PEDRO TORRES

v.

CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA

crrv OF MIAMI, FLORIDA ‘*4; __ t * p p-A .f_' V: _-_ ._.--v Respondent. :7? H I A o / Opinion filedm% / Z _, 20/5’ l On appeal from a decision rendered by the City of Miami City Manager, Carlos A. Migoya. Betsy L. Warwick, for Petitioner. p Julie O. Bru, City of Miami Attorney, John A. Greco, Assistant City of Miami Attorney, of i the City ofMiami Attorney’s Office, for Respondent. Before BAGLEY, and ESPINOSA DENNIS, JJ.

ESPINOSA DENNIS, J.

The case before this Court on appeal stems from a verbal exchange and physical altercation that took place on July 5, 2007 in the Coconut Grove Business District between Appellant Pedro Torres, an employee with the City of Miami Public Works Department, and a co-worker. As a result of the altercation, the City of Miami issued Appellant a discipline letter on September 19, 2007 and suspended him for three work days for violating two City of Miami administrative policies. Specifically, the City of Miami alleged that Appellant-violated Civil Service Rule 14.2(h) for “disgraceful conduct”, Rule 14.2(i) for “wantonly offensive conduct”, and City of [*2] Miami Administrative Policy l-99, the “Workplace Violence” policy (herein referred to as “APM l-99”). Appellant denied the alleged misconduct and appealed his discipline to the City of Miami Civil Service Board, claiming he acted in self-defense. The City of Miami Civil Service Board held an evidentiary hearing on April 6, 2010 and heard testimony from Appellant and two co-workers who were at the scene and helped to end the altercation. After hearing this testimony the Board voted 4 - l approving a motion to find Appellant not guilty of the alleged violations. The Civil Service Board submitted its formal “Findings. of Fact and Conclusions of Law” to the City of Miami City Manager on April 27, 2010. The Civil Service Board determined that Appellant had engaged in a physical altercation, but that Appellant had acted in self-defense after his co-worker had “punched Appellant a couple of times.” The Civil Service Board further concluded that, although APM 1-99 does not contain an express exception for self-defense, the policy must be read to contain a self-defense component, “as everyone has the right to defend themselves under common law.” The City ofMiami City Manager reviewed the findings submitted by the Civil Service Board and issued a Final Judgment on June 14, 2010. The City Manager accepted the Civil Service Board’s findings in part, but rejected other findings as “legal conclusions.” He further rejected the Board’s finding that Appellant was not guilty of violating Rule l4.2(h), l4.2(i), and APM l- 99. Finally, the City Manager affirmed the discipline imposed by the City. Appellant now appeals the matter to this Court. Standard ofReview First-tier certiorari review of quasi-judicial decisions rendered by a local administrative or government agency that is not subject to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act consists of a review ofthe record to determine: (1) whether procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the “essential requirements of the law” were observed‘; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by “competent substantial evidence.” City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982); see also Dusseau v. Metro. Dade C’ty Bd. of C’ty Comm’rs, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. ‘Applying the correct law is synonymous with observing the essential requirements of law. Dusseau v. M§11‘Q._D_ade C’ty Bd. of_C’ty Comm’rs, 794 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (Fla. 2001); Haines City Comm’ty Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). _ [*3] 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). The City Manager’s Final Judgment shall be reviewed to determine whether it satisfies this standard. Understanding that the interpretation and application of APM l-99 alone controls whether Appellant may be disciplined despite acting in self-defense, the issue now turns to whetherthe Civil Service Board or City Manager has the authority to interpret and apply the relevant administrative policies regarding employee discipline. Appellant argues that it is not within the City Manager’s authority to reject either the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Civil Service Board, while Appellee argues that the City Manager may reject the legal conclusions of the Civil Service Board. The Code of the City of Miami sets out the respective roles of the Civil Service Board and City Manager when handling appeals of employee discipline. Chapter 40~ 124(7) of the Code states: The [Civil Service Board] shall be free to make its determination of appellant’s innocence or guilt in keeping with the public interest, based solely on the board’s reasonable interpretation of all the pertinent information available. The board shall not be bound by a presumption of the appellant’s innocence or guilt; such presumption does not prevail in administrative law. The findings ofthe board shall be based on competent substantial evidence before it.² In addition to Administrative Policy l-99, the City of Miami also based its discipline of Appellant. on the City of Miami Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Specifically, the City alleged that Appellant violated Rule 14, Sections l4.2(h) and l4.2(i), which state: Sec. 14.2. Grounds for Dismissal, Suspension and Demotion. The following are declared to constitute a breach of duty and to be grounds for dismissal or suspension from the 2E City ofMiami, FL Mun. Code, § 40-124(7). 1 @ City ofMiami, FL Mun. Code, § 40—l22(a). I [*4] classified service or grounds for demotion, though charges may be based upon causes other than those enumerated; viz, that any employee who has been guilty of conduct unbecoming any employee ofthe City of Miami, who: (h) Has been guilty of actions which amount to insubordination or disgraceful conduct, whether committed on duty or off; (i) Has been wantonly offensive in conduct or language toward the public or City officers or employees _ Neither the Civil Service Board nor the City Manager discusses the alleged violations ofRule 14.2 in great detail. While the Civil Service Board briefly discussed whether Appellant’s conduct was “disgraceful”, the Board did not specifically address either alleged violation of Rule 14.2 in its Findings of Facts before finding Appellant not guilty of the allegations. The City Manager likewise did not specifically address the violations of Rule 14.2 in the Final Judgment before overruling the Board’s decision. Nevertheless, the record clearly indicates that the Civil Service Board and City Manager have interpreted the record facts differently by coming to different conclusions whether Appellant’s actions constituted “disgraceful conduct” or “wantonly offensive conduct”. Once again, the issue at hand is to determine which administrative body may make the ultimate decision regarding Appellant’s alleged violation under Rule 14.2. However, unlike the issue ofadministrative policy interpretation presented by APM 1-99, the alleged violations of Rule 14.2 appear to present an issue regarding the interpretation of facts. ' As a general rule, a city manager reviewing the findings of a civil service board may not disregard the findings of fact made by the board unless there is no competent substantial evidence to support those findings. See Town of Surfside v. Higgenbotham, 773 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); see also Cib] ofMiamiv. Huttoe, 38 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1949). In this case the City Manager’s Final Judgment does not contain any findings of fact or explanation why he rejected the Civil Service Board’s not guilty finding regarding the alleged violations of Rule l4.2(h) and l4.2(i). If the City Manager hopes to overrule the Civil Service Board on the factual determination ofwhether Appellant’s actions constituted a violation ofRule 14.2, the City Manager’s Final Judgment must contain findings of fact to support that determination. “Where an administrative agency fails to make the required findings of fact the case must be remanded for that purpose.” City of Miami v. Lopez, 487 So. 2d llll, lll² (Fla. [*5] 3d DCA 1986). See also Smith v._Metro, Dade County, 532 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Accordingly, with regard to the alleged violations of Rule 14.2, the City Manager’s Final Judgment must be quashed. THEREFORE, based on the foregoing analysis, Appellant’s petition is GRANTED with regards to the alleged violations of Civil Service Rule 14.2, and DENIED with regards to the alleged violation of Administrative Policy 1-99. The City Manager’s Final Judgment is QUASHED with regards to Civil Service Rule 14.2 and AFFIRMED with regards to Administrative Policy 1-99. BAGLEY, JJ., concurs. /than HON. MARIA ESPINOSA -DENNIS

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

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CUIT COURT J

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