WANDA I. RUFIN, P.A.
v.
ALICIA MARIA BORGA
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A trial court violates a party's due process rights when it imposes attorney's fees as a sanction against counsel without notice of the issue and opportunity to be heard.
[1] A trial court's inherent authority to award attorney's fees and costs as sanctions for bad faith conduct does not override the constitutional requirement that such sancti…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court violates a party's due process rights when it expands the scope of a hearing to address and determine matters not noticed for hearing.”
Court's statement of controlling legal principle regarding notice requirements for trial court proceedings
Wanda Rufin, an attorney, represented the husband in a dissolution proceeding. After final judgment, the trial court imposed $3,900 in attorney's fees…
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
WANDA I. RUFIN, P.A., and WANDA I. RUFIN,
Appellants,
v.
ALICIA MARIA BORGA and MARCO AURELIO PEREZ,
Appellees.
No. 4D19-491
[February 26, 2020]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Nicholas R. Lopane, Judge; L.T. Case No. 12-08235 FMCE.
Wanda I. Rufin of Wanda I. Rufin, P.A., Miami, for appellants. No brief filed for appellees. LEVINE, C.J. Wanda Rufin, an attorney, appeals the order requiring her to pay opposing counsel $3,900 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for her conduct during the dissolution proceeding below. Because this issue was not noticed for hearing, we reverse and remand.
Rufin represented the husband below in a dissolution proceeding. After the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the wife’s attorney served a notice of hearing on Rufin, notifying her of a hearing to address only two matters: (1) the wife’s motion for attorney’s fees based on her need and the husband’s ability to pay, and (2) the wife’s motion for contempt against the husband due to his failure to comply with a request for production. Significantly, the notice of hearing made no mention that any attorney’s fees would be sought against Rufin personally as a sanction.
During the hearing, and after the trial court granted the wife’s motion for attorney’s fees, the wife’s counsel requested that the court award attorney’s fees as a sanction against Rufin personally. The trial court granted the request and ordered Rufin to pay $3,900 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for her bad faith conduct. Rufin appeals, claiming a violation
of her fundamental right to due process.
The United States and Florida Constitutions guarantee due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Fla. Const. art. I, § 9. “The denial of due process rights, including the opportunity to be heard, to testify, and to present evidence, is fundamental error.” Weiser v. Weiser, 132 So. 3d 309, 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
“A trial court possesses inherent authority to award attorney’s fees and costs for bad faith conduct against a party.” Hicks v. Hicks, 284 So. 3d 576, 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Although the trial court has this authority, the trial court still has the obligation to provide due process. Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221, 226-27 (Fla. 2002). Accordingly, such a sanction is appropriate only after notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 227.
In the instant case, the trial court denied Rufin due process. The notice of hearing stated that only two matters would be addressed: (1) the wife’s motion for attorney’s fees against the husband, and (2) the wife’s motion for contempt against the husband. Nothing in the notice of hearing put Rufin on notice that the court would consider attorney’s fees as a sanction against her personally at the hearing. “A trial court violates a party’s due process rights when it expands the scope of a hearing to address and determine matters not noticed for hearing.” Rodriguez v. Santana, 76 So. 3d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Williams v. Primerano, 973 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (“A trial court cannot determine matters not noticed for hearing or award relief not sought by the pleadings.”).
Because the trial court imposed the attorney’s fees sanction without notice and opportunity to be heard, we reverse and remand.1 See Rickard v. Bornscheuer, 937 So. 2d 311, 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (reversing where trial court imposed personal sanctions against attorney without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard).
Reversed and remanded. MAY and GERBER, JJ., concur.
* * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Diaz v. Kasinsky, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…y maintains, this inherent authority is not unlimited. “The inherent authority of the trial court, like the power of contempt, carries with it the obligation of restrained use and due process.” Id. at 226-27; see also Wanda I. Rufin, P.A. v. Borga, 294 So. 3d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“such a sanction is appropriate only after notice and an opportunity to be heard”). In Moakley, the court concluded that “the trial court’s exercise of the inherent authority to assess attorneys’ fees against an attorney…
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Palm Beach Cnty. v. Wilson, 386 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)…timely reinstate Wilson. We agree with the County. “A person facing civil contempt sanctions is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Chetram v. Singh, 937 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Wanda I. Rufin, P.A. v. Borga, 294 So. 3d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (holding that a sanction imposed against an attorney denied her due process when the notice of hearing failed to place that attorney on notice that she would be personally subjected to sanctions); Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F. 3…
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Buechele v. In re the Est. of Amparo Berenice Buechele (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…raneous objection to the lack of an evidentiary hearing, the trial court was required to provide Mark the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence at an evidentiary hearing before issuing its sanctions order. See Wanda I. Rufin, P.A. v. Borga, 294 So. 3d 916, 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“Because the trial court imposed the attorney's fees sanction without notice and opportunity to be heard, we reverse and remand.”)4 Additionally, with regard to the amount of attorney’s fees awarded, the trial court “failed…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2002)
- Weiser v. Weiser, 132 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
- Candy Lynn Rodriguez v. Santana, 76 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
- Rosenia Williams v. Primerano, 973 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Hicks v. Hicks, 284 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
- Rickard v. Bornscheuer, 937 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)