DAMIAN GIROUX

v.

JENNIFER GIROUX

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 7, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D25-0648 Lower Tribunal No. 22-2055-FC-04

Damian Giroux, Appellant,

vs.

Jennifer Giroux, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Samantha Ruiz Cohen, Judge.

Law Offices of Ronald L. Giroux, and Ronald L. Giroux, for appellant.

Crabtree & Auslander, LLC, and John G. Crabtree, and Charles M. Auslander and Brian C. Tackenberg, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LINDSEY and MILLER, JJ.

LINDSEY, J.

Appellant Damian Giroux (“Husband”) appeals the final judgment dissolving his marriage to appellee Jennifer Giroux (“Wife”), as well as the subsequent amended final judgment and orders granting Mother's motion for clarification/rehearing but denying Husband's motions for rehearing. Husband argues the final judgment is so cumulatively inequitable on its face that reversal is required. He identifies six issues which he claims contribute to the overall inequitable result: (I) the trial court failed to consider the tax consequences of Husband having to prematurely withdraw funds from one of his retirement accounts to pay Wife's attorney's fees; (IIA) the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife alimony; (IIB) the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife retroactive alimony and child support; (III) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay 75% of Wife's attorney's fees; (IV) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay 90% of the Guardian ad Litem's (“GAL") fees; (V) the trial court abused its discretion by awarding a non-equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets; and (VI) the trial court erred by adopting Wife's proposed rulings on post-judgment motions verbatim without first conducting a hearing or giving Husband an opportunity to object.

We conclude that we lack jurisdiction as to issues I, IIA, III, and IV because they go to the original final judgment rather than the amended final judgment. However, even if we were to reach the merits of those issues, we would affirm because Husband cannot establish reversible error due to the lack of trial transcript. We likewise affirm as to issues IIB and V due to the lack of trial transcript. As to issue VI, we reverse because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing before granting Wife's motion for clarification/rehearing and did not give Husband sufficient time to object to Wife's proposed order on Husband's second motion for rehearing.

BACKGROUND

Husband and Wife married in 2010. They had two children together. Wife petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in 2022. The trial court conducted a 7-day trial before entering the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. There is no transcript on appeal. In the final judgment, the trial court summarized the witness testimony it heard at trial and made the following pertinent findings.

Wife is a nurse and Husband is an FBI agent. During the marriage, Wife stayed home when she was pregnant and after the children were born but otherwise worked part-time. Wife testified that Husband exerted financial control over her during the marriage and subjected her and the children to verbal and emotional abuse. When Wife would ask Husband for money to buy groceries or pay for things like childcare, he would tell her that she needed to wait until her next paycheck. When Wife did not have the money to pay for living expenses herself, she had to borrow funds from her parents or liquidate her 401K account.

During the dissolution of marriage proceedings, Wife learned that Husband had paid off the over $400,000 mortgage on their home and had more than $231,000 in various checking and savings accounts.

The parties attempted to reconcile, conditioned on Husband agreeing to give Wife access to marital funds and permitting Wife to relocate to Virginia if the reconciliation was not successful. The trial court entered an agreed order on temporary support and child support which: (1) gave Wife exclusive use and possession of the marital home; (2) directed Husband to sufficiently fund the parties' joint accounts to pay for certain enumerated expenses; (3) directed Husband to pay Wife $1,000 each month as temporary support; (4) ordered the parties not to remove or prevent one another from accessing marital accounts; (5) permitted Wife to pay her attorney's fees from the joint marital accounts; and (6) stated Husband had agreed that Wife could move to Virginia with the children if their attempt at reconciliation failed.

After several months, the parties' attempt at reconciliation failed. Around that time, Wife used money from a joint bank account to pay her divorce attorney. Husband reported the payment as fraudulent to the bank.

Wife took the children to Virginia to visit family, and Husband cut her off financially. Wife was left without access to marital funds for one year. Wife did not obtain access to marital funds again until Husband was found to be in contempt of court twice.

Wife eventually exercised her ability to permanently relocate to Virginia with the children because she was unable to find full-time employment in Florida, Husband was not paying support or regularly timesharing with the children, and she had an extensive support system in Virginia. When Husband learned of the move, he filed an emergency motion to have Wife return the children to Florida, which the trial court denied. Husband also told the police that Wife had kidnapped the children.

