COPART CATASTROPHE RESPONSE FLEET LLC

v.

MIAMI DADE COUNTY

Veronica Sanchez, Assistant County Attorney, and Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, County Attorney, as counsel for Appellee, Miami-Dade County.

Before: TRAWICK, ARECES, R., and DE LA O, JJ.

TRAWICK, J., [*2] This matter is before this Court on an appeal filed by Copart Catastrophe Response Fleet, LLC ("Appellant")¹ to reverse the Final Administrative Orders rendered on May 14, 2025, by the Miami-Dade County Office of Code Enforcement ("Appellee" or "County"). Appellant was issued two citations for failing to display a towing decal ("towing without a license"), in violation of Miami- Dade County Code § 30-462.

This case centers on a legal conflict between a federal statute and a local ordinance. The sole issue before this Court is whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c) preempts § 30-462 of the Miami-Dade County Code ("County Code").

Background

Appellant was issued two citations for towing without a required towing license. The first citation was issued on February², 2023, in connection with the removal of a white 4-door Hyundai SUV at the direction of Farmers Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The second citation was issued on May 17, 2024, following the removal of a 4-door KIA vehicle at the request of Autoland of [*3] America, Inc. Officer Harris² issued both citations to the Appellant for violation of § 30-462 of the County Code for towing without the required towing licenses.

On May 14, 2025, an administrative hearing was held for both citations.

During the hearing the Appellee produced testimony and evidence.³ The hearing officer entered two Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Final Orders") after the hearing and found Appellant liable on both citations. (App. 129-130). Appellant appealed the Final Orders and argued that the County's licensing requirement is preempted by federal law and that the administrative orders were issued in violation of FAAAA. [*4] Analysis In a first-tier appellate review of a final administrative order from a municipal hearing officer, the circuit court functions in its appellate capacity and applies a three-part standard of review and evaluates: (1) whether the County observed the essential requirements of the law; (2) whether the County afforded due process; and (3) whether the decision is supported by competent substantial evidence. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).4 Departure from the Essential Requirements of Law In Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995), the Supreme Court held that "applied the correct law" is synonymous with "observing the essential requirements of law." Further, to warrant relief, there must be "an inherent illegality or irregularity, an abuse of judicial power, an act of judicial tyranny perpetrated with disregard of procedural requirements, resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice." Id. at 527 (citation omitted).

Appellant's main argument is that the Appellee failed to follow the essential requirements of law because the FAAAA, 49 U.S.C.A. § 14501(c)(1), preempts § 30-462 of the County Code.

The FAAAA was codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 14501(c)(1) (hereinafter "§ 14501(c)(1)"), and provides that:

[*5] (1)General Rule. Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property.

(2) Matters not covered.-- Paragraph (1) (A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization;

(Emphasis added).

Appellant argues that there is no statutory exception to preemption that applies and that the safety exception (49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)) does not apply. Appellee, on the other hand, maintains that § 14501(c)(2)(A) contains an "explicit carveout" of the preemption.

In 2003, Article III, Chapter 30 of the County Code was amended to conform with a then recent Supreme Court ruling in the case of City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc. 536 U.S. 424 (2002) (see infra). The amendment was enacted to allow the County to establish towing regulations that were safety related. The intent of the Code amendment was to protect all County consumers. Section 30-4625 of the County Code makes it unlawful for any 5 The above ordinance applies to both consensual and non-consensual towing. It further requires any person or entity who tows or recovers vehicles within the County to obtain a County issued decal license. Among other factors, the regulations set forth insurance levels, vehicle standards, records and trip manifest requirements, criminal background standards for business owners, [*6] company to engage in the business of towing vehicles within the County without first obtaining a license from the Consumer Services Department.

Section 30-462 of the County Code states:

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to recover, tow or remove a vehicle or provide storage in connection therewith or to cause or permit any other person for compensation to recover, tow or remove a vehicle or provide storage in connection therewith, or to advertise or offer to recover, tow or remove a vehicle or provide storage in connection therewith, without first obtaining and maintaining a current and valid license pursuant to the provisions of this article ...

Appellant contends that § 30-462 of the County Code, which requires a local license for all towing activity - including consensual tows - is expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1). Appellant argues that the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous appellate courts have interpreted this provision broadly to preclude local economic regulations that interfere with a motor carrier's ability to provide services. Appellant posits that § 30-462 is a local business licensing ordinance, not a public safety measure. In support of this position, Appellant cites to Tillison v. Gregoire, 424 F. 3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that the safety exception is not applicable because it is an economic regulation disguised as a safety exception. Id. at 1101.6 and requirements governing non-consensual tows, including the Board's establishment of maximum rates. It is interesting to note that the Tillison court found that the State of Washington statute was not preempted by § 14501(c). Therefore, we find no need to address it here. [*7] We disagree with Appellant's interpretation of § 14501(c)(1) as it relates to the code provision at issue here. In City of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court affirmed local government authority to establish towing regulations that are safety related. The Court held that "[s]ection 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to municipalities and other local units the State's authority to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers of property, including tow trucks." Id. at 428.

In Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 341 F. 3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a municipal regulation requiring towing entities to apply for and obtain a permit. The court found that this requirement fell within the public safety exception of § 14501(c)(2)(A). Here, the Court finds that City of Columbus supports a broad interpretation of the safety exception under § 14501(c). This broad interpretation is buttressed by the holding in Galactic Towing, which specifically noted that the challenged sections of the City's towing ordinance were responsive to public safety concerns.

Similar public safety concerns were expressed here when § 30-462 was enacted. The Staff Recommendation of the Consumer Services Department of the County explained their recommendation for approval of § 30-462 as follows:

It is recommended that the Board (of County Commissioners) approve the attached ordinance amendments to Article III of Chapter 30 or the Code of Miami-Dade County (the Towing Ordinance) that effectively reinstate the towing licensing and regulatory program. The amendments, which comply with a recent Federal Supreme Court ruling permitting local [*8] governments to enforce safety-related towing regulations, clarify which Code sections apply to consent versus non-consent towers, eliminate provisions that are not deemed to be safety-related, and conform administrative provisions with those contained in other regulatory programs. (App. 126) (Emphasis added).

Cathy Peel, Assistant Director of the Consumer Services Department, provided an overview of the proposed ordinance. She pointed out the "need for local regulation, noting the state had limited resources to devote to local counties." "Ms. Peel noted that not all tows were police directed, and that the department's goal was to protect all County consumers in consent and nonconsent tows." (App. 114). County Manager Steve Shriver noted that provisions of the ordinance included "insurance levels, criminal background standards, most vehicle standards, and require license numbers to be included in advertisements.” (App. 130).

Given our conclusion that a broad interpretation of the safety exception under § 14501(c) is appropriate, we find that there was no departure from the essential requirements of the law. We specifically find that § 14501(c)(2)(A) – the Towing Safety Exception - does not preempt § 30-462 of the County Code.

This Appeal is denied in all other respects.

Consistent with the foregoing findings, the Court affirms the decision of the Hearing Officer. ARECES, R. AND DE LA O, JJ., CONCUR. COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.