LUIS LEZCANO

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA

This cause having been brought to this Court by appeal, and after due consideration the court having issued its opinion; YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that such further proceedings be had in said cause in accordance with the opinion of this CQURT attached hereto and incorporated as part of this order, and with the rules of procedure and laws of the STATE OF FLORIDA. Lower Tribunal Case Number(s): B13004139 WITNESS the Honorable Abby Cynamon, Administrative Judge ofthe Appellate Division ofthe Circuit Court ofthe Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida and the seal ofthe said Circuit Court at Miami, this 23"¹ dayof February, 2015. A True Copy Attest COM’ t . Piarveyguvt 1/ vs cLE;;\P Clerk0 . - j A T ya D. Ben Deputy Clerk, 0é_wW="‘*"°Q~¢ Ourm-.9’ /5:. sm“ »

MARIA LAUREDO, ESQ, ASSISTANTPUBLIC DEFENDER

JUAN C. PEREZ, JR., ESQ, ASSISTAJVTSTATE ATTORNEY

Mandate rev. l0/22/2008 [*2] IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND

FOR MIAMI-I)ADE COUNTY, FLORIDA APPELLATE DIVISION CASE NO.: 13-211 AC LOWER COURT CASE NO. B13-004:1 STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. / Opinion filed: An appeal from the Co C

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J0 Pl can E110 £'Z"‘§3 ‘fig’--e ear; Ls: -*4 at; Cw-l ‘ '_::* “Y¹ NV? Elill 9'1 =8 W lrri 0537.1 -2-a iéil 14"“- -,.. .- w .. unty outt for Miami-Dade County, Florida, the Honorable Andrew S. Hague presiding. Carlos l\/iartinez,I?sq Publi Def d . -. , ., c en er; and Maria Laure-do, Esq. Chief Assistant P bl I) . , u ic efender, for Appellant. Katherine Fernandez Rundle, E St sq., ate Attorney; and Juan C. Perez, Jr., Esq., Assistant State Attorney, for Appellee. Before SAYFIE, RUIZ—COHEN, and LUCK, JJ. PER CURIAM: For masturbating at Haulover beach, a jury found defendant Luis Lezcano guilty of indecent exposure. Lezcano a eals hi pp s conviction and probation sentence because the trial court denied his cause challenge to Juror James, and the state made improper comments during its closing argument. We affir ith m w out further discussion on the closing argument issue. On the cause challenge issue, we affinn for three reasons. l [*3] Reason One: Section 913.03 Cause challenges are a creature of statute. “Section 913.03 of the Florida Statutes, which specifies the grounds for challenging a juror for cause, provides: ‘A challenge for cause to an individual juror may be made Qllly on the following grounds,’ and then lists twelve separate grounds.” Gonzalez v. State, 143 So. 3d 1171, ll77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (quoting § 913.03, Fla. Stat). Of the twelve grounds, only one in applicable here: “The juror has a state of mind regarding the defendant, the case, the person alleged to have been injured by the offense charged, or the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted that will prevent the juror from acting with impartiality . . . .” § 9l3.03(l0), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added)! The test for impartiality is whether the juror has a “bias or prejudice” that “will prevent him or her from serving as a fair and impartial juror.” Gonzalez, 143 So. 3d at 1177. Juror James expressed her discomfort with the charges in this case. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked: “Knowing that this [case] is about the exposure of sexual organs and you are going to be hearing things of that nature[,] [d]oes anybody feel uncomfortable seating on ajury dealing with that?” Two jurors raised their hands: Juror Poulard and Juror James. Juror Poulard said that she was “not comfortable with that subject” and she “already set aside an opinion already based on what I already know.” The prosecutor then called on Juror James and asked, “you feel the same,” and Juror James said, “[y]es.” The trial court then followed up about Juror James’ discomfort: Where I use to work with homicides oftentimes you get graphics [sic] pictures and people are employ [sic] squeamish and uncomfortable in seeing those I The remaining grounds for cause challenges are that the juror is disqualified, incompetent, has religious beliefs that preclude jury service, served on the grand jury that returned the indictment, served on a previous jury in the same case, served on ajury of a co~defendant. served on a related civil jury, was an adverse party in a civil case, related to a party, victim, or attorney, a witness, and a bail surety on the case. [*4] pictures. But that doesn’t mean they couldn’t do their duty and follow the law in taking the facts that were given them to them and applying the law as I gave it in order to make a decision as for [sic] as whether a crime was committed and the defendant is [the] person that committed the crime. Do you understand what I am saying? Can you do that? Juror James apparently gave a non-verbal response in the affirmative. Se; i_d_. at 1174 (“No response was noted but Ms. Johnson presumably nodded yes”). Lezcano, during his voir dire, followed up with Juror James about her discomfort. Lezcano asked: “I think Ms. Poulard