IBRAHEEM S. JACKSON

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

IBRAHEEM JACKSON, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D2025-1862

[November 4, 2026]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Martin S. Fein, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062015CF006443A88810.

Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the denial of all claims raised by Ibraheem Jackson in his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, except for his claim that trial counsel was deficient for failing to raise an issue regarding section 812.025, Florida Statutes (2015).

Jackson argues that his dual convictions for dealing in stolen property and grand theft are improper pursuant to section 812.025 because those offenses occurred within one scheme or course of conduct. See Hall v. State, 826 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that “section 812.025 prohibits a trial court from adjudicating a defendant guilty of both theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct"). The trial court summarily denied Jackson's claim and agreed with the State that the dual convictions were permitted because the property involved in the counts differed.

The trial court erred in focusing solely on whether different property was involved. See Jones v. State, 453 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA

1984) (concluding the statute barred dual convictions even where the State attempted to limit the theft count to one item and the dealing count to a different item, reasoning both were part of the same scheme); see also Melendez v. State, 135 So. 3d 456, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (approving Jones and vacating grand theft conviction even though the State argued that different property could have been involved in the two offenses).

Consequently, we reverse and remand for the trial court to apply the correct analysis focusing on whether one “scheme or course of conduct" was at issue in the convictions. See Bradshaw v. State, 263 So. 3d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (concluding defendant could not be convicted of both petit theft and dealing in stolen property, although defendant stole sawblades from his employer on one day and waited until following day to sell them, where offenses were in connection with one scheme or course of conduct). We affirm on all other issues without comment.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

GROSS, LEVINE and SHAW, JJ., concur.

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