DEMETRAS BERNELL PARISH
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A law enforcement officer may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop without requiring a particularized basis for believing the driver poses a threat, as officer safety is inherently implicated in all traffic stops.
[1] A law enforcement officer may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop without requiring a particularized basis for believing the driver poses a thre…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an officer making a traffic stop may order [people] to get out of the car pending completion of the stop”
The court cited Maryland v. Wilson for the proposition that no particularized safety concern is required for an exit order during a traffic stop.
Parish was ordered to exit his vehicle during a traffic stop to enable a K-9 search. He was subsequently convicted of possession of a firearm as a con…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
No. 1D2025-3040
DEMETRAS BERNELL PARISH,
Appellant,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. John L. Miller, Judge.
September 23, 2026
LONG, J.
Appellant, Demetras Parish, challenges the denial of the dispositive motion to suppress underlying his convictions and sentences for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession of a controlled substance (two counts), and resisting a law enforcement officer without violence. He argues that the dispositive evidence against him was obtained because he was unlawfully ordered to exit his vehicle during a traffic stop to enable a K-9 search, the lawfulness of which he otherwise concedes.
To support his theory that the exit order was unlawful, Parish cites State v. Creller, 386 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2024), where the Florida Supreme Court held that “a K-9 officer may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop for officer safety reasons."
Creller, 386 So. 3d at 492. Parish focuses on the “for officer safety reasons" language and argues that this condition was not met because the law enforcement officer who ordered him to exit had no particularized basis for thinking that he was a threat.
Parish misreads the “for officer safety reasons" condition discussed in Creller. A law enforcement officer does not need a special reason or an additional particularized basis to order a person to exit his vehicle. See generally id. at 491–95. Rather, without more, “an officer making a traffic stop may order [people] to get out of the car pending completion of the stop." Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997). This is permitted because approaching a person seated inside a vehicle during a traffic stop is dangerous enough that a law enforcement officer always has a "safety reason" to order the person to exit. See Creller, 386 So. 3d at 492 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–11 (1977)). In other words, the “for officer safety reasons" is not a condition that the State needs to prove in every case. Rather, it is the justification for the straightforward rule that a law enforcement officer may order a person out of a car during a traffic stop. The exit order in this case was, therefore, lawful.
AFFIRMED.
ROWE and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1977)
- Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1997)
- State v. Creller, 386 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2024)