HENRY LEE JONES

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC2024-1135

HENRY LEE JONES, Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

October 15, 2026

COURIEL, C.J.

We have for review a postconviction court's denial of Henry Lee Jones's initial rule 3.851 motion for relief. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Jones raises four claims on appeal, but we need only address one. In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the State broke that rule when it withheld evidence that was favorable to Jones. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of Jones's motion for postconviction relief, direct that his conviction be set aside, and remand this case for a new trial.

I

Jones was convicted of and sentenced to death for the 2003 murder of Carlos Perez. We affirmed. Jones v. State, 212 So. 3d 321, 325 (Fla. 2017). For purposes of this appeal, we recount the facts in brief.

On August 27, 2003, housekeeping staff at a motel in Melbourne discovered the body of nineteen-year-old Carlos Perez. He had been strangled and stabbed repeatedly in the neck, then rolled up in a comforter.

Jones worked in the same temporary labor pool as Perez. He emerged as a suspect when the detective working Perez's case identified Jones's white Lincoln Town Car as matching one associated with another double homicide. Later, a hair on the motel room carpet was determined to have a mitochondrial DNA profile that matched Jones's. Additionally, footwear impressions from the bathroom floor were determined to be consistent with— and one of them most likely made by—shoes that were found in Jones's car. The manner in which Perez was murdered, specifically the strangulation with deep incised wounds to the neck, was also similar to the manner of three other murders in which Jones was implicated.¹ Mr. and Mrs. James were bound during their murders, and the ligatures were removed after death. Both also suffered a series of cuts to the neck before a deep fatal wound, inflicted from left to right, severing the jugular vein. Mrs. James had cut marks on her vertebrae. Jones was convicted of the first-degree murders of the Jameses in Tennessee state court and sentenced to death.

The State also presented evidence that Jones was the primary and only suspect in the 2002 murder of Keith Gross in Fort Lauderdale. Gross was found face down and legs spread open. His wrists were bound behind his back and his legs were bound. The cause of death was multiple incised wounds to the neck, some of which were so deep they cut into his vertebrae and severed his jugular vein. There was evidence of strangulation and petechial hemorrhaging. There were also severe lacerations of the anus and rectum, which were most likely caused by penetration by a penis or some other object. Jones was never charged with the murder of Gross.

Perez up, tortured him in a sadistic fashion, sexually assaulted him, and murdered him. Expanding on the sexual component of this theory, the State's medical examiner testified as we described the last time we considered this case:

Perez was laid face down, his hands were tied at the wrists, his legs were tied at the ankles, and then the sexual penetration occurred. The ligature was applied to the neck and was tightened and released multiple times. The perpetrator then inflicted multiple superficial, incised wounds to the neck that would have been painful and bled a small amount. The cutting to the neck then got deeper and deeper until finally the neck was slashed and the windpipe, jugular vein, vertebral bone, and muscles were cut.

Jones, 212 So. 3d at 326. The medical examiner testified that Perez's murder was an act of “sadism” done at least in part for “sexual arousal” and “sexual excitement."

DNA from Deborah Williams Bello was found on Perez's penis. Bello, who was married to a man who was incarcerated, lived at the motel where Perez was murdered.

According to Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) conversation logs,² The conversation logs reflect that, in a July 2012 call, Rinck and Dwyer told Garner that they believed Bello's DNA got onto Perez's penis by “secondary transfer from the comforter, since the maids indicated that they often do not wash the comforters and will [switch] them from room to room.” Garner told them, as reflected in the call log notes, that this secondary transfer theory "sounded highly unlikely.”

The call logs also show that, the next month, Garner contacted Detective Rinck again. By this time, both Garner and her supervisor at FDLE, Harry Hopkins, had reviewed the data for the penile swab. Following that review, Garner and Hopkins explained to Rinck that they “both agree that it is highly unlikely that it was secondard [sic] transfer from the comforter in another room to the room where the victim was found to being on the victims [sic] penis. It is more than likely a direct contact of some sort.” communication; the parties to the communication; and a detailed description of the discussion.

The State, which had these FDLE documents over a year before Jones's trial commenced, did not produce them in discovery. Additionally, in April 2013—months after FDLE's “highly unlikely" assessment but still months before Jones's trial-Jones's public defender deposed Detective Rinck. Defense counsel asked Rinck if she ever had any conversations with FDLE about Bello's DNA on Perez's penis. Rinck responded, in part, that “the comforters were not being cleaned." At no point did Rinck give any indication that she spoke with FDLE or that FDLE told her that the secondary transfer theory was highly unlikely.

