ROBENSON ANTOINE

v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY

Mr. Antoine's petition for writ of certiorari seeks to quash the Miami-Dade County Mayor's decision to reject a hearing examiner's recommendation that his ten day suspension from employment be rescinded; thereby sustaining the suspension imposed by the Miami-Dade County Department of Transportation and [*1] Public Works. We deny the petition, because we find that the County Mayor's decision is not a departure from the essential requirements of the law, and is supported by competent substantial evidence.

On October 4, 2017, Robenson Antoine was a train operator employed by the Miami-Dade County Department of Transportation and Public Works. That day, he operated a rail train that derailed. The Department imposed a ten day suspension on Mr. Antoine under Article II, Section 2-47 of the County Code of Ordinances. The relevant portion of that provision provides:

Any employee may be suspended or reduced in grade or dismissed by the head of his department or designee thereof as approved in the manner provided for in an administrative order for any cause which will promote the efficiency of the service.

Any employee who has completed the probationary period may appeal the action to a hearing examiner....

The hearing examiner shall conduct a hearing after notice upon the charges and shall transmit his findings of facts, conclusions, and any recommendations together with a transcript of all evidence taken before him and all exhibits received by him, to the Manager¹ who N 1 In 2012, the Code essentially substituted the County Mayor for the County Manager for all delegations of "authority, power, and responsibility . . . ." Sec. 1-4.4. - Transfer of Delegated Authority from the County Manager to the County Mayor. Commencing with the elimination of the County Manager as a Miami- Dade County Home Rule Charter County officer on November 20, 2012, all delegations of Board authority, power and responsibility to the County Manager provided in enactments of this Board including, but not limited to, ordinances, resolutions, implementing orders, [*2] may sustain, reverse or modify the suspension, reduction in grade, or the dismissal.

(emphasis added).

The facts section of the Department's Disciplinary Action Report provided as follows:

On Wednesday October 4, 2017, at approximately 1:29 pm. Train Operator Robenson Antoine was operating rail cars 189-191 a four car train which was out of service, traveling to yard limits. Operator Antoine was given permission from the Rail Traffic Controller at Central Control to pass Signal OKE #18 on a red signal after verifying the switch positions for proper alignment for a route from Track#2 to Palmetto Yard Limits. Operator Antoine repeated instructions and proceeded to Yard Limits, white traveling over Switch #9 the front truck of rail car #189 derailed Causing damages to the power rail and the current collector on the front truck of rail car #189.

Train Operator Robenson Antoine failed to verify proper track alignments after he was given permission to pass OKE Signal#18 on a red signal causing damages and passenger service delays.

Train Operator Antoine actions violates Miami Dade County Personnel Rules and Miami-Dade Transit Working Procedures.

(emphasis added). As a result, the Department suspended Mr. Antoine for 10 days. Under section 2-47 he appealed the Department's action to a hearing examiner. regulations, rules, and provisions of the Code of Miami-Dade County are hereby delegated to the County Mayor or the County Mayor's designee. All references in enactments of this Board including, but not limited to, ordinances, resolutions, implementing orders, regulations, rules, and provisions of the Code of Miami-Dade County relating to the County Manager shall be deemed to be references to the County Mayor or the County Mayor's designee. [*3] The hearing examiner held an appeal hearing on October 30, 2018. Unfortunately, the hearing examiner's Recommendation didn't have anything called "findings of fact." It has an "Introduction," an "Analysis," a "Conclusion," and a "Recommendation." The Introduction is essentially a recitation of the procedural history of the case and the allegations of the Disciplinary Action Report. The Analysis is a summary of the testimony and the parties competing contentions. The Recommendation rescinds the ten day suspension. The hearing examiner's Conclusion provides as follows:

1. Central Control knew of existing problems in the area and yet allowed an operator to proceed on his own, through red signals, without first determining and fixing the cause of the track "being out of correspondence."
2. The pictures of track configurations submitted by the County were not taken just before the incident in question.
3. The evidence supported the claimant's confusion [sic] contributed by the nature of Central Control's communication and his experience is [sic] dealing with the normal switches, signs, and signals.
4. The evidence depicted the complexity in determining the correct alignment of the peculiar movable frog switch. 4[sic]. Although the claimant's seniority is 19 years with the County, without any disciplinary action, he was a Train Operator for only one year. Testimony from Supv. Salvarrey supported the fact that the claimant was not sufficiently trained and knowledgeable with the frog switch situation.

