JOSE ROBERTO ARREGUIN
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 4th DCA | 2026-09-16
No. 2026-1087
Mullins, J., Forst, J., Shepherd, J., Lott, J.
2026 FL 12089 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2026)

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Holding

A sentence imposing both life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years violates section 775.082(3)(a)4.a., Florida Statutes, and when the sentencing record clearly establishes the court intended to impose life imprisonment, the proper remedy is ministerial removal of the unauthorized mandatory minimum rather than de novo resentencing.


Headnotes

[1] A sentence imposing both life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum term is illegal under section 775.082(3)(a)4.a., Florida Statutes, which authorizes either a life sente…

[2] A rule 3.800(a) motion raising a different sentencing issue not previously adjudicated is not successive and must be considered on the merits, even if a prior rule 3.800(…

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Key Quotes

“Section 775.082(3)(a)4.a. authorizes either a life sentence or a split sentence of at least twenty-five years' imprisonment followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the offender's natural life... does not authorize imposition of both.”

Court's explanation of the statutory authorization and limitation on sentencing options

Facts & Procedural History

Arreguin was convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim under twelve and sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory…

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Opinion of the Court

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOSE ROBERTO ARREGUIN, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

No. 4D2026-1087

[September 16, 2026]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Okeechobee County; Leatha D. Mullins, Judge; L.T. Case No. 472012CF000255CFAXMX.

Jose Roberto Arreguin, Miami, pro se.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

PER CURIAM.

Jose Roberto Arreguin appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), which challenged the legality of his sentence of life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum for lewd or lascivious molestation. He argues that the sentence is illegal under section 775.082(3)(a)4.a., Florida Statutes (2012). The State concedes error. We agree and reverse and remand for correction of the sentence.

Arreguin was convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim under twelve by an offender over eighteen under section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), and sentenced to life imprisonment with a twentyfive-year mandatory minimum.

He previously filed a rule 3.800(a) motion challenging his life sentence as indefinite imprisonment, which was denied. Based on his prior motion, the postconviction court denied the present motion as successive.

Because the present motion raises a different sentencing issue that was not previously adjudicated, it was error to deny the motion as successive. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(2).

Section 775.082(3)(a)4.a. authorizes either a life sentence or a split sentence of at least twenty-five years' imprisonment followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the offender's natural life. In Prentice v. State, 319 So. 3d 57, 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), we held that section 775.082(3)(a)4.a. does not authorize imposition of both. We further held that when the record clearly establishes that the sentencing court intended to impose life imprisonment, the proper remedy is to allow the life sentence to remain and remand for the unauthorized mandatory minimum to be stricken from the written sentence. Id. at 61-62.

The State properly concedes that Arreguin's sentence is illegal. The parties disagree only as to the remedy. Arreguin seeks de novo resentencing, while the State requests ministerial removal of the unauthorized mandatory minimum.

Prentice controls. The sentencing transcript here demonstrates the court's intent to impose a life sentence. Defense counsel requested twentyfive years, the State requested life, and after hearing the competing recommendations, the court imposed life imprisonment. The court added the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum only after confirming with the prosecutor that it applied. As in Prentice, the record establishes that the court intended to impose life imprisonment and erroneously added the mandatory minimum.1

We reverse the order denying Arreguin's motion and remand for ministerial correction of the sentence on count two by striking the unauthorized twenty-five-year mandatory minimum. Arreguin's presence is not required for the correction of his sentence.

Reversed and remanded for ministerial sentence correction.

FORST, SHEPHERD and LOTT, JJ., concur.

* * *

Footnotes
1 Although the improper remarks of prosecutor Donald Richardson during sentencing do not alter our disposition, those remarks have not gone unnoticed.

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