VIRTUAL IMAGING SERVICES INC., A/A/O VICTOR ALVARE

v.

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

lNC., alalo Victor Alvarez, Petitioner-Plaintiff, '

V.

I V ‘

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

6461 Respondent-Defendant. I Opinionfilecl5£ J 2014. Panel Date: August 20, 2014. On common-law certiorari review from a non-final order rendered by the Mranu Dade County Court, Hon. Carlos Guzman. Joseph Littman, from The Greenspan Law Firm, P.A., for the Petitioner-Plaintiff. Michael J. Neimand, from United Automobile Insurance Company’s Office of the General Counsel, for the Respondent-Defendam. Before HOGAN SCOLA, A QL , and MARIN, JJ.

JUDGE MARIN.

6‘ M Virtual Imaging Seraoes, Inc. (“medical provider” or “pr0vider”) requests certiornri relief from £1 non~fiual order overruling its objection to United Automobile Insurance C0mpany’s (“insure¹"’ or “insurance company") fourth (4th) interrogatory. We may review ' N r secret disclosure even when such orders provrde fo orders improperly requiring trade confidentiality limit-ntions.“ Cooper Tire & Rubber C0. v. Cabrera, 112 So. 3d 731, 733 (Fla. . 3d DCA 2013). -J ‘z »"_'|¥~%v|

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BNO.13- 14 SP gal ’ an r ‘1.:=’=z r-~_ :7.‘ - 3.)\ VIRTUAL IMAGING SERVICES, lNC., alalo Victor Alvarez, Petitioner-Plaintiff, '

V.

I V ‘

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

6461 Respondent-Defendant. I Opinionfilecl5£ J 2014. Panel Date: August 20, 2014. On common-law certiorari review from a non-final order rendered by the Mranu Dade County Court, Hon. Carlos Guzman. Joseph Littman, from The Greenspan Law Firm, P.A., for the Petitioner-Plaintiff. Michael J. Neimand, from United Automobile Insurance Company’s Office of the General Counsel, for the Respondent-Defendam. Before HOGAN SCOLA, A QL , and MARIN, JJ.

JUDGE MARIN.

6‘ M Virtual Imaging Seraoes, Inc. (“medical provider” or “pr0vider”) requests certiornri relief from £1 non~fiual order overruling its objection to United Automobile Insurance C0mpany’s (“insure¹"’ or “insurance company") fourth (4th) interrogatory. We may review ' N r secret disclosure even when such orders provrde fo orders improperly requiring trade confidentiality limit-ntions.“ Cooper Tire & Rubber C0. v. Cabrera, 112 So. 3d 731, 733 (Fla. . 3d DCA 2013). -J ‘z »"_'|¥~%v|

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1I ri C “'4 1 '1 The provider also contends that the insurer did not demonstrate “a need for the requested infomiation”, which outweighed the prejudice suffered by the provider in divulging this trade secret information. in opposition, the insurer argues that it does not seek the provider’s “methodology, factors, or data considered by the I-IMO and PPO insurers in calculating their reimbursement amounts”; rather, it only requests “the amounts paid" to this provider by other insurance companies. The insurer contends that reimbursement amounts do not qualify as “secrets because they are routinely disclosed to third-parties in advertising, on websites, and in explanations of benefits.” A petitioner may obtain common-law certiorari relief when a non-final order departs from the law’s essential requirements, causes “material injury through subsequent proceedings”, and no “adequate remedy after final judgment” can alleviate the “irreparable injury” inflicted by the non-final order. Sheridan Hcaltircozp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Ina, 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The Florida Legislature enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 688.001, Fla. Stat. (1988), which defines a trade secret as information, including a fomiula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that (a) Derlves independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generalty known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. § 688.002(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). The Legislature also enacted a trade secret evidentiary privilege, which states: A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade secret owned by that person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. § 90.506, Fla. Stat. (2013). In this proceeding, the provider relies upon section 90.506, Florida Statutes, the trade secret evidentiary privilege (Cert. Pet. 11). When a litigant asserts the trade secret privilege “as the basis for resisting production, a trial court must determine whether the requested production constitutes a trade secret,” -S'heria'an Hsalthcorp, 770 So. 2d at 222. If the requested information constitutes a trade 09-11 -’ l4 13:48 The provider also contends that the insurer did not demonstrate “a need for the requested infomiation”, which outweighed the prejudice suffered by the provider in divulging this trade secret information. in opposition, the insurer argues that it does not seek the provider’s “methodology, factors, or data considered by the I-IMO and PPO insurers in calculating their reimbursement amounts”; rather, it only requests “the amounts paid" to this provider by other insurance companies. The insurer contends that reimbursement amounts do not qualify as “secrets because they are routinely disclosed to third-parties in advertising, on websites, and in explanations of benefits.” A petitioner may obtain common-law certiorari relief when a non-final order departs from the law’s essential requirements, causes “material injury through subsequent proceedings”, and no “adequate remedy after final judgment” can alleviate the “irreparable injury” inflicted by the non-final order. Sheridan Hcaltircozp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Ina, 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The Florida Legislature enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 688.001, Fla. Stat. (1988), which defines a trade secret as information, including a fomiula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that (a) Derlves independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generalty known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. § 688.002(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). The Legislature also enacted a trade secret evidentiary privilege, which states: A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade secret owned by that person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. § 90.506, Fla. Stat. (2013). In this proceeding, the provider relies upon section 90.506, Florida Statutes, the trade secret evidentiary privilege (Cert. Pet. 11). When a litigant asserts the trade secret privilege “as the basis for resisting production, a trial court must determine whether the requested production constitutes a trade secret,” -S'heria'an Hsalthcorp, 770 So. 2d at 222. If the requested information constitutes a trade [*3] O9—'|'!—’ 14 13:48 FRGi‘/1- T—48'| P0004/0064 F-650 secret, “the court must require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity for the requested materials.” Id. Ifthe court orders production, it “must set forth its findings." Id. I-Iere, the insurer’s fourth (4th) intcrrogatory requests that this provider reveai the payment amount it received from insurance companies and uninsured patients listed in the response to interrogatory number three (3). See App. A3, 1| 4. The county court oven-uled the provider's objections to interrogatory four (4) and ordered the provider to disclose “the reimbursement amounts for CPT Code 72148 for only the year 2012 from each insurance” company “listed in” interrogatory three (3) and reimbursements froin uninsured patients. Id. at AS. The county court also directed the provider to anonymously‘ identify the insurance companies “by number and type of carrier”, such as “I—lMO#l [reimbursement amount]”, to avoid disclosing any trade secret. Id? The county court reasoned that pursuant to section 62'/'.'736(5)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, payments to this provider become relevant to determining reasonableness. Id. Although this nonwfinal order directed this insurer to avoid disclosing the insurance companies’ identities, we conclude that the county court did not make any clear finding as to whether the reimbursement amounts and the insurance companies’ identities constitute trade secrets. Because this order does not include a clear legal conclusion that the reimbursement amounts and the insurance corn anies’ and uninsured patients’ identities constitute trade P secrets, the county court violated the iaw’s essential requirements. Cabrera, 112 so 3d at 733; Gen. Hotel & Rest. Supply Corp. v. Skqriper-, 514 So. 2d 1158, I159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). The county court implicitly ccnciuded that the trade secret privilege applies; however, an implicit finding does not satisfy the legal criteria for trade secret analysis. Accordingly, we grant certiorari relief.