At Jones's trial, the State advanced the secondary transfer theory. The State elicited the testimony of a motel maid who said that the comforters were not always washed and speculated that “it could be possible” for body fluids from one guest to come into contact with another guest. Next, the State's medical examiner, Dr. Sajid Qaiser, testified that secondary transfer via the comforter was "quite possible.” Detective Johnny Lawson likewise testified that DNA could have ended up on Perez's penis by secondary transfer. The State called Bello and asked whether she knew Perez. She denied ever meeting or seeing him. In its closing argument, the

State attempted to reconcile this testimony with the fact that Bello's DNA was found on Perez's penis by relying on the secondary transfer theory. The State argued to the jury that there was "nothing suspicious” about Bello's DNA on Perez's penis and that it was “entirely explainable" by secondary transfer via an unwashed comforter. The State contended that the secondary transfer theory provided the “innocent explanation” for Bello's DNA on Perez's penis. The State did not call any FDLE analyst to testify on the topic of secondary transfer.

Jones was convicted and sentenced to death. Before the postconviction court, Jones argued that the State withheld the call logs in violation of Brady. The postconviction court found that the State withheld the FDLE call logs containing the analysts' opinions "either willfully or inadvertently.” The court also found that this evidence was “favorable to the defense because it place[d] another person at the hotel with the victim near the time of his death." The court concluded, however, that “the evidence is not exculpatory." The court reasoned, “[i]t is entirely possible that the victim had a sexual encounter with Bello and that the Defendant killed the victim.”

II

The State has a due process obligation, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, to disclose to the defense material exculpatory or impeachment evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Brady and the cases following it reflect “the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.” Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373, 378 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)).

We have said that, to establish that the State has violated its Brady obligation, “the defendant has the burden to show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced." Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d 803, 827 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla. 2017)). “When a Brady violation occurs, a defendant is entitled to a new trial.” Scott v. United States, 890 F. 3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2018).

“In reviewing a Brady claim, ‘this Court defers to the factual findings made by the trial court to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviews de novo the application of those facts to the law.' ” Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 1002, 1028 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Lightbourne v. State, 841 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 2003)).

Here, the State knew that FDLE analysts had concluded that Bello's DNA found on Perez's penis was “highly unlikely” to have been the result of secondary DNA transfer and was rather “more than likely a direct contact of some sort." The State violated the Brady rule when it withheld this evidence, as it would have provided a substantial basis for impeachment of the State's witnesses, and Jones was prejudiced by his not having received it.

A

The State's duty under Brady “extends to impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.” Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869 (2006). Accordingly, the first component of a Brady violation is satisfied where the evidence in question is “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.

The FDLE call logs could have been used to impeach several of the State's witnesses, and to attack the rigor of the State's investigation. For starters, Detective Lawson and Dr. Qaiser both testified that secondary transfer was a viable explanation for Bello's DNA on Perez's penis. The call logs show that FDLE analysts had concluded just the opposite. And after Bello testified that she had never even seen Perez, Jones could have used the call logs— showing that Bello likely had sexual contact with Perez shortly before the murder—to impeach that testimony. The logs could have been coupled with evidence of Bello's marriage to explore Bello's motives for testifying as she did.

More broadly, the logs could have been used to attack the quality and thoroughness of the State's investigation. See Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F. 2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A common trial tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we may consider such use in assessing a possible Brady violation."); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444-45 (evidence could have been used to attack the “thoroughness,” “reliability,” and “good faith of the investigation”).

For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence at issue is of the kind to which the State's Brady obligations attach.

B

The second component of a Brady violation is the State's willful or inadvertent suppression of evidence. Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827. Generally, there is no Brady violation “where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Provenzano v. State, 616 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1993). A trial court's finding as to whether the State disclosed Brady material is a factual finding that will be upheld as long as it is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 911 (Fla. 2000).

The postconviction court found that “[b]ased upon the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, it appears that the State withheld [the FDLE call logs] from the defense, either willfully or inadvertently.” We agree.