Wife testified that Husband failed to sufficiently fund the marital accounts and pay for expenses he was responsible for under the temporary support order. For example, Husband cancelled the windstorm and flood insurance on the marital residence and stopped paying for Wife's car and car insurance. Husband testified that he did not comply with the temporary support order because he needed to purchase a house in Virginia; he did not own a vehicle with Wife anymore and thus did not need to pay for her vehicle expenses listed in the order; Wife was an adult who could pay for her own car and insurance; he no longer lived in the marital residence so he did not need to pay for expenses related to it despite a court order saying otherwise; and Wife hired her divorce attorney so she should pay the attorney's fees herself.

As to the equitable distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities, the trial court found that Husband did not provide a schedule of assets and liabilities or otherwise present any evidence of a proposed equitable distribution. Accordingly, the trial court adopted Wife's proposed equitable distribution. The trial court awarded Wife: (1) a Bank of America Advantage Plus account valued at $1,082; (2) an HCA 401k with a net value of $1,555; and (3) half of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. The trial court awarded Husband: (1) a Capital One 360 account valued at $7; (2) a Bank of America Advantage Plus account valued at $32; (3) a Bank of America Advantage Plus account valued at $11,177; (4) a Discover Savings account valued at $222; (5) the marital portion of Husband's Thrift Savings Plan valued at $355,919; (6) the marital portion of Husband's Federal Employee Retirement System pension valued at $452,952; (7) half of the net sale proceeds from the sale of the marital residence; (8) the marital portion of Husband's new residence in Virginia, valued at $95,000; and (9) Husband's accrued leave, valued at $14,261.

Wife sought alimony, so the trial court made findings as to each of the statutory factors. Wife's monthly net income was $6,246. Husband's monthly net income was $11,065. The trial court noted that Husband was saving $6,000 each month. In contrast, Wife had to live with her parents because Husband had not been compliant with the agreed order on temporary support and she could not pay her or the minor children's living expenses without alimony. Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that Husband should pay wife durational alimony because Wife had a need for alimony and Husband had the ability to pay. The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,687 in alimony each month for 7.2 years.

The trial court also awarded Wife retroactive child support from the date the parties' attempted reconciliation ended and retroactive alimony from the date Wife moved to Virginia. The court concluded Wife had a need for the retroactive alimony based on the statutory factors and ordered Husband to pay Wife $41,206 from his share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay 90% of the GAL's fees because most of the fees were incurred due to his behavior throughout the proceedings and he had the ability to pay.

As to Wife's request that Husband pay her attorney's fees, the trial court found that Husband's income was more than double Wife's income.

Even after the alimony award, Husband's income was still 20% greater than Wife's income. Additionally, Husband had $476,986 in non-marital assets that he could use to pay attorney's fees. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded Wife had a need and Husband had a superior ability to pay attorney's fees.

The trial court also found that Husband had engaged in a pattern of vexatious and frivolous litigation, including repeated noncompliance with court orders and deliberate nondisclosure of significant marital and nonmarital assets in his sworn financial affidavits. The trial court concluded that it could consider Husband's behavior in determining attorney's fees. In light of its findings, the trial court ordered Husband to pay 100% of the attorney's fees and costs Wife incurred as to certain orders and motions and 75% of Wife's remaining attorney's fees and costs. The trial court gave Husband credits for amounts already paid. The trial court entered its final judgment on December 23, 2024.

Wife moved for clarification or rehearing of the final judgment. First, Wife asked for clarification regarding the equalizer payment included in her proposed equitable distribution, which provided that Husband would pay Wife $491,291 of his portion of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Although the trial court stated that it adopted Wife's equitable distribution schedule, the final judgment did not specifically include language regarding the equalizer payment. Second, Wife identified a scrivener's error where the trial court mistakenly found that Husband had $11,177 in a Bank of America account when the evidence at trial showed that the account had a balance of $101,177.

Third, although the final judgment ordered Husband to pay Wife retroactive child support and alimony from his portion of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, Wife noted that the trial court failed to make an explicit finding that Husband had the ability to pay retroactive support. Wife argued this finding could be implied from the trial court's findings that Husband could pay the retroactive support from the net proceeds of the sale of the marital residence as well as the findings that Husband's non-marital assets were considered in determining whether Husband had the ability to pay alimony and that Husband had a monthly net income of $11,065.00.

