GEISELA GARCIA

v.

CARLOS L RAMOS

Before: MILIAN, R. ARECES,¹ and LOPEZ, JJ.

LOPEZ, J.

In the instant case, Carlos L. Ramos (“Appellee”) filed a Complaint for Tenant Eviction against Grisel Garcia (“Appellant”). R. at 4-15. In the Complaint, Appellee alleged that he was the owner and lessor of the subject property and that the Appellant had an oral month-to-month tenancy since November 1. 2013 through December¹, 2017. R. at 4. Appellant filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims (“Answer”) and a Motion to Transfer to Circuit Court (“Motion to Transfer”). In her Answer, Appellant alleged that Appellee was not the owner Filing # 110070562 E-Filed 07/10/2020 01:21:11 R. at 19- 20. The Motion to Transfer was based on the Counterclaims which sought to quiet title, as well as recession and cancellation of the deed transferring the property at issue from the Appellant to the Appellee. R. at 16-24. In response, Appellee filed a Motion to Strike Garcia’s Affirmative Defenses (“Motion to Strike”) based on failure to meet the pleading requirements of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. R. at 37-41. On February 27, 2018, the trial judge granted the Motion to Strike, based on Appellant's failure to set forth the reasonable grounds for the relief requested and on her failure to place money into the Court Registry. R. at 81-82. On that same date, the trial judge entered an order granting the Motion to Dismiss. R. at 83. Both orders were entered without a hearing. Also on that same date Appellee filed a Motion for Default Final Judgment for Tenant Eviction based on the Appellant’s failure to deposit rent owed into the Court Registry and her failure to file a responsive pleading. R. at 77-78. On February 28, 2018 the trial court judge entered a Final Judgment for Removal of Tenant and Amended Order Granting Plaintiff-Counter- Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Amended Order of Dismissal”). R. at 83-85. The Amended Order of Dismissal granted Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, but also granted Appellant’s Motion to Transfer as to the Counterclaims only. R. at 84. Appellant filed an Emergency Motion for Reconsideration, to Set Hearing and to Set Aside Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant’s Answer and [*3] Affirmative Defenses and Order Granting Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss; she additionally filed an Emergency Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment for Removal of Tenant and Motion to Modify Amended Order Granting Plaintiff- Counter-Defendant Motion to Dismiss. R. at 86-92. The trial court denied both on March¹, 2018. R. at 156-59. In Florida, a landlord may proceed with an action for possession in county court when seeking to remove a tenant from its premises. Toledo v. Escamilla, 962 So. 2d 1028, 1029-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). However, a landlord/tenant relationship is a condition precedent. Id. at 1030. If there is no landlord/tenant relationship, then the county court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. Additionally, in an eviction action where there is a factual dispute in the case concerning who is the true owner of the property, the trial court must first conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the nature of the transaction in question and who is the true owner of the residence before requiring a deposit into the registry. Minalla v. Equinamics Corp., 954 So. 2d 645, 648-49 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). The trial court commits a reversible error when imposing the payment requirement upon the defendant before holding the evidentiary hearing and making the necessary determinations as to the relationship between the parties. Id. See also Bernstein v. New Beginnings Tr., LLC, 988 So. 2d 90, 95-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (trial court erred by not holding evidentiary hearing before awarding partial summary judgment of eviction because genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether residents of home conveyed the home to the buyer and leased it back with an option to purchase [*4] actually intended a mortgage rather than a sale). The instant case is very similar to Minalla, where the purported tenant asserted that the transaction in which she conveyed her home to the purported owner was not actually a sale, but a disguised loan secured by her home. Id. at 646. The Third DCA determined that because there was a factual dispute concerning who was the true owner of the property, the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the nature of the transaction and who was the true owner of the residence in question. Id. at 648-49. The Court reversed based upon the trial court’s failure to conduct such a hearing. Id. at 649. This Court treats the present appeal as a Petition for Writ of Certiorari for two reasons. First, because the trial court failed to conduct an evidential*}' hearing, as required by law. See Minalla. 954 So. 2d at 648-49. Consequently, the trial court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction and should have not entered a final judgment before conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Espinosa v. Alonso. 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 16a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 2007). Second, because the trial court in the Amended Order of Dismissal granted Appellant's Motion to Transfer the Counterclaims to the circuit court. As a result, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it let execution issue on the judgment while other interrelated claims remained pending. See Innovision Practice Grp., P. A. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 135 So. 3d 501. 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). [*5] Therefore, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED and the Order Granting Plaintiff s Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses. Amended Order Granting Plaintiff-Counter-Defendants Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs Final Judgment for Removal of Tenant are QUASHED. REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. MILIAN.J. concurs.

R. ARECES, J. Concurring Opinion

I concur in the reversal of the Final Judgment, but respectfully disagree with the reasoning. The error attributed to the lower court by the majority is a failure to have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Plaintiff/Appellee was, in fact, the owner/landlord of the subject real property. I disagree. Instead, I believe the lower court does not have the jurisdiction to conduct said evidentiary hearing and erred when, upon reviewing the Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, did not immediately transfer the action to Circuit Court. The lower court’s decision to exercise subject matter jurisdiction did not involve the resolution of any facts. This Court, therefore, reviews, de novo, the [*6] County Court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. See e.g. Beroes v. Florida Dept. Revenue ex. rel. Palacios, 958 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). The Florida legislature has given the Circuit Court exclusive jurisdiction over “all actions involving the title…of real property.” See Fla. Stat. 26.012(2)(g) (2017). Moreover, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170 provides that “[i]f the demand of any counterclaim…exceeds the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is pending, the action must be transferred immediately to the court of the same county having jurisdiction of the demand in the counterclaim.” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j) (2017) (emphasis added). In this case, Appellant filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim wherein she claims to be the rightful owner of the subject real property and seeks, among other things, to quiet title to said property. The Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, therefore, raise legal issues beyond the County Court’s jurisdiction. The Counterclaim, moreover, which seeks relief in excess of the County Court’s jurisdiction, would, pursuant to Rule 1.170(j), make the entire action subject to immediate transfer to the Circuit Court.

