MIAMI-DADE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES
v.
ALL CAR CENTERS ENTERPRISES, INC
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Miami-Dade County Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources appealed an administrative hearing officer's decision regarding two civil violation citations issued to a motor vehicle repair shop. The appellate court quashed the hearing officer's decision due to due process violations and departures from essential requirements of law, including bias, unprofessional conduct, and a contradictory ruling that did not align with the evidence presented.
The appellate court held that the hearing officer violated due process by displaying bias and partiality, making unprofessional statements, and attempting to compromise by making "everybody a winner" rather than basing decisions on evidence. The court also held that the hearing officer departed from the essential requirements of law by misinterpreting the Motor Vehicle Repair Ordinance's inspection requirements and issuing a written decision contradicting his own verbal ruling.
[1] A hearing officer's impartiality is compromised when they express personal animosity towards attorneys or parties, or base decisions on personal experiences outside the e…
[2] A hearing officer's decision must be based on evidence submitted at the hearing and cannot rely on information outside the record.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To afford due process to a party to a quasi-judicial hearing, the quasi-judicial decision must be based on evidence submitted at the hearing. Hearing officers cannot base their decision on information that they may be privy to which is outside of the record.”
Establishes the fundamental due process requirement that administrative decisions be based solely on evidence presented at the hearing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCounty enforcement officers inspected All Car Centers Enterprises to ensure compliance with the Motor Vehicle Repair Ordinance. The shop owner's emplo…
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TRAWICK, J.
On January 27, 2022, County Enforcement Officer Max Freiria visited Appellee's motor vehicle repair shop to conduct an inspection pursuant to Miami-Dade County's Motor Vehicle Repair Ordinance, Miami-Dade County Code, Chapter 8A, Article VIIA. Freiria was accompanied by Louis Gonzalez, an enforcement officer in training. The purpose of the inspection was to ensure that vehicle repair was being conducted within the scope of the shop's license. When Officer Freiria spoke to a shop employee, Alexander Goin, Goin would not allow access to the shop's work area to view the automobiles being repaired. The officers were only allowed access to the office of the shop, but the shop employee would not provide any records of the vehicles in the shop. When Freiria asked Goin to see the shop's licenses, Goin pointed to all of the licenses on the wall of the shop.
Rather than allow the officers to conduct an inspection, Goin called the shop owner, Luis Arboleda, who was driving to the shop and who said he was 15 minutes away. When Goin asked the officers to wait for the owner, Freiria replied that the owner did not Page 2 of 10 [*3] have to be present for an inspection of the shop, and that the inspection would not be performed over the telephone. Because Freiria was not able to access the work area, he issued Appellee the Inspection Citation, Civil Violation Notice No. H007991, for violating County Code section 8A-171(a).
Licensing and Advertising Citation
In August of 2021, Arboleda completed an application for motor vehicle repair business registration on behalf of All Car Centers for the following repair categories: engine repair, automatic transmission, oil change, tire installation, and alarm/radio installation. The County issued licenses through August of 2022 for automatic transmission, engine repair, muffler installation, and oil changes. The shop was not licensed to provide brake services, alignment services, or electrical work.
Freira photographed a sign hanging above the garage at the front of the shop advertising oil changes, tires, brakes, auto repair, auto accessories, wheels, alignment, and electrical work. Arboleda admitted that licenses for brake services, alignment services, and electrical work were expired at the time of the inspection. He said that he was in the process of renewing them, but was side-tracked Page 3 of 10 [*4] by a COVID-related hospitalization. Freiria determined that the shop was advertising beyond the scope of its licenses, in violation of County Code section 8A-161.6, and as a result issued the Licensing/Advertising Citation, Civil Violation Notice No. H007992.
Administrative Hearing
Appellee appealed the citations, and an administrative hearing was held before Hearing Officer Fernando Rodriguez ("the HO") on July 20, 2022. Officers Freiria and Gonzalez testified as representatives of the County Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources ("the Department"). Arboleda testified on behalf of the Appellee. At the conclusion of the hearing, the HO announced his rulings. As to the inspection citation, he stated:
Two things that I did not like, that, you know, going into the shop, getting into the office and this and that. I think I think his business is a business for the County. They pay taxes. They pay their licenses and this and that. So I think the County overstepped their authority by doing what they did, so therefore, he's not guilty.
The HO appeared initially to find Appellee not guilty on the Licensing/Advertising Citation as well, but when the Department's representative asked a question about that, the HO reversed himself:
Page 4 of 10 [*5] ... I'll tell you what, let's do this, Mr. Arbolela, this is what I'm - I'm going to change my ruling. The H007991, he's guilty. And 7992, he's not guilty. How's that? Keep everybody happy. Is that okay with you? The licensing, the licensing, you're not a 100 you're not 100% with the licensing, but the other stuff, I did not like their - and it's been done to me before by inspectors, so that's why I'm ruling for you, but the 991, your licensing is a little bit questionable. So let's leave it at that, and I think everybody is a winner here, okay?