Husband also moved for rehearing. He first argued the trial court had failed to consider the tax consequences he faced as a result of having to withdraw $290,672.19 from his Thrift Savings Plan to pay Wife's attorney's fees. Second, Husband argued the trial court failed to consider the lack of testimony supporting its decision to order him to pay 90% of the GAL's fees.

Next, Husband argued that the trial court failed to consider the parties' financial situation after the dissolution proceedings before ordering him to pay Wife's attorney's fees. Finally, Husband argued the trial court failed to adequately explain its calculation of the equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets and failed to consider the fact that its rulings and judgment were unjustifiably punitive toward Husband.

On January 25, 2025, the trial court entered orders denying Husband's motion, granting Wife's motion, and amending the final judgment. In the amended final judgment, the trial court corrected the scrivener's error Wife had identified in her motion and added a finding that Husband would pay Wife a $491,291 equalizer payment as set forth in Wife's equitable distribution schedule. The trial court also added an explicit finding that Husband had the ability to pay retroactive alimony and child support.

Wife subsequently filed a schedule for distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. According to that schedule, Husband would not receive any of the $1,157,172.55 earned from the sale of the marital residence. Additionally, Husband was still required to pay Wife $252,607.92.

Husband moved for rehearing as to the amended final judgment. He argued the amended final judgment incorporated proposed language and findings suggested by Wife even though they were not supported by the evidence. Husband specifically took issue with the trial court's addition of the finding that he had the ability to pay retroactive alimony and child support. Husband further argued that the values in Wife's accountant's equitable distribution schedule were contrived, speculative, inflative, and inaccurate and that the proposed equitable distribution itself was unfair because it disproportionately distributed the marital assets to Wife. Husband also reraised his arguments that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay 75% of Wife's attorney's fees, ordering him to pay 90% of the GAL fees, and failing to consider the tax consequences he faced as a result of having to withdraw funds from his Thrift Savings Plan.

On March 7, 2025, the trial court adopted Wife's proposed order denying Husband's motion as an unauthorized second motion for rehearing that improperly reraised arguments previously rejected in his first motion for rehearing. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS a. We lack jurisdiction to address Husband's arguments directed at the original final judgment.

As a preliminary matter, Wife argues this Court lacks jurisdiction to address Husband's arguments because he did not file his notice of appeal until thirty days after the trial court denied his unauthorized second motion for rehearing. Wife argues Husband's second motion was unauthorized because the amended final judgment did not change the entire basis of the trial court's original final judgment. Wife further argues that, even if the amended final judgment did change the entire basis of the trial court's ruling, Husband's appeal would be limited to the amended portions of the final judgment.

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b) requires a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. However, in cases where a trial court makes a material amendment to a final judgment, the time to file a notice of appeal runs from the date of the amendment rather than the date of the original final judgment. DeGale v. Krongold, Bass & Todd, 773 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

An amendment is material if it disturbs legal rights and obligations that were plainly and properly settled with finality in the prior judgment. Id. at 632 (quoting St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughtry, 249 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1971)). In other words, an amendment to a judgment is material if it changes a matter of substance or resolves a genuine ambiguity. Id. In the event a trial court does make a material amendment to a final judgment, the appellate court's review of the amended final judgment is limited to the amended portions of the judgment. See Fletcher v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Monroe Cnty., 425 So. 3d 749, 750-51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).

In cases where a litigant files an authorized motion for rehearing as to a final judgment, the time to file the notice of appeal runs from when the trial court enters an order denying the motion. See Miller v. Ko, 426 So. 3d 556, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). Litigants are generally not authorized to file a second motion for rehearing. See Matamoros v. Infinity Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 3d 682, 683 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citing Balmoral Condo. Ass’n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149, 1151–52 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)). One exception to this general rule applies when an amendment to a judgment "changes the entire basis of the first ruling.” Id. at 685.

For example, in Matamoros the trial court entered final summary judgment against an insured who had filed a lawsuit against his insurance company. Id. at 683. The trial court's order expressly invited the insured to file a motion for rehearing, which the insured did. Id. The trial court granted the insured's motion and set aside the order granting summary judgment, but sua sponte dismissed the insured's complaint. Id. The insured filed a second motion for rehearing challenging the trial court's decision to dismiss his complaint. Id. at 684.

