RUIZ
v.
STATE
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David Ruiz appeals his convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, and simple battery. The appellate court reverses his convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors about the defense theory of excessive force during voir dire.
The trial court abused its discretion by restricting defense counsel's questioning about excessive force, the sole defense theory. Where a juror's attitude about a particular legal doctrine is essential to determining challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, voir dire properly includes questions about that doctrine. Defense counsel must be permitted to question prospective jurors about their willingness and ability to accept the defense theory.
[1] Where a defendant's sole defense theory requires jurors to assess a particular legal doctrine, the trial court abuses its discretion by restricting voir dire questions th…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the single thing that defense counsel needed to know was whether the prospective jurors could fairly and impartially consider the defense of [excessive use of force]”
From Lavado v. State, cited to establish what information defense counsel must be permitted to obtain during voir dire when excessive force is the sole defense.
During Ruiz's trial, the sole defense theory was that officers used excessive force during his arrest. Defense counsel attempted three times during vo…
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SALTER, J.
The defendant, David Ruiz, appeals his judgment of conviction and sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, and simple battery. We reverse the convictions under Mosely v. State, 842 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in curtailing defense counsel’s questions of the jury venire about the sole defense theory.2 The theory of defense at trial was that the officers used excessive force during Ruiz’s arrest. During voir dire, the defense attempted three times to ask the prospective jurors their views about police use of excessive force. Each question was met with an objection by the state. After a side bar on the state’s objection to the third question, the trial court ordered defense counsel not to discuss excessive force. This line of questioning ceased.
The trial court’s ruling denied the defendant his right to a fair trial and to an impartial jury by restricting questioning of the prospective jurors about the sole defense in the case. Mosely, 842 So. 2d at 280-81. Mosely concluded that “where a juror's attitude about a particular legal doctrine . . . is essential to a determination of whether challenges for cause or peremptory challenges are to be made, it is well settled that the scope of the voir dire properly includes questions about and 2 Additionally, we note the state’s concession that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked discretion to withhold adjudication. The trial court had such discretion, State v. Hewitt, 702 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1997), and we reverse and remand the sentences for that reason.
references to that legal doctrine . . . .” Id. at 281 (quoting Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Pearson, J., dissenting) (dissent adopted in Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1986)).
It is improper to curtail questioning on the theory of defense, even where counsel is permitted to inquire generally. Counsel must be permitted to question the prospective jurors about their willingness and ability to accept the defense’s theory. Harrison v. State, 172 So. 3d 1018, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). If defense counsel knew nothing else about the prospective jurors, “the single thing that defense counsel needed to know was whether the prospective jurors could fairly and impartially consider the defense of [excessive use of force].” Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1986).
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
Cited By
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Rivera v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
Authorities Cited
- Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1986)
- Williams v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- State v. Hewitt, 702 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Mosely v. State, 842 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Harrison v. State, 172 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
- A. P. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 172 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)