State, 385 So. 2d 119, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (As “no allegation that the plea itself was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, or was otherwise subject to legal challenge, the motion [for postconviction relief] was properly denied without evidentiary hearing.”); § 812.13(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (“An act shall be deemed ‘in the course of committing the robbery’ if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission.”).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Cobb v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…bsence of an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the same. On appeal, Cobb raises numerous claims of error. Applying a de novo standard of review, we affirm his newly discovered evidence assertion without elaboration. See Tisdale v. State, 282 So. 3d 998, 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). However, his remaining three grounds for relief merit further discussion. Cobb contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) misadvising him as to the…
Authorities Cited
- Gissendanner v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979)
- Bradley v. State, 3 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 2009)
- Harvin v. State, 385 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Baxter Tisdale v. State, 282 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)