ANGEL DIAZ MIRANDA
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

11th Cir. Ct. App. Div. | 2020-08-13
No. 2019-186-AC-01
1 FLCA 6959 Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, Appellate Division (2020)

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Synopsis

Angel Diaz Miranda appeals his conviction for driving without a valid driver's license, arguing that his statements to police following a motorcycle accident should have been excluded under Florida's accident report privilege. The court found error in admitting the statements but affirmed the conviction because Miranda's own trial testimony admitted all elements of the offense, rendering any evidentiary error harmless.


Holding

The court held that Miranda's statements should have been excluded under Florida's accident report privilege because they were made to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report. However, the court affirmed the conviction because the error was harmless, as Miranda's own trial testimony admitting all elements of the offense rendered the excluded statements immaterial to the conviction.


Headnotes

[1] Statements made to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report are inadmissible as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, under Florida's ac…

[2] The admission of statements made in violation of the accident report privilege is harmless error when the defendant subsequently testifies and admits all elements of the…

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Key Quotes

“Such statements, pursuant to the statute, 'may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal.'”

Establishes that Florida's accident report privilege absolutely prohibits use of accident-related statements to police as evidence in criminal proceedings.

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Facts & Procedural History

Miranda was involved in a traffic accident while operating a motorcycle. Officer Figone investigated the crash and obtained statements from Miranda th…

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Opinion of the Court

Before: TRAWICK, WALSH and SANTOVENIA, JJ.

WALSH, J.

Angel Diaz Miranda appeals from conviction and sentence for driving without a valid driver's license, in violation of section 322.03(1), Florida Statutes. At issue in this appeal is whether Mr. Miranda's statements to the police following [*1] his motorcycle accident should have been excluded under Florida's accident report privilege, codified at section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes.

Mr. Miranda was involved in a traffic accident while riding his motorcycle. At trial, Officer Figone testified that he arrived to investigate the crash, and while "in the preliminary grabbing information," spoke to both drivers involved in the accident. Mr. Miranda told the officer that he was driving the motorcycle and that he was involved in the accident. The State introduced proof that Mr. Miranda was unlicensed at the time of his accident.

Mr. Miranda chose to testify at his trial. He denied making any statements to the officer after the crash. However, Mr. Miranda testified that indeed, he was operating his motorcycle at the time of the crash, with his wife riding on the back of the motorcycle. He also testified that he is unlicensed and does not have a motorcycle endorsement to lawfully operate a motorcycle.

Mr. Miranda argues that his statements to the police after the accident should have been excluded under Florida's accident privilege. § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2019). The Defendant is correct. His statements were made "to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report." Such statements, pursuant to the statute, "may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal." Id.

Notwithstanding the error, we affirm. Mr. Miranda chose to testify at trial in his defense, wherein he admitted all elements of the offense. The State argues that [*2] any error in admitting the defendant's statements to the police was harmless. We agree. Mr. Miranda's testimony established all elements of the charged offense (he was more intent on proving that the other driver was at fault for the crash). Were he to be retried, his testimony from his first trial would be admissible in the State's case-in-chief. See State v. Mosley, 760 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 2000) (former testimony of defendant at murder trial admissible as non-hearsay at retrial under section 90.803(22), Florida Statutes). Since the Defendant admitted all elements of his offense at trial, and this testimony would without any doubt prove his guilt irrespective of his statements to the police, any error in admitting his statements to the police was harmless and there is no purpose to be served in granting a retrial. Accordingly, we affirm.

TRAWICK and SANTOVENIA, JJ. CONCUR COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL

OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY

[*3] Copies Furnished to: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]


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