(emphasis added).

The Mayor rejected the hearing examiner's recommendation, and sustained the ten day disciplinary suspension imposed by the Department. The Mayor's January 15, 2019 final decision provides in pertinent part: [*4] I have reviewed the findings, recommendation, and the entire record from the appeal hearing of the Hearing Examiner in the matter of your ten (10) day suspension that was imposed by the Department of Transportation and Public Works (DTPW).

I accept the Hearing Examiner's findings in this case; however, I cannot agree with his conclusion or recommendation. The Hearing Examiner acknowledged the undisputed facts that you were operating a rail train that derailed. The Hearing Examiner found that there was evidence that you were confused in determining the correct alignment of the switching mechanism at Switch #9. I accept the Hearing Examiner's findings and the undisputed facts that you were operating a train that derailed because of Switch #9. I do not accept the Hearing Examiner's conclusion and recommendation that you should be excused from operating a train that derailed because of an asserted lack of training, communications with Central Control or any other excuses. A fundamental responsibility of a train operator is to operate the train safely and keep the train on track so that it does not derail. I do not accept these excuses for your failure to keep the train you were operating on track. Your failure to keep the train you were operating on track violated the rules with which you were charged, including your failure to maintain a constant lookout for unsafe conditions, and your failure to take the safest course of action when confronted with uncertain situations. Therefore, I reject the recommendation of the Hearing Examiner and hereby sustain the 10-day disciplinary suspension imposed by the Department on March 28, 2018.

(emphasis added).

Mr. Antoine now petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to quash the Mayor's decision to reject the hearing examiner's recommendation that his ten day suspension be rescinded.

I.

Mr. Antoine argues that the Mayor's decision is a departure from the essential requirements of law. He argues that our standard of review is the [*5] familiar inquiry as to whether the lower tribunal (1) afforded due process; (2) departed from the essential requirements of the law; and (3) issued a decision supported by competent substantial evidence. The key to his argument, however, is as follows as set forth in his petition:

In considering the case, the relevant inquiry is whether the Hearing Examiner's determinations are supported by competent substantial evidence, not whether the Mayor's decision is supported by competent substantial evidence. While the Mayor may disagree with the Hearing Examiner's conclusions, he is nevertheless bound by them if competent substantial evidence exists in the record to support them.

(Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 4).

In Raghunandan v. Miami-Dade County, 777 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the court approved the County Manager's rejection of the hearing examiner's conclusion that the employee was not incompetent or inefficient. In so doing, the Third District embraced the analysis of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Schrimsher v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 694 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). As described by the Raghunandan Court, in Schrimsher:

[T]he School Board properly rejected the hearing officer's interpretation of facts regarding Schrimsher's behavior and actions, concluding that the issue of whether his actions constituted misconduct or incompetence sufficient to warrant discharge was a matter of opinion infused by policy considerations for which the agency has special responsibility.

Raghunandan v. Miami-Dade County, 777 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). [*6] In this case, the Department contended that Mr. Antoine was negligent in "not verifying that his track was not clear to proceed." (Hrg. Examiner Recommendation at 2). Mr. Antoine contended that the County did not properly and sufficiently train him to determine proper track alignment. The hearing examiner concluded that Mr. Antoine's "confusion" was "contributed by" Central Control's communications and his lack of experience and training with this switch. In sum, the hearing examiner couldn't help but conclude that Mr. Antoine was "confused" when he failed to visually verify proper track alignment; but the examiner excused that confusion – and ultimately the conclusion that Mr. Antoine was negligent - by blaming it on the Department's lack of training and Central Control's communication. Under Raghunandan and Schrimsher, the Mayor was free to disregard the hearing examiner's conclusion that Mr. Antoine was not negligent or, alternatively, that his negligence was the fault of the Department. See also Miami-Dade County v. Jones, 778 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (reversing circuit appellate division and concluding Public Health Trust President had discretion to ignore mitigating factors and reject excuses for misconduct).

