DALE AND LISA SIMS

v.

MIAMI SHORES VILLAGE, FLORIDA

J (RUIZ, J.) In 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Miami Shores Village Code Enforcement Board (the “Board”) found that Dale and Lisa Sims (the “Property Owners”), committed numerous code enforcement violations and subsequently recorded code enforcement liens against them. As the fines gradually accrued to $441,650.00, the Property Owners requested relief from said fines. The Board conducted a hearing regarding the Property Owners’ request to mitigate the fines, and denied their request on July ll, 2013. The homeowners did not file an appeal within 30 days of I.- Z ‘Tu .__.‘<. M “U1l\.JCD ,_.. ‘pa Lhlb denial. Instead, on .1" ' the Property Owners again requested relief from the i 1‘. r=:-1.=_._. ll

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES

TO FILE REHEARING MOTION,

AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF

IN TI-IE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, _

FLORIDA

' _

APPELLATE DIVISION

DALE and LISA SIMS, CASE NUMBER: 13-308, AP Appellants, l snare. Ill CASES BELOW: 4-07-1897; _ - _ 9-06-1151; 12-07-3273; 12-07-$217 9-06-1152; 4-07-1898; 4-09-sgfig T MIAMI SHORES VILLAGE, 2%; ‘-t?-£1"? V.- ' a02aids atat - Appellee. ' I” " so =nit 3i‘.}’.}”rt E ..1-""- \ - . ,,_ ,a"; Opinion filed: , , ,2015. ~ On direct appeal from a final administrative order rendered by the Miami Shores Village Code Enforcement Board. ' Jeffery L. Allen from the Law Office ofJeffery Allen for the Appellants. Richard Sarafan from Genovese Joblove & Battista, P.A. for the Appellee. /A 4" (Before WALSH, CYNAMON, and RUIZ,JJ. ‘ ' ._ ' l I. BACKGROUND ' /Wt/Q7 ' J (RUIZ, J.) In 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Miami Shores Village Code Enforcement Board (the “Board”) found that Dale and Lisa Sims (the “Property Owners”), committed numerous code enforcement violations and subsequently recorded code enforcement liens against them. As the fines gradually accrued to $441,650.00, the Property Owners requested relief from said fines. The Board conducted a hearing regarding the Property Owners’ request to mitigate the fines, and denied their request on July ll, 2013. The homeowners did not file an appeal within 30 days of I.- Z ‘Tu .__.‘<. M “U1l\.JCD ,_.. ‘pa Lhlb denial. Instead, on .1" ' the Property Owners again requested relief from the i [*2] l l l CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP aforementioned fines. The Board conducted another hearing on August 1, 2013, and once again denied the Property Owners’ mitigation request. On August 23, 2013, the homeowners filed a notice of appeal ofboth the denial on July 11, 2013 and the denial on August 1, 2013. Appellants seek review ofthe (1) code enforcement violations and liens imposed in 2007, 2008, and 2009; (2) the Board’s denial of mitigation and/or fine reduction on July ll, 2013; and (3) the Board’s second denial of mitigation and/or fine-reduction on August 1, 2013. The Property Owners contend that the underlying violations, and all subsequent orders denying mitigation, are invalid. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. Stat. §§ 26.012(l); 162.11; 162.03(2) (2014). _ - ' .

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

- Where, as in the instant case, a party is entitled as a matter of right to seek review‘ in the circuit court from administrative action, the Court must determine: (1) whether procedural due process was afforded; (2) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence; and (3) whether the essential requirements of law have been observed. Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 2000); Bd. of County Comrs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). On first-tier certiorari review, the circuit court should not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the local government authority. Dusseau, 794 So. 2d at 1275-76; Florida Power, 761 So. 2d at 1093.

III. ANALYSIS

A.

The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Address Code Enforcement Violations Issued in 200 7, 2008, 2009, as well as the Board’s July I 1, .2013 Order An aggrieved party may challenge a final administrative order by filing an appeal “within an n.-1 .- l\Q - - --- 7- su days or tne execution or the order to be appealed." Fla. Stat. § 162.11 (2013). Given that the Page 2 of 7 l l l CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP aforementioned fines. The Board conducted another hearing on August 1, 2013, and once again denied the Property Owners’ mitigation request. On August 23, 2013, the homeowners filed a notice of appeal ofboth the denial on July 11, 2013 and the denial on August 1, 2013. Appellants seek review ofthe (1) code enforcement violations and liens imposed in 2007, 2008, and 2009; (2) the Board’s denial of mitigation and/or fine reduction on July ll, 2013; and (3) the Board’s second denial of mitigation and/or fine-reduction on August 1, 2013. The Property Owners contend that the underlying violations, and all subsequent orders denying mitigation, are invalid. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. Stat. §§ 26.012(l); 162.11; 162.03(2) (2014). _ - ' .