and Ms. James raised their hand when I believe the State asked whether you are uncomfortable with the subject. So if I could inquire a little bit more. Ms. James, knowing that the allegations is [sic] of masturbation and you are so disgusted or maybe opposed with the thought of masturbation that you would feel like I feel about animal cruelty?” Juror James answered, “If you do it in your home that’s your problem, but outside again with children around I have a son it makes me a little uncomfortable. Do that in your home but not out in public.” The court followed up, asking whether Juror James could put aside her discomfort with the crime and apply the law: “Whether or not it is a park violation or a first degree murder. You look at it in terms of in sort of sterile environment as for as whether or not the State met their burden. You under what l am saying? Are you comfortable with that?” Juror James said, “yes, I am trying to push that [her discomfort] to the side because at first when I heard the charge it just made me kind of shut down in way.” The court asked again, You understand the separate hats. The Legislature decides you know what the laws arc. Wc are to apply them and to determine in this specific case as I jury did a violation of the law as stated occur and was the defendant the one that committed the crime. Can you do that? Juror James, again, presumably nodded yes, because the court then asked the entire panel, “Everybody understand my analogy?” [*5] Lezcano came back to Juror James one more time. Lezcano asked: “You know the fact that you shut down when you heard the charges is that going to mean that if you are picked on this jury when you go into deliberate you are going to be thinking you know I shut down. I really don’t like that charge. I am really grossed out. How is that going to make you feel if you are picked as a juror?” Juror James responded, “I mean I know I can set that aside, but you know if he became guilty then that will just kind of make a little bit more disgusted I guess. But I can set that aside.” In none of the questions directed at Juror James during voir dire was she asked whether she was biased or prejudiced against Lezcano. The questions were directed at whether she was comfortable with the allegations against Lezcano and whether that would affect her ability to deliberate with the jury. Juror James, moreover, did not say that she was biased or prejudiced against Lezcano such that it would affect her ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Juror James said that she was uncomfortable with public masturbation but that she understood her role as a juror and could put her discomfort aside and follow the law. In Gonzalez, a juror in a sexual molestation case “raised her hand when the trial judge asked the panel the generalized question whether anything about the case might potentially cause them to be biased or prejudiced.” I_r:l.. at 1180. Even with this question and answer, which is much more directly related to the impartiality of the juror for section 9l3.03(l0) purposes than the questions in this case, the Third District concluded that the juror “never stated she could not be fair or impartial.” Ii In other words, to the Third District, even answering yes to the question, “Is there anybody . . . who feels that they might be prejudiced or biased in this particular kind of case,” is not sufficient to conclude that the juror is unfair or partial. Id, at 1173, 1180. Here, the questions and answers [*6] did not touch on whether Juror James was biased or prejudiced against Lezcano, which is the touchstone of a challenge for impartiality under section 913.03(l0). In contrast to this case and Gonzalez, the juror in Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2013) said “she could not be a fair juror because of reservations she held with regard to the defendant°s burglary charge,” and later, “I don’t think I could be fair against [the defendant] because that grudge [about a previous burglary].” Matarranz, 133 So. 3d at 477. The Florida Supreme Court explained that “the Juror admit[ted] to the trial court while describing an upsetting incident in her life that she believed she was biased in favor of the State.” Id_. at 489. It was this sort of statement that questioned the juror’s “ability to be fair and impartial” in deciding the case. Juror James made no such similar statement here. Expressing discomfort about public masturbation, or rape, or murder, is not a basis for a cause challenge under section 913.03. Of course jurors are uncomfortable with a defendant exposing himself, or sexually molesting a child, or gruesomely murdering a stranger. These are crimes, made unlawful by our elected leaders, for the very reason that this conduct is condemned by society. The question for whether a juror can serve is not whether the juror likes or is happy or indifferent to the crime charged. Rather, the question is whether, despite the juror’s feelings about the crime, she can presume the defendant to be innocent, and fairly and impartially judge the evidence and determine whether the state has met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt. The