ANTHONY DWAYNE GOSHAY

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT ANTHONY DWAYNE GOSHAY, Appellant, V.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.pbut No. 4D2025-2213 [September 30, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Michael J. Linn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562022CF001577AXXXXX.

Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nathanial LeBlanc, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. LOTT, J.

In 2015, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan said, “we're all textualists now."¹ Through counsel, Appellant, too, is a textualist. He sets forth a sound textualist framework for statutory interpretation in his brief: [C]ourts “follow the supremacy-of-the-text principle.”

Pradaxay v. Kendrick, 387 So. 3d 437, 439 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). “In interpreting the statute, we follow the ‘supremacyof-text principle’—namely, the principle that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla.

2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012)). This mode of interpretation asks what is the plain and ordinary public meaning of the text at the time it was enacted. Department of Children & Families v. J.H., 418 So. 3d 765, 777 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025). “[T]he goal of interpretation is to arrive at a fair reading of the text by determining the application of the text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued. This requires a methodical and consistent approach involving faithful reliance upon the natural or reasonable meanings of language and choosing always a meaning that the text will sensibly bear by the fair use of language.” Ham, 308 So. 3d at 947 (cleaned up). Initial Brief at 14-15.

In this case, Appellant was pulled over for rolling through a stop sign. During the stop, the officer noticed cocaine rocks in a cup in his cupholder. Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine and now appeals. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his dispositive motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the stop was improper. The crux of his argument is that although he did not stop until his car was about halfway over the line, he stopped “at” the line based on the definition of "at."

We review the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress with a mixed standard of review. Lowery v. State, 201 So. 3d 791, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact and review the legal conclusions de novo. Id. “A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct, and on appeal, the evidence from the suppression hearing must be interpreted in a manner most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling.” Id. (quoting Dixon v. State, 72 So. 3d 171, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).

Atwell v. State, 398 So. 3d 459, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). We have reviewed the undisputed video evidence, which shows that appellant slowly approached the stop sign and came to a complete stop with the stop sign at about the midpoint of the vehicle, such that half the vehicle was past the stop sign in the direction of the intersection. Although the stop line is difficult to discern in the video, it appears to be extremely proximate to the sign. No evidence suggests otherwise. Appellant's argument that his actions were legal are as follows: [Section 316.123(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2022)], in relevant part provides: [E]very driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection. § 316.123(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022) (emphasis added). A common dictionary definition of the word “at” is indicating the “presence or occurrence in, on, or near." Initial Brief at 15 (citing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 72 (10th ed. 2000)). Therefore, Appellant argues, because he was at least "near” the stop sign, he met the definition of stopping “at” the stop sign and acted legally.

The problem with Appellant's argument is that statutory interpretation, informed by sound textualist principles as the Florida Supreme Court has instructed, is a much more common-sense exercise than rote application of a particular dictionary definition. Context is key. See Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (“[J]udges must exhaust all the textual and structural clues that bear on the meaning of a disputed text. That is because the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (citation modified). “Adhering to the fair meaning of the text (the textualist's touchstone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text." Scalia and Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West 2012) at 356. “Because common words typically have more than one meaning, you must use the context in which a given word appears [in a dictionary] to determine its aptest, most likely sense.” Id. at 418.

Appellant provides one definition of an extremely commonly used word, "at,” from one dictionary. That is insufficient to conduct a sound contextually-based exercise to discern the best ordinary meaning of “at” as used in section 316.123(2)(a).

A few examples demonstrate why context must be considered apart from the universe of dictionaries. If a runner is told to line up “at” a line, he knows not to cross over and simply be near it (on the far side). If someone is told to stop “at” the front door, they know not to open the door and cross the threshold so as to be somewhere near it (but also through it). The line is a limit, and being “at” a limit doesn't mean over but at least near to the limit.