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

- Where, as in the instant case, a party is entitled as a matter of right to seek review‘ in the circuit court from administrative action, the Court must determine: (1) whether procedural due process was afforded; (2) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence; and (3) whether the essential requirements of law have been observed. Dusseau v. Metropolitan Dade County, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 2000); Bd. of County Comrs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). On first-tier certiorari review, the circuit court should not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the local government authority. Dusseau, 794 So. 2d at 1275-76; Florida Power, 761 So. 2d at 1093.

III. ANALYSIS

A.

The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Address Code Enforcement Violations Issued in 200 7, 2008, 2009, as well as the Board’s July I 1, .2013 Order An aggrieved party may challenge a final administrative order by filing an appeal “within an n.-1 .- l\Q - - --- 7- su days or tne execution or the order to be appealed." Fla. Stat. § 162.11 (2013). Given that the Page 2 of 7 [*3] E CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP Property Owners filed their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, we do not have jurisdiction to PBVIEW the HIIEHQKI nnrie Vifilfififlflfl1'£>.l‘.l"\1‘!'Il=!lI in ')fifl’7, ")nnQ, marl 9000, nnr rln um l1n1mj111~ierIir\‘l'in1'\ H ._- .. .__- -.__-D__. ___.- .__.-..-______. -_____.._. ___ _,,_,, _,_,_,,, ,,,_,_,_, _\,.,, 1,,“ _,,_, ,._, ,,,_,._, _,,“,_,__,,,,,,,_,“ to vacate the fines and release the liens imposed. Peltz v. District Court ofAppeal, Third Dist, 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the untimely filing of a notice of appeal precludes an appellate court from exercising jurisdiction). Appellants maintain that despite filing their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, more than 30 days from the July 11, 2013 denial, this Court does possess jurisdiction to address the Board‘s denial of mitigation on July 11, 2013. Specifically, the Property Owners argue that they did not “waive their right to appeal the July [11, 2013] decision” by seeking a “rehearing in August” 2013. Reply Br. at 20. They assert that “successive mitigation hearings authorized by the Board” may extend rendition, thus expanding “the jurisdictional time limit for initiating appellate review.” Id at 20-21. _ ' However, “[a] motion can suspend rendition of an order only ifthe motion is authorized under the rules governing the proceeding in which the order was entered.” City ofPalm Bay v. Palm Bay Greens, LLC, 969 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Fla. IR. App. P. 9.020(i); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Forrest, 682 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). In this case, the Property Owners do not identify anordinance or other applicable rule of procedure before the lower tribunal authorizing a motion for rehearing once mitigation has been denied. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i) (“An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal”). Additionally, rule 9.020(i) does not categorize a motion to mitigate as a motion that tolls rendition. Id. Thus, given that the motion for rehearing filed on July 25, 2013 was unauthorized, it did not toll the 30-day time period to appeal the July ll, 2013 order denying mitigation._ City ofPalm Bay, 969 So. 2d at 1190 (“A motion for rehearing does Page 3 of 7 _____z. E CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP Property Owners filed their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, we do not have jurisdiction to PBVIEW the HIIEHQKI nnrie Vifilfififlflfl1'£>.l‘.l"\1‘!'Il=!lI in ')fifl’7, ")nnQ, marl 9000, nnr rln um l1n1mj111~ierIir\‘l'in1'\ H ._- .. .__- -.__-D__. ___.- .__.-..-______. -_____.._. ___ _,,_,, _,_,_,,, ,,,_,_,_, _\,.,, 1,,“ _,,_, ,._, ,,,_,._, _,,“,_,__,,,,,,,_,“ to vacate the fines and release the liens imposed. Peltz v. District Court ofAppeal, Third Dist, 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the untimely filing of a notice of appeal precludes an appellate court from exercising jurisdiction). Appellants maintain that despite filing their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, more than 30 days from the July 11, 2013 denial, this Court does possess jurisdiction to address the Board‘s denial of mitigation on July 11, 2013. Specifically, the Property Owners argue that they did not “waive their right to appeal the July [11, 2013] decision” by seeking a “rehearing in August” 2013. Reply Br. at 20. They assert that “successive mitigation hearings authorized by the Board” may extend rendition, thus expanding “the jurisdictional time limit for initiating appellate review.” Id at 20-21. _ ' However, “[a] motion can suspend rendition of an order only ifthe motion is authorized under the rules governing the proceeding in which the order was entered.” City ofPalm Bay v. Palm Bay Greens, LLC, 969 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Fla. IR. App. P. 9.020(i); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Forrest, 682 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). In this case, the Property Owners do not identify anordinance or other applicable rule of procedure before the lower tribunal authorizing a motion for rehearing once mitigation has been denied. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i) (“An order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal”). Additionally, rule 9.020(i) does not categorize a motion to mitigate as a motion that tolls rendition. Id. Thus, given that the motion for rehearing filed on July 25, 2013 was unauthorized, it did not toll the 30-day time period to appeal the July ll, 2013 order denying mitigation._ City ofPalm Bay, 969 So. 2d at 1190 (“A motion for rehearing does Page 3 of 7 _____z. [*4] ll CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP not suspend rendition of an administrative order because rehearing is not authorized in administrative proceedings . . . A lower ‘tribunals erent authority to reconsider an order :5-Er(' does not transfonn a motion for rehearing into the kind of motion that suspends_rendition.”); see also De Ardila v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp.,_826 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (filing of an unauthorized motion for rehearing will not toll the time for filing an appeal).