In Raghunandan, the hearing examiner found that the section which the employee supervised was "out of control," but nevertheless concluded that the County hadn't proved that he was "incompetent" or "inefficient." The Manager rejected those conclusions, and imposed disciplinary sanctions. This Court [*7] affirmed that determination. On second tier certiorari, the Third District Court of Appeal denied the petition, based on the same analysis in Schrimsher. The Schrimsher Court, citing an earlier decision, recognized the "conundrum" faced by reviewing courts "in attempting to give deference to agency findings of fact supported by competent substantial evidence yet, at the same time, ascertain whether the agency accorded the same respect to the hearing officer's findings." Schrimsher v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County, 694 So. 2d 856, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). In resolving this issue, the Court relied on, and quoted extensively from, a First District Court of Appeal opinion, McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

[C]ourts . . . must review the entire record, including the hearing officer's findings. . . .

The weight which should be given to the hearing officer's findings, as opposed to the agency's substituted findings, will depend greatly upon the nature of the hearing officer's inquiry and the bases for his findings of fact.

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the agency's substituted findings of fact, a reviewing court will naturally accord greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings when the question is simply the weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise susceptible of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not rightfully claim special insight....

At the other end of the scale, where the ultimate facts are increasingly matters of opinion and opinions are increasingly infused by policy considerations for which the agency has special responsibility, a reviewing court will give correspondingly less weight to the hearing officer's findings in determining the [*8] substantiality of evidence supporting the agency's substituted findings....

Thus, the substantiality of evidence supporting an agency's substituted finding of fact depends on a number of variables: how susceptible is the factual issue to resolution by credible witnesses and other evidence, how substantially the hearing officer's discarded findings are supported by such evidence, how far the factual issue tends to be one of opinion, how completely agency policy occupies a field otherwise open to different opinion.

Schrimsher v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County, 694 So. 2d 856, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (emphasis added).

In this case, the hearing examiner didn't expressly make "findings of fact." In his "Conclusion," he noted the complexity in determining proper track alignment for the "frog switch" at issue. He also noted that Mr. Antoine was not sufficiently trained and knowledgeable with the "frog switch situation." And, as set forth above, he concluded that Mr. Antoine's "confusion" was contributed by the Department's failures.

Whether Mr. Antoine was negligent in failing to verify track alignment, and whether that failure was the fault of the Department, are plainly "ultimate facts" which are "matters of opinion" that are "infused by policy considerations for which the Department and the County have special responsibility." In reviewing the entire record of the proceedings, including the examiner's findings, we conclude that Mayor's decision is supported by competent substantial evidence. In his [*9] closing argument before the hearing examiner, Mr. Antoine's representative described the evidence as follows:

MR. WRIGHT: Well, it is obvious that the switch was misaligned and what Mr. Antoine didn't do, did not do in this case was to read the switch. However, that being said, also, this case was just about training.

(Tr. of Hr'g of 10/30/18 at 171) (emphasis added).

Plainly, the hearing examiner's "conclusions" in this case were really matters of opinion. They were not classic findings of fact which depended on the weight or credibility of witness testimony, such as eyewitness identification or "who-said-what-to-whom." Under Raghunandan, Schrimsher, and McDonald, we find that the Mayor's decision properly rejected the examiner's "interpretation of facts," and is supported by competent substantial evidence, and conforms to the essential requirements of the law. As a result, we deny the Petition.

II.

Even if the Mayor's rationale is incorrect, it will be allowed to stand if there is any basis in the record to support his decision to sustain the ten day suspension.

It is elementary that the theories or reasons assigned by the lower court as its basis for the order or judgment appealed from, although sometimes helpful, are not in any way controlling on appeal and the Appellate Court will make its own determination as to the correctness of the decision of the lower court, regardless of the reasons or theories assigned therefor.... Stated another way, if a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record. [*10] Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In this case, the Mayor's decision to sustain the suspension complies with the plain language of Article 11, Section 2-47 of the County Code. As highlighted and excerpted above, a County employee may be suspended for "any cause which will promote the efficiency of the service." There's plenty of evidence in the record to support the determination that the County's suspension of Mr. Antoine was for a cause which will promote the efficiency of the train service.

Moreover, the plain language of section 2-47 places no constraints on the Mayor - after having received everything from the hearing examiner - "who may sustain . . . the dismissal." The actions by the Department and the Mayor in this case comply with the plain language of the applicable code provision and thus cannot be a departure from the law's requirements and are supported by competent substantial evidence.

For all of these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied.

TRAWICK AND WALSH, JJ., concur. Copies furnished to all parties