CERTIORARI RELIEF GRANTED.

HOGAN SCOLA and ARZOLA, JJ., concur. ' See § 90.506, Fla. Stat. (2013) (“When the court directs disclosure, it shalt take the protective measures that the interests of the holder of the privilege, the interests of the parties, and the furtherance ofjustice require”). 2 Cf E. Colonial Refiese Se:-v., Inc. v. Velocci, 416 So. 26 1276, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (a “customer list can constitute a ‘trade secret’ Where the list is acquired or compiled through the industry of the owner of the list and is not just a compilation of information commonly available to the public") (footnote omitted). O9—'|'!—’ 14 13:48 FRGi‘/1- T—48'| P0004/0064 F-650 secret, “the court must require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity for the requested materials.” Id. Ifthe court orders production, it “must set forth its findings." Id. I-Iere, the insurer’s fourth (4th) intcrrogatory requests that this provider reveai the payment amount it received from insurance companies and uninsured patients listed in the response to interrogatory number three (3). See App. A3, 1| 4. The county court oven-uled the provider's objections to interrogatory four (4) and ordered the provider to disclose “the reimbursement amounts for CPT Code 72148 for only the year 2012 from each insurance” company “listed in” interrogatory three (3) and reimbursements froin uninsured patients. Id. at AS. The county court also directed the provider to anonymously‘ identify the insurance companies “by number and type of carrier”, such as “I—lMO#l [reimbursement amount]”, to avoid disclosing any trade secret. Id? The county court reasoned that pursuant to section 62'/'.'736(5)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, payments to this provider become relevant to determining reasonableness. Id. Although this nonwfinal order directed this insurer to avoid disclosing the insurance companies’ identities, we conclude that the county court did not make any clear finding as to whether the reimbursement amounts and the insurance companies’ identities constitute trade secrets. Because this order does not include a clear legal conclusion that the reimbursement amounts and the insurance corn anies’ and uninsured patients’ identities constitute trade P secrets, the county court violated the iaw’s essential requirements. Cabrera, 112 so 3d at 733; Gen. Hotel & Rest. Supply Corp. v. Skqriper-, 514 So. 2d 1158, I159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). The county court implicitly ccnciuded that the trade secret privilege applies; however, an implicit finding does not satisfy the legal criteria for trade secret analysis. Accordingly, we grant certiorari relief.

CERTIORARI RELIEF GRANTED.

HOGAN SCOLA and ARZOLA, JJ., concur. ' See § 90.506, Fla. Stat. (2013) (“When the court directs disclosure, it shalt take the protective measures that the interests of the holder of the privilege, the interests of the parties, and the furtherance ofjustice require”). 2 Cf E. Colonial Refiese Se:-v., Inc. v. Velocci, 416 So. 26 1276, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (a “customer list can constitute a ‘trade secret’ Where the list is acquired or compiled through the industry of the owner of the list and is not just a compilation of information commonly available to the public") (footnote omitted).