B.

The Board’s August J, 2013 Denial ofMitigation Departedfrom the Essential Requirements ofLaw Given that the Property Owners filed their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, this Court does have jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of mitigation on August.1, 2013. Attached to the Property Owners’ July 25, 2013 request for relief, counsel submitted a letter stating that “mitigating and extenuating circumstances” existed in support of a fine reduction, thereby implicating section 2-8l(d)(2) of the Miami Shores Village Code. At a hearing convened by" the Board, counsel proceeded to explain such circumstances, asserting that the Property Owners had “been extremely involved . . . with the care of their terminally and critically ill parent” for “several years.” Hr. Tr. 6:4-10, Aug. 1, 2013. On August 1, 2013, the Board denied their mitigation request, but stated no factual findings or legal conclusions supporting their denial. See Hr. Tr. 49:5-50:11, Aug. 1, 2013. On appeal, the Property Owners argue that the Board departed from the essential requirements of law by levying an excessive fine and failing to “adhere to the criteria prescribed for the assessment offines.” Initial Br. at 1 1; 27'. . - When reviewing an administrative order, we determine (1) whether the agency afforded due process; (2) whether competent, substantial evidence supports the agency/’s decision; and (3) whether the agency’s decision complies with the essential requirements of law. Dusseau, 794 So. 2d at 1274; Florida Power, 761 So. 2d at 1092. Litigants and tribunals must follow Page 4 of 7 ll CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP not suspend rendition of an administrative order because rehearing is not authorized in administrative proceedings . . . A lower ‘tribunals erent authority to reconsider an order :5-Er(' does not transfonn a motion for rehearing into the kind of motion that suspends_rendition.”); see also De Ardila v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp.,_826 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (filing of an unauthorized motion for rehearing will not toll the time for filing an appeal).

B.