We need not define the precise bounds of section 316.123(2)(a)'s requirement for where to stop. We need not decide, for example, whether a car stopped such that only the hood ornament has crossed the near plane of the line violates section 316.123(2)(a). We also need not decide whether a car that is “on” the line—that has crossed the near plane of the line but not the far plane of the line—has stopped “at” the line. But we are confident that Appellant's vehicle—which was halfway over the line when it came to a complete stop—did not stop “at” the line. As Appellant acknowledges, the Fifth District has rejected a similar argument. See State v. Daniels, 158 So. 3d 629, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“A stop line protects other motorists and pedestrians only if a vehicle stops when its front bumper reaches that line.”). We agree with Appellant that the Fifth District's reasoning was not particularly persuasive, inasmuch as the court grounded its analysis primarily in legislative intent rather than the text's ordinary meaning. Cf. FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, Ltd., 146 S. Ct. 1546, 1557 (2026) (noting that legislative intent“depends on the fictional premise that hundreds of legislators (not to mention the President) shared a unified private view of how the statute should apply in a contested circumstance. Worse, it violates the fundamental precept that we are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.” (citation modified)). But purpose is an element of context, not to be thrown out the window in sound textual analysis: “Purpose sheds light only on deciding which of various textually permitted meanings should be adopted.” Reading Law at 57. Purpose is an indicia of meaning that “[a] stop line protects other motorists and pedestrians only if a vehicle stops when its front bumper reaches that line. This is particularly true because vehicles vary greatly in length.” Daniels, 158 So. 3d at 631. Likewise, purpose is an indicia of meaning in that "[i]f we construe the statute otherwise, a big rig truck would not violate the statute even if its midsection is straddling the stop line and its tractor is protruding into the intersection.” Id. We find an even more persuasive analysis in the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision in State v. Gibson, 945 N.W. 2d 855 (Minn. 2020). The court looked to a dictionary definition that made more sense in the context of stopping “at” a line: “The term 'at' is defined as 'expressing location or arrival in a particular place or position.” Id. at 858 (quoting Oxford Dictionary of English 99 (2010)). The court reasoned: This dictionary definition aligns with the common usage of the phrase "stop at” in the context of a stop line or a stop sign because stop lines and stop signs are used for controlling traffic. A stop line and a stop sign are signals that specify the precise place, location, or position where a driver must stop a vehicle to maintain a safe and orderly flow of traffic. This definition also aligns with the command that a driver “shall” stop at a stop line or stop sign. This command is not merely a suggestion, but rather a mandatory requirement for traffic control and safety.

Id. The court went on to note that dictionary definitions aside, “[c]ommon usage of the word 'at' in relation to a line or boundary is that, once something completely crosses a line, it is no longer at the line.” Id. at 859. "It simply cannot be said that the popular understanding of ‘at' is such that stopping at a stop line or at a stop sign means that vehicle movement ceases at some point after the stop line or the stop sign." Id. In any event, a majority of jurisdictions have considered the question and agree that “at” a line does not mean “over but nonetheless near to” the line. See, e.g., State v. Tyson, 41 N.E. 3d 450, 455–56 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015), cause dismissed, 2015-Ohio-5225, 144 Ohio St. 3d 1425, 42 N.E. 3d 762 ("[A] motorist must stop his or her vehicle before the front-most portion of the vehicle breaks the plane of the outermost edge of a clearly marked stop line."); People v. Wood, 883 N.E. 2d 620, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“If a vehicle stops 'at' the stop line by straddling it, the line does not mark a definite stopping point; it marks a range of stopping points that varies with the length of a particular vehicle involved.”); United States v. Mack, No. 5:14cr-28, 2014 WL 7140604, at *8 n.6 (D. Vt. Dec. 12, 2014) (noting “courts interpreting similar laws in other jurisdictions have concluded that a vehicle must come to a complete stop before the designated marked stop line"); People v. Binkowski, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 744 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2007) (“[T]he apparent purpose of the statute is to require a vehicle to stop before it is in a position where it could impede or hit pedestrians who could be in a crosswalk, or cross-traffic that could be in an intersection."); State v. Posey, 463 P. 3d 551, 554 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) ("[W]e conclude that the stop-sign provision imposes the same requirement on drivers at stop signs regardless of the marking on the road; vehicles must cease movement before proceeding to the area beyond the stop line, crosswalk, or intersecting roadway.”); but see State v. Drushal, 2014-Ohio- 3088, ¶ 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (“This definition does not indicate that a person must stop 'before' a stop line, in order to properly be ‘at' the stop line.”); Mumper v. State, No. 05-08-00141-CR, 2009 WL 201142, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 29, 2009) (“[S]ince . . appellant stopped with his front tires beyond the marked ‘stop line' but before the crosswalk and there is no basis for the stop apart from the officer's belief that appellant failed to stop at the 'stop line,' the trial court should have granted appellant's motion to suppress.").

While again, we need not delineate the precise boundaries of what it means to stop “at” the line, we think it does not mean “clearly over” the line. Appellant was clearly over the line. The traffic stop was not illegal, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We affirm on all other issues raised without discussion. See, inter alia, Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., and WEISS, MARLON J., Associate Judge, concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.