STATE, EX REL. CHARLES COHEN
v.
ROBERT W. MILBURN, AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE DISTRICT OF WEST PALM BEACH
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case concerns a challenge to a conviction based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the municipal court that issued the commitment. The court found that the municipal court, though established under a special taxing district act, was a de facto court for the City of West Palm Beach and its judgments were not void.
No, the commitment is not void. The court functioning under the special taxing district act is considered a de facto municipal court for the City of West Palm Beach, serving the same territory and enforcing its ordinances. Therefore, its judgments are not subject to collateral attack.
“The Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach under the circumstances appearing in this case is at least a de facto municipal court of the City of West Palm Beach, because it judicially serves the same territory as that occupied by the City of West Palm Beach and exercises authority to enforce the ordinances of the municipality of West Palm Beach.”
Establishes the court's de facto status.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant was convicted in the Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach for violating a city ordinance. He argued that the commitment wa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Municipal Ordinance Enforcement cases and more on FLexlaw
This is a writ of error from a final judgment in habeas corpus remanding the plaintiff in error to custody-under a commitment issued by the Judge of the Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach, pursuant to a trial and conviction of petitioner before said court on a charge of having violated Ordinance No. 268 of the City of West Palm Beach, which ordinance was, by virtue of Section 149 of Chapter 16759, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1933, made an ordinance to be enforced within the. territorial limits of the District of West Palm Beach.
The contention of the appellant is that the commitment was void in that it was emanated from a Municipal Court existing under and by virtue of Chapter 16759, Acts of 1933, only in a special taxing district designated as the “District” of West Palm Beach and not existing in any municipality known as the “City of West Palm Beach.” It is argued that by reason of this circumstance, Chapter 16759, Acts of 1933, undertaking to create a Municipal Court in the so-called “District” of West Palm Beach is unconstitutional and that the processes of said court, including its commitments, are void, for the reason that the Legislature is without power to create a municipal court in a special taxing district such as Chapter 16759, Acts of 1933, purports to set up and to vest with municipal powers in succession to the previously existing municipality of West Palm Beach.
Chapter 16758, Acts of 1933, which abolished the former municipality of West Palm Beach and created and established a new municipality to be known as the City of West Palm Beach is in pari materia with Chapter 16759, Acts of 1933, purporting to set up a separate taxing district superimposed over the same territory to be known as the District of West Palm Beach. Both said Acts taken together pro*378vide for the exercise of municipal functions in identical territory.
And under said Acts it is provided that the pre-existing ordinances of the City of West Palm Beach shall he enforced within designated territory which, if within the limits of the District of West Palm Beach, is necessarily also within the territorial limits of the City of West Palm Beach as re-established and continued in existence as a municipal corporation by Chapter 16758, supra.
Likewise the Court described as the Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach under Chapter 16759, supra, is in form and substance a municipal court that is invested with jurisdiction to act as such and to exercise jurisdiction as a municipal court in territory which is by law made territory co-terminous with the territorial jurisdiction of the municipal corporation described in the statutes as the City of West Palm Beach.
It therefore appears from the facts of the controversy now before us that there is in legal existence a municipality described by statute as the City of West Palm Beach; that the territorial jurisdiction of such city has been fixed by law; that within the identified territorial jurisdiction of the City of West Palm Beach as so fixed by law, is a Municipal Court which is invested by law with the judicial power of a municipal court to enforce ordinances theretofore admittedly adopted and in effect as ordinances of the municipality of West Palm Beach; that plaintiff in error has been tried, found guilty and committed to custody by a municipal court actually functioning as such under color of law in, territory that is admittedly within the territorial jurisdiction of a municipality known as the City of West Palm Beach, although it is also within territory that likewise is described as the District of West Palm Beach; that the *379ordinance for violation of which he has been found guilty and sentenced in the Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach is an ordinance admittedly adopted and promulgated as an ordinance of the City of West Palm Beach; that it was adopted for application within the territorial limits of the municipality continued in existence as the City of West Palm Beach, and is being enforced only in such territory.
The Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach under the circumstances appearing in this case is at least a de facto municipal court of the City of West Palm Beach, because it judicially serves the same territory as that occupied by the City of West Palm Beach and exercises authority to enforce the ordinances of the municipality of West Palm Beach. Accordingly the acts and judgments of the Municipal Court of the District of West Palm Beach are not absolutely void, nor is the title or right to the office of Judge of said Court subject to collateral attack on habeas corpus. Ex Parte: Ward, 173 U. S. 462, 19 Sup. Ct. 459, 43 L. Ed. 765; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585, 44 Am. Dec. 574; In Res Corum, 62 Kan. 271, 52 Pac. Rep. 661, 84 A. S. R. 382; State v. Vailey, 106 Minn. 138, 118 N. W. Rep. 676, 130 A. S. R. 592, 16 Ann. Cas. 338, 19 L. H. A. (N. S.) 775.
The judgment remanding the prisoner to custody should be affirmed on the authorities just cited and such will be the judgment of this Court in the premises.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown, J., concur.
Ellis, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
City of Sarasota v. State, 125 Fla. 381 (Fla. 1936)…event that there is not sufficient money on hand applicable with which to pay relator’s claim. The contention finds ample support in the case of McNally v. State, ex rel., 112 Fla. 434, 150 Sou. 751; Treat, et al., v. State, ex, rel., 118 Fla. 448, 159 Sou. 529; City of Winter Haven, et al., v. State, ex rel., 114 Fla. 527, 154 Sou. 879; City of Bradenton, et al., v. State, ex rel., 117 Fla. 578, 158 Sou. 165. Therefore, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions that relators b…
Authorities Cited
- Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1899)