In sum, the verbal rulings of the HO were that Appellee was not guilty of the Inspection Citation and guilty of the Licensing/Advertising Citation. Yet the HO told the clerk to affirm 7991 (the Inspection Citation) and reverse 7992 (the Licensing/Advertising Citation), the opposite of his verbal rulings. He did so even after the Department sought to correct his misstatements. The Department appeals the decision of the HO.
Standard of Review
A circuit court reviewing the final decision of an administrative hearing officer must determine: (1) whether due process was accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed, and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent, substantial evidence. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995).
Page 5 of 10 [*6] Due Process Concerns Here, the Appellant contends that the Department was not accorded due process because of statements made by the HO indicating that he was not neutral. The Department argues that the HO was predisposed to rule against the Department by making these types of declarations:
1. Before the Appellant had a chance to cross-examine
Arboleda, the HO told Arboleda, "I've heard enough. I'm on your side."
2. The HO indicated that he ruled on the inspection citation in the Appellee's favor based on his own negative experience with County enforcement officers:
You're not 100% with the licensing, but the other stuff, I did not like their - and it's been done to me before by inspectors, so that's why I'm ruling for you ..."
To afford due process to a party to a quasi-judicial hearing, the quasi-judicial decision must be based on evidence submitted at the hearing. Miami-Dade Cty. v. City of Miami, 315 So. 3d 115, 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Hearing officers cannot base their decision on information that they may be privy to which is outside of the record.
Page 6 of 10 [*7] Id. Even if these comments are given a benign interpretation, and the HO was just trying to assist a pro se litigant, it still departs from an appearance of neutrality. Marwan v. Sahmoud, 306 So. 3d 248, 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).
We also conclude that the Department was not afforded due process because the HO opted for a "split-the-baby" approach, affirming one citation and reversing the other, rather than basing his decision regarding each citation on the evidence before him:
The H007991, he's guilty. And 7992, he's not guilty. How's that? Keep everybody happy. Is that okay with you? So let's leave it at that, and I think everybody is a winner here, okay?
The HO's attempt to make "everybody a winner" is not proper if such a decision is not supported by the evidence on the record. Miami-Dade Cty. v. City of Miami, 315 So. 3d at 126.
Finally, the Department contends it was denied due process when the HO outwardly expressed animosity towards the Department's representative because she was a female attorney. At one point, he said:
You're an attorney? I don't like attorneys, okay? I do not like attorneys. I know that.
Page 7 of 10 [*8] He later referred to her derisively as "Ms. Lawyer Lady." Such statements were uncalled for and unprofessional, reflecting poorly on the HO. In sum, we conclude that the HO's partiality and unprofessional conduct deprived the Appellant of its right to due process.
Departures from the Essential Requirements of Law We also find that the HO's decision departs from the essential requirements of the law. A decision departs from the essential requirements of law "when it amounts to 'a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.'" Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) (citations omitted). Also, a failure to apply the unambiguous language of a statute is a departure from the essential requirements of law. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Chakrin, 304 So. 3d 822, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). Here, the HO operated under the incorrect assumption that because the enforcement officers could see the rear ends or undersides of the vehicles in the work area from the open garage doors, that was enough for an inspection. Indeed, the HO stated that the officers had "overstepped their authority by doing what they did."
Page 8 of 10 [*9] Contrary to the HO's conclusion, the Motor Vehicle Repair Ordinance provides that the premises of all motor vehicle repair shops shall be open for inspection for any purpose necessary for the enforcement and administration of the ordinance. Miami-Dade County Code § 8A-161.7(a). Freiria testified about the importance of inspecting the vehicles under repair to verify the type of repair, the work being done, and to ensure that the repairs match the records for each vehicle. Therefore, the HO erred in believing that the inspections were complete, thus departing from the essential requirements of law.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the HO verbally ruled that Appellee was guilty of the licensing/advertising citation, but not guilty on the inspection citation. But the written decision, as directed by the HO to the Clerk, states the opposite. This juxtaposition also departs from the essential requirements of the law.
Conclusion
As the Appellant was denied due process and the HO's decision departed from the essential requirements of the law, we Page 9 of 10 [*10] quash the decision of the HO and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WALSH and SANTOVENIA, J.J., concur. Page 10 of 10
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Leila Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)
- Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2003)
- City OF Miami v. Santos, 315 So. 3d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
- Gamal Marwan v. Geilan Sahmoud, 306 So. 3d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)