TRACEY KENDRICK

v.

AURA M CORSER

I v i l l \ |. I .r | i I \ '\'_. IS I ‘F . S l i x ‘ .- -_ NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES ' TO FILE.RE-HEARING MOTION, - '

AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF

- . . - . .'

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

. - . . _ ELEVENTHworcw, CIRCUIT; v [hi AND FOR MIAMI-DADB c0Ifi~rI§,

FLORIDA

e "' SL110 - .'

APPELLATE DIVISION

__ TRACBY KBNDRICK, 3::-v I . - CASENUMBER: 10-488AP -tI.:. § "7'! F- F11 C-‘ 4'“ ... 0‘ v Appellant-Defendant _ ‘ ' = :99 ' - CASE BELOW: 10-6079 CC 26 ‘ / Opinionfi1m=' 2011. Oral argument: September 2-, 201 On eppeal from a final judgment rendered by the County Court for Miami-Dede County, Florida, Hon. Gladys Perez, - . _ ' - Jeflfrey M¹ Elsesserjlr. and Purvi Shah, firom Florida Legal Services, Ine., adjunct professors with the _Comraun1ty Lawyering Clinic at the University ofMiami School ofLaw Community Justice Project, as Rule 9.370 amici curiaefor the Appellant-Defendant. ; Aura M. Corset, _Appellee-Plaintiff, pro se. Before soro, THORNTON, and RUIZ-COHEN, JJ. PER cumam. ' ‘ - . - ' ' , _ On September 17, 2010, Aura M. Corser (“landlord”) filed an eviction complaint against Tracy Kendrick (“tenant”). On September 22, 2010,-the tenant answered the complaint and filed almotionto ‘determine the rent amount for deposit into the court registry. The tenant disputed the additional arnount ehaifged to her rent for pressure cleaning the property. The appellate reeord clearly reflects that the tenant tlmely_' filed the answer and motionto detern1inerent._ ' '.0n appeal, the pro Jse landlord did not submit an answer brief; thus, she did not assert appellate arguments regarding whether the tenant-timely filed the rent detemiuation motion. We do not consider this an issue‘ for review. | it Fgéfii 47-vi/"”‘*‘ AURAM-¢0R$ERy_. M i - _ .1 W113 Q AP»s¹{e;;1%'§w;ppp V, |o\?-'5\“ - 1-5 L.-l-_'_ZL.-I..-_'_.. "E -4 I [*2] ':_—'t_:“:~.;: '4_ |'-.I.".:.:'_-- l

F.

l -1rG”! A ¥ F”..._, l: l F l l I l ll _ __ rfl' ' - . _ ' ~"On September 29;2010,-the landlord requested an order striking the answer and a default. This 'm0l7i0n alleged that the tenant failed to file a motion to determine the rent amount payable into the court registry. Without conducting a hearing and ruling on the tenant's pending rent determination motion, the trial court entered a default favoring the landlord. This default order found that the tenant Tailed to pay the accrued rent, as alleged in the complaint, into the registry and also failed to submit a motion requesting rent determination The trial court subsequently rendered a final judgment and issued a writ ofposseesion. This appeal followed.’ ‘ ' Our jurisdiction to resolve this appeal arises from section 26.0l2(l), Florida Statutes (2010). We presinne correctness in the county court's factual findings and donot disturb these “unless clearly erroneous.” 310 S0. 2a 119s, 1196 (ins. 4111 DCA 1979). We must reverse a judgment u'pon_deterrninlng that “the finding or conclusion upon which” the trial o0u1't.based*it8 judgment was “clearlywrong through being contrary to the manifest weight oftheevidence.” Leonard v. Leonard, 259 se. gs 529, 532 (Fla. sonon 1912). _ ' ' ‘v = ‘The tenant-argues that the county court improperly ‘granted a default since it failed to resolve the rent determinationmotion pursuant,to section 8160(2), Florida Statutes, which reads: h ' ' In‘ an"action by the landlord for possession of a dwelling unit, if the tenant inter-poses ~ g anydefense other than peymenmhe tenant shallpay into the regisoy ofthe court the ' uccrued rent as alleged in the? complaint or 'qL@rrnlr:ed bptlle court and the rent . which accrues during‘ the pendency of the proceeding, when due._ . ‘.1. Failure of the _' temml to pay the rent into the registry of the court of to fllg Q mpllon [0 delqrgpjgg glie. ‘ »m_ be paid intothe registry 5 days . . . alter the date ofservice of ‘- " process constitutes an absolutewaiver of the tenant's defenses other than payment; and - . - the landlord is entitled to an lm"medlate detaufIt igdgmegtfor removal ofthe tenant with a writ ofpossession to issue without further notice . . . I. = - § ss.co(2) Fla. stat. (2010) (emphasis added). We interpret statutes in accord with theirplain language. Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Med-Union Med Center, Ind; _ Fla. L. Weekly Supp. ___ (Fla. llth __Cir. Ct. Sept-. 22, 2011). Pursuantto section 8160(2), Florida Statutes, the tenant must‘ pay the accrued rent, alleged an the implant or as determinedby the trialma, nothe registry. The pro ‘se landlord did not appear at oral argument. Maya Thomas, a certified legal intern fium the University of Miami School of Law Tenants’ Rights Clinic, presented oral argument on the tenant’s behalf. See R. Regulating Fla; Bar¹ 1-1.6(c) (“An eligible law student may participate in oral argument in appellate coin-ts but only in the presence ofthe supervising lawyer”). 3-S'ee Stanley v. Quest Int‘! Inv., Inc.,450 So. 3d 672, 673; 35 Fla. L. Weekly D2636 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“The statute {section 8160(2)] plainly requires the payment of rent if the tenant chooses to assert any defense other than payntent, and failure to '1nal<e:the necessary deposit constitutes an absolute waiver allowing for immediate defaultjudgrnenri). _ ; ' _ ' i l i "i _.__.n_._.._._._. I [*3] i.‘

