JASON J. GANGA
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 5th DCA | 2026-10-02
No. 2024-2695
Wallis, J., Davis, J., Edwards, J., Soud, J.
2026 FL 13026 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2026)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at resentencing when the trial court has discretion over the sentence imposed, and an oral waiver by counsel does not satisfy the requirement for a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's right to be present at resentencing cannot be waived by counsel's oral announcement but requires a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by the defenda…

[2] A discretionary fine imposed under Florida Statutes section 775.083 is invalid if not orally announced by the trial court at sentencing.

Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“When a trial judge has discretion as to the new sentence, resentencing is not a ministerial act and the defendant's presence is required.”

The court explained the standard for when a defendant's presence is constitutionally required at resentencing.

Facts & Procedural History

Jason Ganga was convicted by jury of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated battery, and shooting into a vehicle. After the State filed a motion t…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

JASON J. GANGA, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Case No. 5D2024-2695 LT Case No. 2023-CF-000758-A

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County. Heidi Davis, Judge.

Hani Demetrious, of The Law Office of Robert David Malove, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

October 2, 2026

WALLIS, J.

Appellant, Jason Ganga, appeals the judgment and sentence that were entered after a jury found him guilty of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated battery, and shooting into a vehicle. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

After trial, the court sentenced Appellant to 30 years in prison on counts 1 and 2 with a 25-year minimum mandatory sentence followed by 5 years probation. It also sentenced him to 159 months in prison on count 3.

The State filed a motion to correct sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1), and requested that the court modify the sentence so that it did not exceed a total of 30 years. The court held a hearing on the matter, but Appellant was not present. Appellant's attorney announced that he would waive Appellant's presence for purposes of the resentencing hearing. The court subsequently issued an Amended Sentence, which sentenced Appellant to 30 years in prison on counts 1 and 2 with a 25-year minimum mandatory and removed the probationary sentence. The court again sentenced Appellant to 159 months in prison on count 3. All sentences were to run concurrent with one another.

Appellant filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Error pursuant to Rule 3.800(b)(2), arguing that the court violated his due process rights when it resentenced him without allowing him to be present at the hearing. The court denied Appellant's motion, finding that Appellant's presence was not required at the resentencing hearing because resentencing was ministerial.

Appellant challenges that ruling on appeal. The State commendably concedes that reversible error occurred below. We agree.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(9) requires the defendant's presence at pronouncement of the judgment and imposition of the sentence, including resentencing. Jordan v. State, 143 So. 3d 335, 338 (Fla. 2014). However, resentencing a defendant in his absence can be harmless error where resentencing only involves a ministerial act. Id. at 339. When a trial judge has discretion as to the new sentence, resentencing is not a ministerial act and the defendant's presence is required. Id. Because the trial court could have imposed any sentence between 25 and 30 years in prison on counts 1 and 2, resentencing was not a ministerial act. See id. Furthermore, nothing in the record established that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to be present at resentencing, even though his attorney orally waived his presence at the hearing. See Darwin v. State, 259 So. 3d 260, 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (reversing and remanding for resentencing where defendant was not present at resentencing and the record did not establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right by the defendant). Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new resentencing hearing at which Appellant is entitled to be present.

In addition, we reverse the $250.00 fine that was imposed pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, because the court did not orally announce that fine at either of the sentencing hearings. A fine imposed pursuant to section 775.083 is discretionary and must be orally announced at sentencing. See Mattice v. State, 393 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). On remand, the court shall also adjust the surcharge associated with the $250.00 fine. In all other respects, we affirm the costs and fees imposed.

REVERSED and REMANDED, With Instructions.

EDWARDS and SOUD, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw