DESMOND HALLMAN
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A claim of denial of counsel's presence at sentencing is not a sentencing error cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), and resentencing as a ministerial act does not require the defendant's personal presence.
[1] A claim that a defendant was denied counsel's presence at sentencing does not constitute a sentencing error cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
[2] Resentencing as a ministerial act requires representation by counsel but does not require the defendant's personal presence.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because this correction [and resentencing] is a ministerial act, the defendant shall be represented by counsel but need not be personally present.”
The court cited its prior holding in Hallman v. State, 41 So. 3d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), establishing that personal presence is not required for resentencing proceedings.
Desmond Hallman, proceeding pro se, appealed from a circuit court order in Miami-Dade County, raising for multiple times a claim that he was denied co…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 7, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D26-0581 Lower Tribunal No. F03-5785B
Desmond Hallman, Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Miguel M. de la O, Judge.
Desmond Hallman, in proper person.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Lourdes Bibiana Fernandez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
We affirm on at least two independent bases. First, a claim of denial of counsel's presence at sentencing is not a sentencing error and therefore not cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 574 (Fla. 2008). Second, Hallman has raised this issue multiple times, and this court has been clear that “[b]ecause this correction [and resentencing] is a ministerial act, the defendant shall be represented by counsel but need not be personally present.” Hallman v. State, 41 So. 3d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); see also Hallman v. State, 357 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (affirming per curiam the identical issue regarding entitlement to resentencing because he was not present at 2011 resentencing).
Because this issue has been raised and addressed by this court multiple times, we caution Mr. Hallman that any additional frivolous pro se pleadings related to Lower Tribunal No. F03-5785B may result in the imposition of sanctions, including prohibition of the filing of pleadings in this court absent the signature of a member in good standing of the Florida Bar and the forfeiture of gain time. See O'Haver v. State, 944 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Affirmed.
2
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008)
- Besmon Hallman v. State, 41 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)