GEICO GENERAL

v.

LORETHA MATHIS

Page 1 of 5 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME

EXPIRES FOR FILING MOTION

FOR REHEARING

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE

COUNTY, FLORIDA

APPELLATE DIVISION

CASE NO. 2020-102-AP-01

L.T. Case No.: 2017-7940 CC 04

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE

COMPANY, a Florida Corporation,

Appellant,

v. LORETA MATHIS, Appellee. _____________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Opinion filed: June 10, 2020 An Appeal from County Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, Hon. Diana Gonzalez-Whyte, Judge Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Giancarlo Nicolosi, Jorge I. Gonzalez, Jr., and Lissette Gonzalez, for Appellant Fowler White Burnett, P.A., Ashley N. Flynn, and Bruno Renda, for Appellee.

Before: TRAWICK, WALSH and SANTOVENIA, JJ.

Filing # 108670370 E-Filed 06/10/2020 02:30:38 GEICO filed a notice of non-final appeal, pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xii), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although not raised by the parties, “[a]n appellate court has an independent duty to determine whether it has appellate jurisdiction and is not bound by the trial court's caption or the parties' characterization of an order.” Medeiros v. Firth, 200 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), citing Almacenes El Globo De Quito, S.A. v. Dalbeta L.C., 181 So. 3d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). This Court issued an order to show cause to the Appellant as to why this case should not be dismissed. This Court has reviewed both the Appellants’ and Appellee’s responses. Because the order on appeal is neither an appealable non-final order nor a final order, this appeal must be dismissed. Jurisdiction to hear nonfinal appeals in the district courts of appeals is governed by Rule 9.130. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. [*3] Page 3 of 5 Const.; Rule 9.130(a)(1), Fla. R. App. P. However, jurisdiction to hear appeals from nonfinal orders in the circuit courts is governed by general law. See Art. V, § 5, Fla. Const. (“The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts, and jurisdiction of appeals when provided by general law”); Blore v. Fierro, 636 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1994) (“The authority for appeals to the circuit court is established solely by general law as enacted by the legislature”). Here, no statute authorizes an appeal from an order denying a motion to enforce settlement, and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed until such time as the lower court enters an appealable final order. See Padovano, P., Florida Appellate Practice § 5:3 (2019 ed.); 911 Dry Solutions, Inc. v. Florida Family Insurance Company, 259 So. 3d 167, 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (where Legislature has not enacted law authorizing appeal from order compelling appraisal, appeal from county court to circuit court was properly dismissed); Shell v. Foulkes, 19 So. 3d 438, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (Appeal of county court order of default in eviction action properly dismissed); State v. Sowers, 763 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (no circuit court jurisdiction to hear appeal of order in limine). GEICO argues that because section 26.012 does not distinguish between final and non-final appeals, that all nonfinal appeals are therefore authorized. This argument is refuted by the above authorities. [*4] Page 4 of 5 Nor is the trial court’s order a final order or judgment, which would be appealable under section 59.06, Florida Statutes. “Florida's test of finality for appellate purposes is well established: the order constitutes the end of judicial labor in the trial court, and nothing further remains to be done to terminate the dispute between the parties.” Bloomgarden v. Mandel, 154 So. 3d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), citing Miami–Dade Water and Sewer Auth. v. Metro. Dade County, 469 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Clearly, judicial labor is not at an end – the case below remains pending. And again, Rules 9.110 and 9.130(a)(4) do not establish the jurisdiction of this Court to hear such an appeal – only the Florida Statutes may authorize circuit court appellate jurisdiction. Nor is the trial court’s order reviewable by certiorari, because there was no departure from the essential requirements of law resulting in irreparable harm. See Pannell v. Triangle/Oaks Ltd. Partnership, 783 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); citing Rodriguez v. Young America Corp., 717 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing numerous cases). The trial court’s order merely denied a motion to enforce settlement -- the case remains pending. There was no error for which GEICO cannot seek redress through plenary appeal if and when a final judgment is secured against it. The fact that GEICO will be forced to litigate this case does not constitute the type of irreparable harm which would authorize the writ. See, e.g., AVCO Corp. v. Neff, 30 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (because the error complained of may be [*5] Page 5 of 5 addressed on plenary appeal, the trial court’s order denying summary judgment did not cause irreparable harm). We therefore dismiss this appeal because an order which denies a motion to enforce settlement is not an appealable order. Appeal DISMISSED. TRAWICK, WALSH and SANTOVENIA, JJ., concur. COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.