The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion because it was an unauthorized second motion for rehearing, so the insured petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to adjudicate the motion for rehearing. Id. We granted the petition, concluding that it was not appropriate to treat the insured's motion as an unauthorized second motion for rehearing given the unique procedural posture of the case. Id. at 685. Because the trial court's order veered from the scope and substance of its first order and changed the entire basis of its ruling, the second motion for rehearing was not successive. Id.

Here, the trial court's amended final judgment: (1) corrected a scrivener's error relating to the value of one of the parties' marital assets; (2) explicitly adopted the $491,291 equalizer payment set forth in Wife's equitable distribution schedule; (3) required Husband to directly pay Wife child support on the first of each month until his employer could implement the "Income Withholding Order"; and (4) explicitly found that Husband had the ability to pay retroactive alimony and child support. The first two amendments materially altered the final judgment because they clarified genuine ambiguities and altered Husband's obligations by increasing the value of a marital asset he received in the equitable distribution and obligating him to pay Wife additional money. See DeGale, 773 So. 2d at

632. As a result, Husband was permitted to file a motion for rehearing directed at the amended final judgment. Husband timely filed his notice of appeal twenty-nine days after the trial court denied that motion.

Even though Husband's notice of appeal was timely as to the amended final judgment, our scope of review is limited to those issues that were amended. See Fletcher, 425 So. 3d at 750-51. Husband's arguments under issues I, IIA, III, and IV do not relate to any of the amendments to the final judgment and thus do not fall within our jurisdiction. In contrast, Husband's arguments under issues IIB and V reference the trial court's findings that Husband had the ability to pay retroactive support and needed to pay Wife an equalizer payment. Husband's argument under issue VI challenges the procedure by which the trial court adopted Wife's proposed amended judgment and proposed orders denying his motions for rehearing. Because we agree that there was a material change to the final judgment, issues IIB, V, and VI fall within our jurisdiction and review is appropriate.

b. Husband cannot establish that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to consider the tax consequences he faced as a result of prematurely withdrawing funds from a retirement account.

We review the trial court's determination of equitable distribution for an abuse of discretion. Rivera v. Rivera, 404 So. 3d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). When distributing marital assets, trial courts are generally obligated to consider the tax consequences of the distributions. Sumlin v. Sumlin, 288 So. 3d 763, 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). This ensures that one party is not "charged with the full value of an asset that is burdened with an inevitable payment of taxes.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “a trial court cannot be faulted for not considering tax consequences if counsel for the parties neglect to present evidence on the subject.” Donahue v. Donahue, 398 So. 3d 1052, 1055 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (citation omitted).

Husband argues the trial court erred by failing to consider the tax consequences he faced as a result of having to prematurely withdraw funds from his Thrift Savings Plan to pay Wife's attorney's fees. As previously discussed, we lack jurisdiction to address this issue. However, even if we had jurisdiction we would affirm.

If Husband wanted the trial court to consider tax consequences, Husband needed to provide the trial court with that evidence. See Donahue, 398 So. 3d at 1055. Husband claims he testified regarding the alleged consequences at trial and Wife's accountant did not dispute that testimony. However, there is no reference to tax consequences in the trial court's summary of Husband's testimony. As a result, without a trial transcript, it is not possible to verify Husband's assertions about the contents of his testimony. See Rios v. Quiala, 279 So. 3d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ("Without a record of the trial proceedings, [we] cannot properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence . . . ." (quoting Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979))).

Husband also argues for the first time in his reply brief that the trial court erred by valuing his Thrift Savings Plan at $418,728 in its equitable distribution of the asset because the asset was significantly depleted by that point. Husband waived this argument by failing to raise it in his initial brief. See Raffay v. Longwood House Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 389 So. 3d 589, 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Issues raised for the first time in the reply brief are precluded from our consideration.").

c. Husband cannot establish that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Wife alimony and retroactive alimony and child support.

