DANIEL VALIENTE

v.

JEYMI TATIANA ROMERO

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DANIEL VALIENTE, Appellant,

V.

JEYMI TATIANA ROMERO, Appellee.

No. 4D2025-1919

[September 23, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Elaine A. Carbuccia, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062023DR008586AXXXCE.

Courtney D. Hutchison of Hutchison Law, P.A., Naples, and Beshoy Rizk of Rizk Law, PLLC, North Miami, for appellant.

Scott A. Lazar of Koltun Lazar Laleh, Coconut Grove, for appellee.

SHEPHERD, J.

Daniel Valiente (“Former Husband”) appeals the trial court's order granting appellee Jeymi Tatiana Romero's (“Former Wife") motion for enforcement of final judgment of dissolution of marriage and the order denying his motion for rehearing.

Background

Former Husband and Former Wife were divorced by a final judgment of dissolution of marriage in 2024. The final judgment approved and incorporated a marital settlement agreement, which provided, in part:

It is agreed that this Marital Residence shall become the sole and separate property of the Husband and the Wife shall relinquish any and all claims she has to the Marital Residence. The parties agree that the Husband shall pay to the Wife her one-half share of the equity in the marital residence, which the parties agree is $140,000.00.

In the event the Husband fails to give the Wife her share of the equity within 60 days from the execution of this agreement, the parties shall mutually agree upon a licensed realtor within five days and the house shall be listed for sale and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.

In the event through no fault of the Husband, the refinancing is delayed, the Husband may seek one thirty-day extension to complete the transaction. The Husband shall provide the Wife with an update from the lender on the progress of the refinance.

Deed: The Wife shall execute a Quit Claim Deed conveying to the Husband all interest that the Wife has in said Marital Residence upon refinancing of the house and paying her the agreed one-half share of the equity. The Parties agree that from and after this date of execution of this Agreement, through the refinancing closing or sale of the marital residence, the parties shall continue to share equally in the payment of the expenses and liabilities associated with home ownership. The parties shall cooperate with the title company to execute the necessary documents, including a quit claim deed, if necessary, to effectuate the closing. The Husband acknowledges that as of the date of execution of this Agreement, the mortgage is current.

Upon the Petitioner/Wife receiving her portion of $140,000.00, she shall have thirty (30) days to vacate the residence.

Former Husband attempted to refinance the marital residence to pay Former Wife her one-half share of the equity. Unable to do so, the marital residence was sold for $465,000.00. A net surplus of $186,068.03 remained from the sale of the marital residence.

Former Wife moved to enforce the marital settlement agreement, arguing that she was entitled to $140,000.00 of the net proceeds from the sale. Former Husband disagreed, arguing that Former Wife was entitled to half of the net proceeds from the sale. After a hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of Former Wife.

Former Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in interpreting the marital settlement agreement to require him to pay Former Wife $140,000.00, because the marital settlement agreement included two separate and distinct plans: Former Husband could pay Former Wife $140,000.00 for her one-half interest in the marital residence and he would keep the property; alternatively, if Former Husband were unable to refinance the marital residence to secure the necessary funds to pay Former Wife the $140,000.00 within 60 days of the date of execution of the marital settlement agreement, the parties would list the marital residence for sale and the net proceeds of the sale would be divided equally between Former Husband and Former Wife.

Analysis

"The interpretation of the wording and meaning of the marital settlement agreement, as incorporated into the final judgment, is subject to de novo review, for we are in as good a position as the trial court to construe the challenged provisions.” McIlmoil v. McIlmoil, 784 So. 2d 557, 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). As we have explained:

The construction of the terms of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the trial court. As such, an appellate court is on equal footing with the trial court as interpreter of the written document. In the absence of ambiguity, the parties' intent must be discerned from the four corners of the document.

Penn Am. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 710 So. 2d 597, 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (internal citations omitted).

As with any contract, a marital settlement is construed in accordance with its terms:

[w]here the terms of a marital settlement agreement are clear and unambiguous, the parties' intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the document. It is only when a term in a marital settlement agreement is ambiguous or unclear that the trial court may consider extrinsic evidence as well as the parties' interpretation of the contract to explain or clarify the language.

Jones v. Treasure, 984 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Levitt v. Levitt, 699 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)).

“When interpreting a contract, a court should give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms.” Golf Scoring Sys. Unlimited, Inc. v. Remedio, 877 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). “Words should be given their natural meaning or the meaning most commonly understood in relationship to the subject matter and circumstances, and reasonable construction is preferred to one that is unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. C.H.B., Inc., 454 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)). Additionally, “[a] contract is not to be read so as to make one section superfluous, and so ‘[a]ll the various provisions of a contract must be so construed . . . as to give effect to each.” Universal Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 114 So. 3d 1031, 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Univ. of Miami v. Frank, 920 So. 2d 81, 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)).

The trial court erred in interpreting the marital settlement agreement to require Former Husband to pay Former Wife $140,000.00, regardless of whether the martial residence was sold or refinanced. To be sure, the marital settlement agreement includes provisions that could only reasonably apply to a refinancing of the home. The agreement, for example, states, “Upon the Petitioner/Wife receiving her portion of $140,000.00, she shall have thirty (30) days to vacate the residence.” This provision could not reasonably apply to the sale of the home. It conditions Former Wife's obligation to vacate on her receipt of $140,000 from Former Husband and further affords her an additional thirty days to move out. If Former Husband lacked sufficient funds to make that payment, and the proceeds from the sale were also insufficient to satisfy the $140,000 obligation, the provision could delay indefinitely the buyer's ability to take possession of the home. See Herian v. S.E. Bank, N.A., 564 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“An interpretation of a contract which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all of the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect."); see also Katz v. Katz, 666 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“A court must construe a contract in a manner that accords with reason and probability. It should avoid an absurd construction.”); Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A. v. Law Offices of E. Clay Parker, 160 So. 3d 955, 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“The entire contract should be considered and provisions should not be considered in isolation to other provisions in the contract.").

The more reasonable construction is that the provision requiring Former Wife to vacate the residence upon receipt of the $140,000.00 applies only to the first paragraph requiring Former Husband to pay Former Wife her one-half share of the equity in the marital residence, which the parties agreed at the time the marital settlement agreement was executed was $140,000.00. See Seritage SRC Fin., LLC v. Town Ctr. at Boca Raton Trust, 397 So. 3d 44, 46–47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (quoting BKD Twenty-One Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Delsordo, 127 So. 3d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)) (“[W]here one interpretation of a contract would be absurd and another would be consistent with reason and probability, the contract should be interpreted in the rational manner.”).

The trial court's ruling requiring Former Husband to pay Former Wife $140,000.00 in the event of a sale also renders superfluous the following language from the marital settlement agreement:

In the event the Husband fails to give the Wife her share of the equity within 60 days from the execution of this agreement, the parties shall mutually agree upon a licensed realtor within five days and the house shall be listed for sale and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.

(emphasis added).

If the marital settlement agreement contemplated Former Wife would receive $140,000.00 regardless of whether the marital residence was refinanced or sold, the language that the net proceeds from the sale would be divided equally would be meaningless. Because the trial court incorrectly interpreted the marital settlement agreement, we reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court order the net proceeds of the sale divided equally between the parties.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

KLINGENSMITH and LOTT, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.