SVYATOSLAV MANGUSHEV

v.

ALPHA TEAM, LLC

Supreme Court of Florida

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2026

Svyatoslav Mangushev, Petitioner(s)

V.

Alpha Team, LLC, Respondent(s)

SC2025-1262

Lower Tribunal No(s).: 4D2025-2201; 062017CA000351AXXXCE

The "Petition for Writ of Certiorari” is hereby treated as a petition to invoke all writs jurisdiction and is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner has failed to cite an independent basis that would allow the Court to exercise its all writs authority, and no such basis is apparent on the face of the petition. See Williams v. State, 913 So. 2d 541, 543-44 (Fla. 2005); St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 1980).

No motion for rehearing will be considered by this Court.

COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

BARRIOS, J., concurs in result.

TANENBAUM, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

TANENBAUM, J., concurring in result.

The petitioner seeks review of a final order. This court initially

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treated his petition for certiorari properly as a notice to invoke this court's review jurisdiction. We clearly do not have jurisdiction, and we could dismiss on that basis alone. See Art. V, § 3(b), Fla. Const. (setting out various bases on which we can exercise discretionary review jurisdiction). Simple and easy.

So it is bewildering that the court would go through the academic exercise of then treating the petition as one invoking “all writs jurisdiction,” only to state that no basis for doing so appears on the face of the petition. There are two problems with this approach.

Most importantly, there is no such thing as “all writs jurisdiction" at all, and it makes no sense to re-characterize the petition as invoking such non-existent jurisdiction. The Florida Constitution authorizes this court to issue, among other things, “all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” Art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla. Const. (emphasis supplied). This means that the court must first have a basis under section 3(b)(1) through (6) to exercise jurisdiction, and if it does, then it may issue one or more

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specified writs necessary to preserve that jurisdiction. Again, nothing in section 3(b)(1) through (6) provides the necessary underlying authority to permit the review the petitioner is seeking here, so there is no jurisdiction to be preserved. That should be the end of the matter.

Additionally, there is no separate bag of remedies called “all writs" available for the asking. Unless the petitioner is seeking one of the four prerogative writs listed in section 3(b) (e.g., mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, or habeas)—and he is not—it is incumbent on the petitioner to specify the one of over a hundred common-law writs historically available in England that he is seeking to preserve this court's otherwise extant jurisdiction. See Antiquities of the Law, 1 ALB. L.J. 247, 247 (1870) (listing and describing many such writs). The petitioner here asks for certiorari review. A writ of certiorari is one of those many ancient writs that we could issue under the proper circumstances (viz.: when necessary to review a non-final order causing irreparable harm in a matter where we will have direct appellate jurisdiction over the

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eventual final order). Those circumstances, however, are not present in this case.

Dismissal, of course, is the proper disposition. The order dismissing this cause, however, does more work than is necessary— in a constitutionally inaccurate way and in pursuit of no apparent meaningful end.

A True Copy Test:

SC2025-1262 10/29/2026

John A. Tomasino Clerk, Supreme Court

SC2025-1262 10/29/2026

CD

Served:

GEORGE LAMBERT

JOHN HENRY PELZER

4DCA CLERK

BROWARD CLERK

HON. KEATHAN BRISCOE FRINK