T.

l ‘ 4 1- .-1—~.-c-2,-\ ,- .1 r It ll r V vi I M m ‘I -~.--.».- ‘r A ' Here, the tenant moved the trial court to determine the rent Payable 501° lb?¹‘°8l$l¹'Y~ Subsequent to the rent determination request, the landlord moved for default and mistakenly alleged that the tenant failedto file a rent determination motion. The lower court found that “no motion has been filed by the Defendant(s) requesting determination of the amount of rent to be paid into the registry.” This factual finding overlooked the pending motionfor rent determination.'We consider this nan finding erroneous‘, thus meritingreversal. Leonard, 259 So. za at 532. ran along led the can court to improperly apply section 8160(2)» Florida Statutes, by prematurely granting the landlord an default judgment, constituting reversible error.’ We therefore reverse the October¹, 2010 default order,.vacate the final judgment removing the tenant, and remand for the trial court to resolve _ the tenant’s rentzdetennination motion in compliance with section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes; l - 'i‘he tenant seeks appellate attorney's fees pursuant to section 83.48, Florida Statutes (2010). Section 814:8 stateszl ‘ _ ' b '. In"any civil action brought to enforce the provisions ofthe rental agreement or this part, -' - the_ party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered may recover reasonable court costs, including attorney's fees, horn the nonprevailing party. Section 59._46, Florida Statutes (2010), permits us to construe any statute permitting attorney’s fees to tlniprevailbtg party as authorizingi'attorney's fees “ona_ppe'a_l."’ Thus, we may award section _83.48 attorney’s fees on appeal. As the tenant prevails on appeal, Twe grant the motion for section 83.48 appellate attor-ney’s fees. » _ - JUDGEMENT VACATED; REVERSED and REMANDED. ‘ We consider the context in which the trial court granted default. The tenant tiled the rent determination motion on September 22, 2010. This motion’s certificate of service indicates that the tenant “faked” the motion to the landlord (R. 19). “A presumption ofnotice arises when a certificate of service indicates _that pleadings and orders were mailed to counsel,”b uta party may rebut this presumption by filing an affidavit creating a factual issue for resolution by the trial court. Depellsi v. Wislnier, 15 So. ~3d 808, 811 (Fla. 4th,DCA'2009). Since the appellate record does not contain the lnndlordfs affidavit rebutting this presumption, ‘we 'pre.sum_e that the landlord received the rent detennination ~ motion before requesting the default Base'd- on this presumption, the landlord imprecisely alleged to the county court that the tenant did not file arentdetermination motion (R. 22). _5 See Dept. of Children and Families v. A.L., 723 So. 2d 342; 343 (Fla. 3d DCA I998) ("failure to follow the statute was error”); Boozer‘ vi City ofMiami, ll Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 883a (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. Aug.'_3, 2004) (concluding that the clty departed from the lavfs essential requirements by falling to follovv the statute), cert. den. 3D04~3023 (Fla.'3d DCA 2005). , _ h. .3 g _ __ v____ _ _ . ._..__.._..___.,_‘ I I l -I I | i