JEAN-PHILIPPE SCHNEIDER
v.
CHRISTIAN TIRIKIAN, ET AL.
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A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify opposing counsel when the motion lacks sufficient grounds under applicable legal principles.
[1] Disqualification of counsel in a civil case is a drastic remedy that must be employed only in limited circumstances, and motions for disqualification are generally viewed…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Motions for disqualification are generally viewed with skepticism because disqualification of counsel impinges on a party's right to employ a lawyer of choice, and such motions are often interposed for tactical purposes.”
The court cited this principle from Alters v. Villoldo to explain the disfavored treatment of disqualification motions.
Schneider, proceeding pro se, appealed an interlocutory order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County denying his motion to disqualify opposing c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed May 21, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D24-2264 Lower Tribunal No. 16-17648-CA-01
Jean-Philippe Schneider, Appellant,
VS.
Christian Tirikian, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lourdes Simon, Judge.
Jean-Philippe Schneider, in proper person.
Paul A. McKenna & Associates, and Paul A. McKenna, for appellees.
Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We deny appellant's motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion, and substitute the following opinion in its stead.
Jean-Philippe Schneider (“Schneider”), pro se, appeals an interlocutory order denying his motion to disqualify opposing counsel. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(E) (authorizing appeals of nonfinal orders that grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel). Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schneider's motion, we affirm. See Stopa v. Cannon, 330 So. 3d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“We review orders on motions to disqualify counsel for an abuse of discretion."); Applied Digit. Sols., Inc. v. Vasa, 941 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“The standard of review for orders entered on motions to disqualify counsel is that of an abuse of discretion. While the trial court's discretion is limited by the applicable legal principles, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the trial court's express or implied findings of fact which are supported by competent substantial evidence."); Gutierrez v. Rubio, 126 So. 3d 320, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ("[D]isqualification of a party's lawyer in a civil case [is] a drastic remedy, one that must be employed only in limited circumstances.”); Alters v. Villoldo, 230 So. 3d 115, 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Motions for disqualification are generally viewed with skepticism because disqualification of counsel impinges on a party's right to employ a lawyer of choice, and such motions are often interposed for tactical purposes.” (quoting Alexander v. Tandem Staffing Sols., Inc., 881 So. 2d 607, 608-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).
Affirmed.