questions to Juror James during voir dire, and her answers, said nothing about whether she was biased or prejudiced against Lezcano. [*7] Reason Two: This Is Not A Matarranz Case. Lezcano argues on appeal that the Supreme Court’s Matarranz decision compels a reversal. For two reasons, this is not a Matarranz case. The holding of Matarranz does not apply here, and the facts in Matarranz are so dissimilar. First, the Florida Supreme Court held in Matarranz that: When a juror expresses his or her unease and reservations based upon actual life experiences, as opposed to stating such attitudes in response to vague or academic questioning, it is not appropriate for the trial court to attempt to “rehabilitate” a juror into rejection of those expressions —- as occurred here. At no point should prospective jurors feel compelled to reject genuine feelings regarding actual life experiences because courts or counsel have engaged in a dialogue that generates embarrassment, nor should our courts empanel jurors who maintain attitudes and feelings regarding the issue currently before the court that are anything but impartial. Matarranz, 133 So. 3d at 490. In Matarranz, a juror said the fact that she had been a victim of a burglary caused her to hold a grudge against the defendant and lean towards the state. The Florida Supreme Court said that trial courts cannot overlook these expressed biases and prejudices based on actual life experiences by compelling or embarrassing the juror into saying she can be fair. Matarranz separated juror statements into two categories. The first category is for “prospective jurors who maintain fixed opinions and firmly held beliefs based on personal life experiences.” Matarranz, 133 So. 3d at 485. “[O]pinion and biases that arise from these circumstances,” the Court said, “are immutable.” l_d_. The second category is for “jurors who misunderstand aspects of the law and the judicial process.” 1g, at 485-86. “These misunderstandings,” the Court said, are based “on a lack of familiarity with or misinformation concerning the law.” id, at 486. For the second category, trial “courts and counsel are correct to engage prospective jurors in a dialogue addressing their partialities, biases, prejudices, and [*8] misconceptions when they are rooted in a lack of familiarity with the judicial system as part of an effort to rehabilitate.” id; Not so for “immutable” biases and prejudices. Sge i_c_i_, at 486-=87 (“[I]t is necessary for courts to distinguish between those biases and beliefs that define a prospective juror — and thus produce little if any actual change in him or her from intensive questioning ~— and those in which information and explanation may provide a prospective juror with the ‘requisite familiarity’ and insight into the judicial process that will render him or her competent to serve”). Here, Juror James did not express an opinion “based on actual life experiences.” Unlike the Matarranz juror, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Juror James was the victim of another’s public masturbation or indecent exposure that made her biased or prejudiced against Lezcano. Juror James did share two actual life experiences during voir dire: her uncle had been the victim of a crime; and another uncle had been accused of a crime. As to these incidents, which were not related to indecent exposure, Juror James said they would not affect her ability to be a fair and impartial juror in Lezcano’s case. Because Juror James’ discomfort with public masturbation was not based on an actual life experience, her answers to the trial court and counsel’s questions did not require the heightened scrutiny that answers based on immutable characteristics require. And because the discomfort was not based on actual life experiences, it was not improper for the trial court and counsel to explain the law and follow up with Juror James about the difference between her discomfort with public masturbation and her role as a juror to assess the evidence and determine whether a crime occurred and whether the defendant did it. Second, the facts of the Matarranz case and this one are so different as to make Matarranz inapplicable. In Gonzalez, the Third District distinguished Matarranz in the following ways: (1) [*9] the Matarranz juror “volunteered that she held a deep-seated bias against the defendant”; (2) the Matarranz juror “affirmatively announced her inability to be fair no less than eight times”;2 (3) the l\/latarranz juror “was expertly rehabilitated after questioning by counsel and the trial court”; and (4) the Matarranz juror “was embarrassed into submission by repeated questioning from the trial court.” Gonzalez, 143 So. 3d at 1180-81. Here, Juror James did not volunteer, after being asked a general question about those who could not be fair, that she held any bias against Lezcano. Juror James did not “repeatedly and expressly” state that she could not be fair to Lezcano based on a past experience — she did not say anything approaching the statements the l\/Iatarranz juror made reflected in footnote two below. The trial court and counsel, moreover, did