We review an alimony award for abuse of discretion. See Corrales v. Corrales, 320 So. 3d 217, 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). An award of retroactive alimony or child support is likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Carroll v. Goll, 255 So. 3d 418, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Appellate courts generally will not disturb a trial court's alimony award if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. See Zargari v. Zargari, 416 So. 3d 1172,

1174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025); see also Koscher v. Koscher, 201 So. 3d 736, 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

In determining whether to award alimony, a trial court must make a specific factual determination as to whether the party seeking alimony has an actual need for it and the other party has the ability to pay. § 61.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023). If the trial court determines that one party has a need for alimony and the other party has the ability to pay, the trial court must consider the list of factors provided in section 61.08(3)(a)-(h). Trial courts are granted considerable discretion regarding alimony, and appellate courts are “loathe to second guess the trial court's ruling where . . . the statutory factors were considered." Fichtel v. Fichtel, 141 So. 3d 593, 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). A trial court can award retroactive alimony and child support “when appropriate," but such an award “must be based on the receiving spouse's need for alimony and the paying spouse's ability to pay.” Ponce v. Ponce, 997 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting Alpert v. Alpert, 886 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)).

Here, the trial court awarded Wife durational alimony in the amount of $1,687 per month for 7.2 years. As required by section 61.08, the trial court found that Wife had a need for alimony based on her financial affidavit and determined that Husband had the ability to pay based on his income and the evidence that he was putting $6,000 into savings each month. The trial court also provided findings as to the required statutory factors. Husband does not dispute any of the trial court's factual findings as lacking competent substantial evidence. Instead, he provides a list of facts that he believes best supports his position that the trial court should not have awarded Wife alimony.

We reject Husband's approach because it is not a function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court through the re-evaluation of evidence. See Fichtel, 141 So. 3d at 595. Additionally, even if Husband's position on appeal was that there is a lack of competent substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings, he cannot meet his burden to show reversible error. See Rios, 279 So. 3d at 1246 (quoting Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152).

Husband also argues Wife's financial affidavit inflated her living expenses by providing estimated expenses. However, litigants are permitted to provide estimates of expenses. See Zinovoy v. Zinovoy, 50 So. 3d 763, 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Grable v. Grable, 432 So. 3d 1154, 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). A trial court can make a finding that an estimate is inflated, but there must be evidence supporting that finding. See Zinovoy, 50 So. 3d at 768. Here, Husband does not cite any evidence establishing that Wife's estimated expenses were inflated other than the fact that they were estimates.

As to the trial court's award of retroactive alimony and child support, Husband argues the testimony at trial did not support the conclusion that Husband had the ability to pay retroactive alimony or child support or that Wife had a need for retroactive support. Once again, Husband cannot meet his burden on appeal. See Rios, 279 So. 3d at 1246 (quoting Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152).

d. Husband has not established that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay Wife's attorney's fees.

We review the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Wife for abuse of discretion. Gidwani v. Roberts, 349 So. 3d 917, 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (quoting Bateman v. Serv. Ins. Co., 836 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). An award of attorney's fees generally will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Zargari, 416 So. 3d at 1174.

Section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2022), governs awards of attorney's fees in dissolution of marriage, support, or child custody proceedings. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997). The primary consideration in determining whether to award attorney's fees under section 61.16 is each party's need for suit money versus their ability to pay. Id. However, because proceedings under chapter 61 are in equity and therefore governed by basic rules of fairness as opposed to the strict rule of law, a trial court may also consider "any factor necessary to provide justice and ensure equity between the parties." Id. at 700. Relevant circumstances a court may consider include the scope and history of the litigation, the duration of the litigation, the merits of the parties' respective positions, whether the litigation was brought or maintained primarily to harass, and whether a defense is raised mainly to frustrate or stall. Id.

Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 75% of Wife's attorney's fees because Wife is capable of paying a larger percentage of her attorney's fees and Husband does not have the ability to pay 75% of Wife's fees. Husband further argues the trial court failed to consider the parties' financial situation after the dissolution proceedings in awarding attorney's fees.

The amended final judgment reflects that the trial court found Husband's income to be almost double Wife's income, and, after alimony, Husband's income was still 20% higher than Wife's. The trial court also found that Husband had non-marital assets worth $476,986. Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that Wife had a need for attorney's fees and Husband had the ability to pay. Although the trial court did not expressly state that it was considering the parties' financial situation after the dissolution of marriage proceedings, the trial court effectively took it into consideration by awarding attorney's fees based on factors that would remain the same after the equitable distribution of the marital assets.