The Board’s August J, 2013 Denial ofMitigation Departedfrom the Essential Requirements ofLaw Given that the Property Owners filed their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, this Court does have jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of mitigation on August.1, 2013. Attached to the Property Owners’ July 25, 2013 request for relief, counsel submitted a letter stating that “mitigating and extenuating circumstances” existed in support of a fine reduction, thereby implicating section 2-8l(d)(2) of the Miami Shores Village Code. At a hearing convened by" the Board, counsel proceeded to explain such circumstances, asserting that the Property Owners had “been extremely involved . . . with the care of their terminally and critically ill parent” for “several years.” Hr. Tr. 6:4-10, Aug. 1, 2013. On August 1, 2013, the Board denied their mitigation request, but stated no factual findings or legal conclusions supporting their denial. See Hr. Tr. 49:5-50:11, Aug. 1, 2013. On appeal, the Property Owners argue that the Board departed from the essential requirements of law by levying an excessive fine and failing to “adhere to the criteria prescribed for the assessment offines.” Initial Br. at 1 1; 27'. . - When reviewing an administrative order, we determine (1) whether the agency afforded due process; (2) whether competent, substantial evidence supports the agency/’s decision; and (3) whether the agency’s decision complies with the essential requirements of law. Dusseau, 794 So. 2d at 1274; Florida Power, 761 So. 2d at 1092. Litigants and tribunals must follow Page 4 of 7 [*5] 2__,.__. J l l l l l ;—;-- _m CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP legislatively mandated “procedure,” and “failure to adhere to that procedure” departs from the essential requirements oflaw. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 44 So. 3d 230, 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (citing Globe Newspaper C0. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518, 519-520 (Fla. 1995)); see also Coconut Grove Playhouse, LLC v. The City ofMiami, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1116a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. App., Sep. 16, 2011) (finding departure from essential requirements of the law and remanding to allow Code Enforcement Board to formally issue findings of fact and conclusions of law); Contrada ofMiami, LLC v. The City ofMiami, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 224a (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. App., Jan. 17, 2007) (final administrative orders remanded to allow City of Miami Code Enforcement Board to issue findings offact and conclusions oflaw). In this case, the Miami Shores Village Code sets forth the following procedure goveming the Board’s authority to reduce a fine: ‘ * An enforcement board may modify, reduce and satisfy a fine imposed subject to thejbllowing guidelines and limitations: (1) A code enforcement lien may only be modified and reduced if (i) the violation which gave rise to the lien has been corrected and has not recurred, and (ii) no other code violations concerning the property which was the subject of the violation exist; (2) A code enforcement lien may only be modified and reduced when unusual and exceptional circumstances exist that would make it inequitable to enforce such lien to the full extent of its accrual . . . Miami Shores Vill., Fla., Ordinance Code Part II, Ch. 2, Art. IV, § '2-81(d)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, section 2-8l(d)(2) requires the Board to consider whether evidence produced ir1 a proceeding demonstrates the existence of“unusual and exceptional circumstances” warranting a fine reduction. Id More importantly, the Miami Shores Village Code clearly states that “the board shall issue findings offacttbased on evidence and conclusions of law.” Id. at § 2-80(d) (emphasis added). Thus, section 2-80(d) requires the Board to state whether the reasons for requesting a fine reduction do or do not satisfy the criteria set forth in section 2-8l(d). At the conclusion of 4 Page 5 of 7 2__,.__. J l l l l l ;—;-- _m CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP legislatively mandated “procedure,” and “failure to adhere to that procedure” departs from the essential requirements oflaw. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 44 So. 3d 230, 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (citing Globe Newspaper C0. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518, 519-520 (Fla. 1995)); see also Coconut Grove Playhouse, LLC v. The City ofMiami, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1116a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. App., Sep. 16, 2011) (finding departure from essential requirements of the law and remanding to allow Code Enforcement Board to formally issue findings of fact and conclusions of law); Contrada ofMiami, LLC v. The City ofMiami, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 224a (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. App., Jan. 17, 2007) (final administrative orders remanded to allow City of Miami Code Enforcement Board to issue findings offact and conclusions oflaw). In this case, the Miami Shores Village Code sets forth the following procedure goveming the Board’s authority to reduce a fine: ‘ * An enforcement board may modify, reduce and satisfy a fine imposed subject to thejbllowing guidelines and limitations: (1) A code enforcement lien may only be modified and reduced if (i) the violation which gave rise to the lien has been corrected and has not recurred, and (ii) no other code violations concerning the property which was the subject of the violation exist; (2) A code enforcement lien may only be modified and reduced when unusual and exceptional circumstances exist that would make it inequitable to enforce such lien to the full extent of its accrual . . . Miami Shores Vill., Fla., Ordinance Code Part II, Ch. 2, Art. IV, § '2-81(d)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, section 2-8l(d)(2) requires the Board to consider whether evidence produced ir1 a proceeding demonstrates the existence of“unusual and exceptional circumstances” warranting a fine reduction. Id More importantly, the Miami Shores Village Code clearly states that “the board shall issue findings offacttbased on evidence and conclusions of law.” Id. at § 2-80(d) (emphasis added). Thus, section 2-80(d) requires the Board to state whether the reasons for requesting a fine reduction do or do not satisfy the criteria set forth in section 2-8l(d). At the conclusion of 4 Page 5 of 7 [*6] :-.