not extensively question or expertly rehabilitate Juror James. The Matarranz juror went through extensive voir dire over two days by the court and counsel for the state and the defendant. In the Florida Supreme Court’s Matarranz opinion, the quoted portions of the voir dire went on for page after page of follow up and leading questions, at the end of which the juror was embarrassed into conceding that she could be fair. Z It is worthwhile to spell out how extreme the Matarranz juror’s statements were: - “l don’t think I could be fair against [the defendant] because I hold that grudge.” * “[l]t is something that just stays there. l know how [the past crime] affected us and how everything happened. lt was during the holiday season and it was just crazy and it just makes me sad about it and it brings back bad memories.” ' Judge: “When you look over at these two tables which way does your judgment go, if you feel like you have one?” Juror: “Towards [the defendant].” ~ “I could have an open mind about it, but it is still — knowing myselfl think l would lean more towards the State of Floridajust because I don’t think that it is right for someone to come in and take something that someone worked so hard for and take their life away from that person.” - After being asked whether she could have an open mind, the juror stated: “Yes, I think l could. Just like you say maybe l would lean a little more to one side, but I would have to hear everything before I can actually make a decision.” ~ “I can put it aside but, it is just that with my past experiences ~ l have an old mind in all things and I know that l can do it. lt is just that l rather not, just because ~ l mean, put it aside, but l can have an open mind and put all my feelings aside. . . . ” Gonzalez, 143 So. 3d at 1179 (quoting Matarranz). [*10] (We have not cut and paste the entire Matarranz voir dire into this opinion because it is too long, but it can be found on pages of 477 through 481 in the Southern Reporter, volume 133, third edition.) Here, the entire trial was completed in a day — this was a misdemeanor case, not a murder/burglary. Each of the attorneys had only twenty or thirty minutes of time to question the panel. After Juror James raised her hand when asked if she was uncomfortable with the charges, the trial court explained the law and Lezcano’s counsel followed up. All of counsel’s questions were open ended, and Juror James volunteered during Lezcano’s voir dire that she could set aside her discomfort and evaluate the evidence — she was not browbeat into submission. The trial court did not find that Juror James was embarrassed into conceding that she would follow the law and there is nothing in the record to reflect that she was embarrassed. The same distinguishing facts from the Gonzalez case are present here. Matarranz, in sum, cannot be stretched to reach the facts of this case. Reason Three: There Is Support In The Record For The Trial Court’s Decision To Deny The Cause Challenge To Juror James. The job of the trial court in deciding whether to grant a cause challenge to a prospective juror, and the job of the appellate court in reviewing that decision, are different and come with different standards of review. In deciding on a cause challenge, “[t]he trial court must excuse a prospective juror for cause if ‘any reasonable doubt’ exists regarding his ability to render an impartial judgment.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 96 (Fla. 2004). On the other hand, “[w]hen evaluating a juror’s competency, an appellate court must keep in mind that the question is not whether the court might disagree with the trial court’s findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record.” Matarranz, 133 So. 3d at 484 (quotation omitted). “[T]he trial court’s determination ofjuror competency will not be overturned absent manifest error. Indeed, [*11] the trial court’s determination whether a juror challenged for cause is fit to sit on the panel is to be given great weight by a reviewing court because the trial court is uniquely able to assess the juror’s demeanor, responses, and reactions to questions on voir dire.” Gonzalez, 143 So. 3d at 1178 (quotation omitted). Here, as to Juror James’ discomfort with public masturbation, the trial court found “that she could set that aside,” and denied the cause challenge. The trial court’s finding was supported by the record. The trial court explained to Juror James and asked: “Where I use to work with homicides oftentimes you get graphics [sic] pictures and people are employ [sic] squeamish and uncomfortable in seeing those pictures. But that doesn’t mean they couldn’t do their duty and follow the law in taking the facts that were given them to them and applying the law as I gave it in order to make a decision as for [sic] as whether a crime was committed and the defendant is the person that committed the crime. Do you understand what I am saying? Can you do that?” Juror James gave some non-verbal indication that she could. The trial court asked the panel: “Can you apply the law as I give it to you when what you should look at this and follow that law. Can