THERON SAPP
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 1st DCA | 2019-04-22
No. 18-2399
268 So. 3d 935 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2019)

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Holding

A trial court may impose any sentence up to life imprisonment on a habitual felony offender convicted of a first-degree felony, including a sentence of forty years.


Headnotes

[1] A habitual felony offender convicted of a first-degree felony who is eligible for life imprisonment may be sentenced to any term of years up to life, and such intermediat…

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Key Quotes

“the trial court in this case had the discretion to impose any sentence up to life imprisonment for appellant's commission of the first degree felony”

Citation to Guy v. State supporting the interpretation of sentencing discretion for habitual felony offenders

Facts & Procedural History

Theron Sapp was convicted in 2006 of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, a first-degree felony. As a habitual felony offender, he was eli…

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Opinion of the Court

he could not be sentenced to forty years. Like the trial court, we disagree.*

The trial court “may sentence” a habitual felony offender convicted “of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.” § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. As Sapp could have been sentenced to life imprisonment, he likewise could be sentenced to forty years imprisonment. See Guy v. State, 632 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (interpreting a habitualization provision permitting a sentence “for life” and concluding that “the trial court in this case had the discretion to impose any sentence up to life imprisonment for appellant’s commission of the first degree felony”). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order denying Sapp’s motion to correct illegal sentence.

MAKAR, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.


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