——T-—\_-— l Il i ! i l l l I l l . l1. ...__._|.___?_ l " CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP the August 1, 2013 hearing, the Board failed to issue such findings of fact regarding the purported existence of “unusual and exceptional circumstances” that would make it “ineq1_1.itable” to enforce the lien. See id. at § 2-8l(d)(2). Given that the Board failed to make the requisite findings under section 2-80(d), the August 1, 2013 decision denying mitigation must be vacated and remanded to the lower tribunal to make findings of" fact. See City of Winter Park v. Metropolitan Planning Organizationfor the Orlando Urban Area, 765 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reversing and remanding order for failing to comply with statutory requirements; “[t]he critical reason for requiring an administrative agency to state their conclusions and orders with specificity is to facilitate judicial review and bolster decisions”) (citations omitted); Dougherty v. City of Miami, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 959a (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. App., Jul. 14, 2006) (“Failure of an agency to adhere to its regulations constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law.”) ' C. Appellants’ Motionfior Attorney ’s Fees is Denied Appellants conclude by requesting attorney’s fees pursuant to Florida Rule ofAppellate Procedure 9.400(b), which operates as the “procedural vehicle by which a party seeks attorney’s fees from an appellate cotut.” Brass & Singer, P.A. v. United Auto. Ins. C0., 944 S0. 2d -252, 253-254 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). However, “[i]t is simply insufficient for parties to only refer to rule 9.400 orto rely on another court’s order in support of a motion for atton1ey’s fees.” United Servs. Auto. Ass ’n v.'_ Phillips, 775 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 2000). “An award of appellate attorneys’ fees must be supported by a particular contractual, statutory, or other substantive basis.” Dept. ofHighway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Trauth, 971 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). In light of Appellants’ failure to cite an ordinance or statute authorizing fees, we deny their motion for appellate attorney’s fees. See Hembd v. Dauria, 859 Page 6 of7 __._i.i.zi.l.____ :-.——T-—\_-— l Il i ! i l l l I l l . l1. ...__._|.___?_ l " CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP the August 1, 2013 hearing, the Board failed to issue such findings of fact regarding the purported existence of “unusual and exceptional circumstances” that would make it “ineq1_1.itable” to enforce the lien. See id. at § 2-8l(d)(2). Given that the Board failed to make the requisite findings under section 2-80(d), the August 1, 2013 decision denying mitigation must be vacated and remanded to the lower tribunal to make findings of" fact. See City of Winter Park v. Metropolitan Planning Organizationfor the Orlando Urban Area, 765 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reversing and remanding order for failing to comply with statutory requirements; “[t]he critical reason for requiring an administrative agency to state their conclusions and orders with specificity is to facilitate judicial review and bolster decisions”) (citations omitted); Dougherty v. City of Miami, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 959a (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. App., Jul. 14, 2006) (“Failure of an agency to adhere to its regulations constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law.”) ' C. Appellants’ Motionfior Attorney ’s Fees is Denied Appellants conclude by requesting attorney’s fees pursuant to Florida Rule ofAppellate Procedure 9.400(b), which operates as the “procedural vehicle by which a party seeks attorney’s fees from an appellate cotut.” Brass & Singer, P.A. v. United Auto. Ins. C0., 944 S0. 2d -252, 253-254 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). However, “[i]t is simply insufficient for parties to only refer to rule 9.400 orto rely on another court’s order in support of a motion for atton1ey’s fees.” United Servs. Auto. Ass ’n v.'_ Phillips, 775 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 2000). “An award of appellate attorneys’ fees must be supported by a particular contractual, statutory, or other substantive basis.” Dept. ofHighway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Trauth, 971 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). In light of Appellants’ failure to cite an ordinance or statute authorizing fees, we deny their motion for appellate attorney’s fees. See Hembd v. Dauria, 859 Page 6 of7 __._i.i.zi.l.____ [*7] =¢_~_=:imm:|fi4==—.<.4 l l ll CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP S0. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that when a litigant fails to cite the substantive provision authorizing appellate fees, denial of the rnotion for appellate attorney’s fees is warranted). _ ' We thereby vacate the August 1, 2013 decision denying mitigation and remand this cause to the lower tribunal to make findings offact. l Page 7 of7 \ t .l .1 l it Z =¢_~_=:imm:|fi4==—.<.4 l l ll CASE NUMBER: 13-308 AP S0. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that when a litigant fails to cite the substantive provision authorizing appellate fees, denial of the rnotion for appellate attorney’s fees is warranted). _ ' We thereby vacate the August 1, 2013 decision denying mitigation and remand this cause to the lower tribunal to make findings offact. l Page 7 of7 \ t .l .1 l it Z