The State does not contest this point. And for good reason. At the very least, the call logs show that Rinck—the lead detective on the case—was aware that FDLE analysts concluded the secondary transfer theory was highly unlikely, thus triggering the State's Brady obligations. See Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 378 (explaining that the Brady rule “encompasses evidence ‘known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor'" (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438)). Jones did not have access to the call logs, and as the postconviction court found, the record demonstrates that the State withheld them. Additionally, after Detective Rinck was made aware of FDLE's "highly unlikely” assessment, Jones's counsel deposed her and specifically asked about any conversation with FDLE regarding the penile swab. Not only did Rinck fail to give any indication that FDLE assessed the secondary transfer theory as highly unlikely, her answer, remarking that the maids did not wash the comforters, actually advanced the secondary transfer theory.

The State suppressed the evidence at issue here.

C

Finally, Jones must demonstrate that the suppressed evidence was material. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-82. “To establish materiality or prejudice under Brady, the defendant 'must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial.'” Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827 (omission in original) (quoting Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006)). As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “[a] reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant ‘would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,' only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to ‘undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.'” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434). Upon careful consideration, we find that bar is cleared in this case.

In determining whether “ there is a reasonable probability' that the result of the trial would have been different,” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, courts must consider “the aggregate effect that the withheld evidence would have had if it had been disclosed,” Smith v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 572 F. 3d 1327, 1347 (11th Cir. 2009). In order to determine “the aggregate effect” of the withheld evidence, the court must both “add[] to the weight of the evidence on the defense side" "all of the undisclosed exculpatory evidence” and “subtract[] from the weight of the evidence on the prosecution's side” “the force and effect of all the undisclosed impeachment evidence.” Id.

Here, the undisclosed call logs would have materially enhanced Jones's ability to contest Detective Lawson's and Dr. Qaiser's testimony regarding the secondary transfer theory, upon which the State relied in summation as an innocent explanation for Bello's DNA having arrived on Perez's body.

And as we have said, Jones could have used the call logs to impeach Bello herself—specifically, by examining her testimony that she never met Perez. He could have explored whether and when she had been present in his motel room, whether they had contact elsewhere in the motel, and what she witnessed around the time of the murder. As this Court explained in Jones's direct appeal, the prosecution needed to “prove that Jones was not just with Perez at the Super 8 but that he was the person who actually killed Perez.” Jones, 212 So. 3d at 329. The call logs would have provided a material basis for contesting the State's exclusion of another suspect from the scene. See Hoffman v. State, 800 So. 2d 174, 180 (Fla. 2001) (finding the suppression of hair of a third party found on the victim was material because the defendant could have argued that it was the hair of the actual assailant); see also Rogers, 782 So. 2d at 383 (explaining the manifest importance of evidence implicating third parties). At a minimum, as it pertains to Bello, Jones could have used the call logs to show that Bello was with Perez near the time of the murder and had something to hide.

Finally, to the extent that the perpetrator's sadism or sexual excitement contributed to the State's narration of the events, the suppressed call logs would have been material to Jones's rebuttal of those themes. From its opening statement, the State presented this as a sexually charged crime.³ Qaiser told the jury that the murder was an act of “sadism” done for “sexual arousal.” This testimony might have been subject to substantially different cross-examination had the relevant evidence been disclosed; indeed, the evidence might have changed the entire trial strategy of the State or defense. See Bies v. Sheldon, 775 F. 3d

3. As noted, the State relied on these elements of sadism to link Jones to the murder of Keith Gross.

386, 400 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding undisclosed evidence material because it "would have provided a compelling counter-narrative to the State's theory of the case”); see also Comstock v. Humphries, 786 F. 3d 701, 713 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Evidence that directly undermines the prosecution's theory of the charged crime is plainly material under Brady.” (citation modified)).

Taking these considerations together, while it is true that the State's theory relied heavily—even primarily—on the similarity of this crime to the murders of Clarence and Lillian James, so too did the State advance its secondary transfer theory as a central component of its case. Because the withheld evidence could have been used to draw that theory into question, we cannot say that there is no “reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial." Sheppard, 338 So. 3d at 827. The withheld evidence was material, and Jones was prejudiced.

III

The State's Brady violation requires reversal of the postconviction court's ruling and Jones's conviction. Jones's remaining claims are rendered moot by our decision and so do not require further discussion here. We reverse the denial of Jones's motion for postconviction relief and direct that his conviction be set aside. We remand this case for a new trial.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ. concur. BARRIOS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which TANENBAUM, J., concurs.