you do that?” The jury panel indicated that they could. The trial court asked Juror James: “The question would be whether or not (A) a crime was committed. Well you get pass[ed] that. Next was he the one that committed the crime. . . . You look at it in terms of in sort [sic] of sterile environment as for as [sic] whether or not the State has met its burden. You understand what I am saying‘? Are you comfortable with that?” Juror James said that “[y]es” she was. She then went on to l0 [*12] explain that she was “trying to push [her discomfort with public masturbation] to the side because at first when I heard the charge it just made me kind of shut down in a way.” The trial court asked Juror James: “[_Y]ou are not here to find any findings on the nature of the charge. You are here to determine if it happened and whether this defendant is the one that did it. You understand the separate hats. The Legislature decides you know what the laws are. We are to apply them and to determine in this specific case as I jury did a violation of the law as stated occur and was the defendant the one that committed that crime. Can you do that?” Juror James again gave some non-verbal indication that she could. Lezcano asked Juror James: “I really don’t like that charge. I am really grossed out. How is that going to make you feel if you are picked as a juror?” Juror James said she knew she could “set that aside.” “I can set that aside,” she said. Juror James clarified that “[i]f the evidence if this witness if you know they say that he did do it. They saw him or whatever it was and if they were believable then that’s the only think I can really go by.” Based on her answers to the trial court and counsel’s questions, Juror James said she could follow the law, understood the difference between her discomfort with the crime alleged and her role as a juror to determine if the crime occurred and whether Lezcano committed the crime, and could set aside her discomfort and evaluate the evidence. The trial court observed Juror James’ demeanor, responses, and reactions to the questions and was able to determine firsthand whether her discomfort at public masturbation somehow overshadowed her answers that she could be fair. The trial court was in the position to determine whether Juror James’ ll [*13] answers were the result of embarrassment or skillful questioning, or reflected a more nuanced and educated understanding of the law and her job as a juror. While we, if sitting as the trial judge, might have concluded differently than the trial court in this case, that is not the standard. An appellate court does not review de novo whether there was a reasonable doubt as to the juror’s impartiality. Rather, the law understands that two judges hearing the same voir dire might disagree. As the reviewing court, we give great weight to the trial court’s findings based on its unique perspective of the voir dire. In Matarranz, the trial court conceded that the prospective juror was embarrassed into agreeing that she could follow the law. Matarranz, 133 So. 3d at 481. Here, the trial court, having sat through and actively participated in the voir dire, hearing Juror James’ responses, observing her facial expressions and body language, concluded that her statements she could be fair, follow the law, and put aside her discomfort, were genuine. Where the trial court’s findings are fairly supported by the record, weware not to disturb them. t W SAM/§I;'THA RUIZ-COHEN It ) j I V i.,_,m% k My

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. , /"}r-~.,,%\ r€f_rj,,g,,LiJcI<:::::::::::::J‘ cracurr JUDGE I2 [*14] SAYFIE, J., dissenting: For the reasons set forth below I respectfully dissent. Appellant, Luis Lezcano was charged by Appellee, the State of Florida, with indecent exposure, arising from allegations that he was observed masturbating on a public nude beach. Lezcano was found guilty after jury trial and now appeals his conviction. He argues that juror Thomasina James (“Ms. James”) was improperly seated on the panel and should have been excused for cause after making numerous comments during jury selection that demonstrated a reasonable doubt as to her impartiality. During the state’s questioning during jury selection, in response to the prosecutor’s statement that the jury was going to hear about the “exposure of sexual organs, a juror, Ms. Poulard responded “Well because I am not comfortable with that subject.” (Trial Transcript, hereinafter “TT” at 67). She further stated “Well it’s just that I think I have already set aside an opinion already based on what I already know.” Id. The prosecutor went on and asked “Who else and Ms. James you feel the same. I don’t want to go into too much if I do not need to?” Juror Thomasina James replied simply “Yes.” Id. Later in the proceedings, during the defense’s questioning, Ms. James stated “If you do it in your home that’s your problem, but outside again with children around I have a son it makes me a little uncomfortable. Do that in your home but not out in public.” (TT 98). The trial court attempted to rehabilitate Ms. James to which she responded, “Yes, I am trying to