The majority, nevertheless, relies on two cases from the Third District Court of Appeal—namely, Toledo v. Escamilla, 962 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) and Minalla v. Equinamics Corp., 954 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Respectfully, these cases do more to support this concurrence than the majority opinion. [*7] The majority reads Minalla as requiring the County Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning the ownership of the real property at issue. Minalla, however, is inapposite, and the majority’s reliance on it is misplaced. Minalla concerns an appeal from a Circuit Court action. Unlike County Courts, Circuit Courts have jurisdiction to preside over matters pertaining to the title of real property. See Fla. Stat. 26.012(2)(g) (2017). A decision that requires a Circuit Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on issues over which it has jurisdiction, cannot reasonably be read to expand the jurisdictional limitations of the County Court. In fact, the issue of whether a County Court has jurisdiction over an eviction action, where title to the subject property is in dispute, is not at all addressed by Minella. It was, however, addressed by Toledo. And Toledo controls this case. Like this case, Toledo concerns a County Court’s judgment of eviction. In Toledo, a Circuit Appellate Panel, like this one, required the County Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if the defendant was, in fact, an equitable owner of the subject property. See 962 So. 2d at 1029. The County Court conducted said evidentiary hearing, found the defendant was not an equitable owner of the property, and entered a judgment of eviction. Id. The Circuit Appellate Panel then affirmed the judgment of eviction. The Third District Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Circuit Appellate Panel, because it applied the wrong law. Id. Specifically, the Third District Court of Appeal held, [*8] We find that the circuit court failed to apply the correct law in affirming the county court’s judgment as the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment of eviction….We also find that when [defendant] asserted in her answer that she was not a tenant and that she had an equitable interest in the property, ejectment, not eviction, was the proper remedy, and the matter should have been transferred to the circuit court. The circuit court has “exclusive original jurisdiction” over ejectment actions. See § 26.012(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004). Thus, the county court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether [defendant] had an equitable interest in the [subject property].

Id. at 1030 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Mesnikoff v. FQ Backyard Trading, LLC, 239 So. 3d 765, 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (finding, as an alternative ground, that the county court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of eviction where the “tenant” claimed to have an equitable interest in the property); Ward v. Estate of Ward,¹ So. 3d 238, 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“In their answer to the complaint for eviction filed in the county court…petitioners asserted a claim to an equitable interest in the property they inhabited, which should have been resolved by the circuit court.”).

This case is a lot like Toledo, except clearer. Here, in addition to defenses similar to those raised in Toledo, Defendant filed a Counterclaim that seeks relief that indisputably exceeds the County Court’s jurisdiction. See Fla. Stat. 26.012(2)(g) (2017) (stating the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction “in all actions [*9] involving the title…of real property”); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j) (2017) (“[i]f the demand of any counterclaim…exceeds the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is pending, the action must be transferred immediately to the court of the same county having jurisdiction of the demand in the counterclaim.”). The majority, nevertheless, finds that the law requires the County Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The majority is incorrect. If the County Court holds an evidentiary hearing, as required of it by the majority, it will, necessarily, make a determination that concerns title of real property. The County Court will either (1) find that Appellee is the owner of the property and, thus, a landlord who can avail himself of the residential eviction laws to Appellant’s detriment; or, (2) that Appellant is the owner thereby preventing the Appellee from exercising some right he may have as an owner/landlord of the subject property. Irrespective of how the County Court rules, it will have, at a minimum, exceeded its jurisdiction, and, at worst, exposed the Parties to the risk of inconsistent judgments, should the Circuit Court, in its determination of Appellant’s Counterclaim, disagree with the County Court.

In short, the County Court does not have jurisdiction over matters concerning the title to real property. The County Court should have “immediately” transferred the action to the Circuit Court, which, by rule, would have had “full power and jurisdiction over the demands of all parties.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(j) (emphasis [*10] added). I would, therefore, in accordance with the plain meaning of Fla. Stat. § 26.012(2)(g) and Rule 1.170(j), and consistent with the Third District Court of Appeal’s binding opinion in Toledo, find the lower court erred in not immediately transferring this matter to Circuit Court, reverse the lower court’s Final Judgment dated February 28, 2018 and remand to the lower court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.² COPIES FURNISHED TO COUNSEL OF RECORD AND TO ANY PARTY NOT

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

App. P. 9.030(c) (2018) (“circuit courts shall review, by appeal…final orders of lower tribunals as provided by general law.”) (emphasis added). Actions to remove a tenant are subject to summary procedures. See Fla. Stat. § 83.21 (2017). Florida’s summary procedures allow for an appeal from a final judgment. See Fla. Stat. § 51.011(5) (2017). However, even if it is appropriate to treat this appeal as one seeking a writ of certiorari, I would reach the same result and grant the writ. The lower court’s decision departed from the fundamental requirements of law, and has materially, and irreparably, prejudiced the Appellant for the remainder of the proceedings by dispossessing her of a home she claims to be her homestead.