Husband also argues that the total sum of Wife's attorney's fees was not reasonable. In making this argument, Husband does not address the trial court's finding that “most, if not all, of [his] legal positions from the inception of the dissolution of marriage proceedings have been factually and legally frivolous and/or untenable.” Nor does Husband address Wife's attorney's testimony that Husband's conduct "significantly contributed to the amount of fees and costs that [were] incurred by the Wife.” Under Rosen, the trial court was permitted to consider Husband's conduct in awarding Wife attorney's fees. 696 So. 2d at 700. We find no abuse of discretion.

e. Husband cannot establish that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay 90% of the GAL's fees.

We review the trial court's determination that Husband should pay 90% of the GAL's fees for an abuse of discretion. Levy v. Levy, 388 So. 3d 932, 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). Husband argues we should reverse the trial court's award because it is “disproportionate and punitive and not supported by the evidence" and not within Husband's ability to pay. Husband further argues there is no testimony supporting the decision to require him to pay 90% of the fees and that the GAL's financial statements show most of the time was allocated to Wife.

The trial court explained that Husband had to pay 90% of the GAL's fees because most of the fees were incurred due to frivolous positions Husband took during the litigation, such as filing an objection to Wife's petition for relocation which caused the GAL to have to fly to Virginia to visit Wife and the children and investigate the proposed new residence and school. The trial court also found that Husband had the ability to pay 90% of the fees. Without a transcript of the trial court proceedings, it is not possible for this Court to review whether these conclusions are supported by competent substantial evidence. See Rios, 279 So. 3d at 1246 (quoting Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152).

f. Husband has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of the parties' marital assets.

We review the trial court's determination of equitable distribution for an abuse of discretion. Rivera, 404 So. 3d at 444. In distributing marital assets and liabilities between the parties, a trial court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution. See § 61.075, Fla. Stat. (2022).

Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to achieve an equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets even though the circumstances did not justify an unequitable distribution. Husband focuses on the fact that he did not receive any of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence but ignores the fact that the final judgment did award him 50% of the proceeds. Husband did not end up receiving any of his share of the proceeds because he owed Wife attorney's fees, forensic accountant fees, an equalizer payment, and reimbursement for certain expenses under the prior temporary support order.

Husband further argues that it is inequitable for him to still owe Wife an equalizer payment of $252,607.92 even though he did not receive any proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Once again, Husband fails to consider the fact that various amounts had to be subtracted from his portion of the sale proceeds and that those amounts were unrelated to the equitable distribution. Husband also fails to consider that the trial court awarded Wife an equalizer payment because Husband received the following marital assets: (1) a Bank of America advantage plus account valued at $101,177, (2) the marital portion of Husband's Thrift Savings Plan valued at $455,919, (3) the marital portion of Husband's Federal Employee Retirement System valued at $452,952, and (4) the marital portion of Husband's new residence valued at $95,000. In contrast, the only major asset Wife received in the equitable distribution was the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. The other assets Wife received were a Bank of America account valued at $1,082 and an HCA 401k valued at $1,555.

Husband argues the trial court erred by relying on the valuations in Wife's accountant's equitable distribution schedule because they were “contrived, speculative, inflated, inaccurate, and blatantly unfair.” Without a record of the trial proceedings, this Court has no way of knowing whether Husband's characterizations are correct. See Rios, 279 So. 3d at 1246 (quoting Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152). Additionally, considering the trial court's finding that Husband failed to provide any evidence supporting a proposed equitable distribution schedule of his own, it is not clear what other evidence the trial court could have relied on.

Finally, Husband argues that Wife's accountant's equitable distribution schedule included an asset that did not belong to him. Husband cites documents in the trial court docket but apparently not in the record on appeal. We cannot review documents that are not included in the record on appeal. Sadeh v. Calenzani, 389 So. 3d 640, 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).

g. The trial court erred in its adoption of Wife's proposed amended judgment and orders.

We review deprivation of due process claims de novo. Thomas v. Cromer, 276 So. 3d 69, 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing A.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 901 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. “A trial court 'provides due process if the complaining party was given notice and an opportunity to be heard." Thomas, 276 So. 3d at 72 (quoting Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Weiler, 227 So. 3d 181, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)). Due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing before granting a motion for rehearing. Id.

It is common for trial courts in marital dissolution proceedings to ask that both parties provide proposed final judgments at the conclusion of the case. Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383, 387 (Fla. 2004). “However, such submissions cannot substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law by the trial judge.” Id. at 389-90. Additionally, the opposing party must have the opportunity to comment or object to the proposed judgment before the trial court adopts it. Id. at 390.