push that to the side because at first when I heard the charge it just made me kind of shut down in a way.” (TT I00). Upon further rehabilitation by the trial court and subsequent questioning by defense counsel she stated, “I mean I know l can set that aside, but you know if he became guilty then I3 [*15] that will just kind of make me a little bit more disgusted I guess. But I can set that aside.” (TT 101) The defense challenged juror Thomasina James for cause and she was ultimately seated as a juror over defense objection. The jury found Lezcano guilty as charged. This appeal followed. The evidence against Lezcano was comprised of essentially two witnesses. One was a beachgoer that was sunbathing at the public nude beach when she noticed Lezcano masturbating. She informed a lifeguard who called the police. The officer responded minutes later and saw Lezcano naked and masturbating on the beach. This court looks predominantly to two recent cases in making a decision on this issue, Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2013) and Gonzalez v. State, 143 So. 3d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). The law in Florida is well settled that “the trial court abuses its discretion only where there exists a reasonable doubt as to a juror’s ability to render a verdict free from bias or prejudice based on the totality of the juror’s responses.” Id. at 1177, (citations omitted). “’Jurors should if possible be not only impartial, but beyond even the suspicion of partiality.’” Matarranz at 485, citing ()’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 222 (Fla. 1860). Stated another way, “[c]lose cases should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality.” Rodriguez v. Slate, 816 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The trial court’s decision to excuse a juror for cause “must be fairly supported by the record” (Matarranz at 484) and while it should be given “great weight”, “the reviewing court is not necessarily required to defer to the trial court’s superior vantage point if the challenged juror’s answers are equivocal or the juror’s responses change due to the skillful questioning by the lawyers or the trial court.” Gonzalez at 1178 (citations omitted). I4 [*16] In Matarranz, the Florida Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred in seating a juror because there was a reasonable doubt as to the juror’s ability to bc fair and impartial. “The Matarranz holding was based on the prospective juror’s repeated insistence that she could not be fair coupled with the trial court’s repeated attempts to rehabilitate the juror.” Gonzalez at 1175. “Concerns that stem from misinformation and confusion concerning the law or process are ripe for discussion and redress through rehabilitation.” Matarranz at 486. In contrast, inability to follow the law because of personal experiences or beliefs cannot be “fixed” and a juror’s change of heart after rehabilitation in these areas is suspect. In Gonzalez, the juror in question stated that she had been molested as a child but “never affirmatively expressed any bias, and consistently and unequivocally maintained that she could set aside her past experiences and be a fair and impartial juror.” Id. at 1180. As such, in applying Florida law and Matarranz, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision. In the instant case looking at the totality of juror James’ statements, there exists a reasonable doubt as to her impartiality. She begins by stating clearly that she is “uncomfortable” with the charge because she has a young child and that when she heard it she “shut down.” She remains equivocal throughout and her statements are based on personal belief, not on any misunderstanding of the law. In only two statements does she give any indication of being able to push these beliefs aside. In the first she states, “I am trying”, a statement indicating at best, an attempt. In the second, where she states “I know I can set that aside” she ends that same sentence saying she would be “more disgusted.” This record does not support the trial court’s denial of the defense’s cause challenge as to Ms. James. Moreover, the juror’s answers, even when arguably supportive of seating her, were clearly the result of lengthy rehabilitation by the trial court on issues of personal experience and l5 [*17] belief. Unlike the juror in Gonzalez, Ms. James made a clear statement of bias more than once. And unlike the juror in Matarranz who ultimately said she could be fair, Ms. James never made a clear, unequivocal statement that she could put aside her feelings and render a verdict free of any bias. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from the Gonzalez facts and analogous to the Matarranz situation, and as such, the juror should have been excused for cause. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above I believe that the judgment and sentence in this case should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. ,1’; i My »-.. /2 . t I I s it»/t it-/4 r§W.»~/ 1/ W z /2 ltww I it NUSlHIN ci. SA/YFIE V’

CIRCUIT JUDGE

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