If a trial court's adoption of a proposed final judgment creates the appearance of impropriety, the final judgment will be reversed on appeal. Id.; see also Nat'l Loan Acquisitions Co. v. Tabernacle Christian Ctr. Ministries, Inc., 402 So. 3d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). For example, in Perlow the trial court adopted a lengthy proposed final judgment shortly after closing argument without making any changes to the judgment or allowing the appellant to review or object to the proposed judgment. 875 So. 2d at 385-86. The trial court also did not allow the appellant to submit his own proposed final judgment, nor did it make any of its own findings of fact or conclusions of law on the record. Id. at 385, 387. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the final judgment because the circumstances created an appearance of impropriety. Id. at 389-90.

In this case, Husband argues the trial court erred by adopting Wife's proposed amended judgment, proposed order granting her motion for clarification/rehearing, proposed order denying Husband's first motion for rehearing, and proposed order denying Husband's second motion for rehearing. Husband's argument focuses on the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing before granting Mother's motion and amending the final judgment as well as the insufficient amount of time Husband had to object to the proposed order denying his second motion for rehearing before it was adopted. We agree with Husband and reverse.

As to the trial court's adoption of Wife's proposed amended judgment and proposed order granting her motion for clarification/rehearing, Wife argues Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530(f) does not require a trial court to hold a hearing before granting or denying a motion for rehearing. Although rule 12.530(f) does not require a trial court to hold a hearing before granting a motion for rehearing, due process does. See Thomas, 276 So. 3d at 72. Consequently, the trial court should have held a hearing before granting Wife's motion for clarification/rehearing and adopting the proposed amended judgment.

As to the trial court's adoption of Wife's proposed order denying Husband's second motion for rehearing, the appendix to Husband's reply brief reflects that Wife sent her proposed order to Husband and the trial court sometime around 1:05pm on March 7, 2025. The trial judge signed the proposed order around 1:49pm that same day. With less than one hour before the trial court adopted the proposed order, Husband did not have an opportunity to object to the proposed order before the trial court adopted it. See Perlow, 875 So. 2d at 390.

Wife argues the Supreme Court's holding in Perlow is not relevant here because Perlow involved a final judgment. Although Perlow did involve a proposed final judgment, appellate courts have not limited the application of Perlow to cases involving final judgments. See Nat'l Loan Acquisitions Co., 402 So. 3d at 1035 (reversing trial court's adoption of a proposed sanction order because the circumstances created an appearance of impropriety); Washington v. Persolve Recoveries, LLC, 408 So. 3d 877, 878 (Fla. 2d DCA

2025) (reversing trial court's adoption of proposed order on motion for class certification).

Wife further argues that, even if Perlow is applicable here, there is no reversible error here because the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the trial court used its independent judgment. Wife relies on Tercier v. Univ. of Miami, Inc., 383 So. 3d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). In Tercier, the appellant challenged the trial court's adoption of the appellee's proposed final judgment verbatim within three hours of receiving each party's proposed judgment. 383 So. 3d at 849. We affirmed because: (1) the trial court adopted the appellee's proposed judgment after a 22-minute hearing consisting solely of legal argument; (2) the proposed judgment was only five and a half pages long and was the result of a non-evidentiary hearing; and (3) the trial court's determinations in the judgment were fully supported by the record. Id. at 855. This case is distinguishable from Tercier because there was no hearing on Husband's motion and the trial court did not request proposed orders from both parties. Instead, the trial court in this case adopted Wife's proposed order less than one hour after it was submitted without holding a hearing or otherwise giving Husband an opportunity to object or provide his own proposed order.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction as to Husband's issues I, IIA, III, and IV. See Fletcher, 425 So. 3d at 750-51. Even if we did have jurisdiction as to those issues, we would affirm because Husband cannot establish that the trial court abused its discretion without a trial transcript. See Rios, 279 So. 3d at 1246 (citing Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152). We likewise affirm as to issues IIB and V due to the lack of trial transcript. Id. As to issue VI, we reverse because the trial court granted Wife's motion for rehearing and amended the final judgment without holding a hearing and adopted Wife's proposed order denying Husband's second motion for rehearing without giving Husband an opportunity to object to the proposed order. See Thomas, 276 So. 3d at 72; Perlow, 875 So. 2d at 390.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.