CARLOS VELEZ & JULIA VELEZ

v.

JOSEPH ALFANO AND GRACE ALFANO

dell M Graham, Judge. Wen . Steven F. Samilow, Bsq., for Appellant. David Magill, Bsq., for Appellees. Hearing on: July 26, 2012. Opinionfiledt Alfigfglji: ,2 . Pagelof3 -_. ,1‘: -_r [*2] "I

49" , Before: JERI BETH COHEN, CINDY S. LEDERMAN, and MARIA I. SAMPEDRO-

IGLESIA, JJ.

COHEN and SAMPEDRO-IGLESIA, JJ. Appellant Carlos A. Velez (Appellant or Broker), appeals the trial court's Amended Final Judgment (Final Judgment) entered on December 16, 2008. The Final Judgment awarded Appellees Joseph Alfano and Grace Alfano (Appellees or Buyers) $5000.00 pursuant to the condominium purchase contract at issue. The trial court found that a handwritten clause in the contract obligating the Broker to pay “$5000 of the 1.75% Deve1cper’s Fee” was in actuality an agreement by the Broker to kick back $5,000 of his commission to the Buyers. Since the evidence at trial was clear that the seller/developer of the property was unaware of the side agreement of the Broker to remit part of his commission to the Buyers, any such agreement would have been illegal The contract at issue states that “Carlos A. Velez will pay $5000 of the 1.75% Developer's Fee." This handwritten piece is signed by Velez, the Broker. Both the Appellant and the Appellees are real estate salespersons, and the Appellant introduced the Appellees to a newly-built Miami condominium.‘ The condominium units were being sold by the original developer and being marketed by its listing broker, Fortune International Realty (Fortune). The Appellant originally offered Fortune $390,000.00 on behalf of the Appellees. Fortune rejected the Appellees offer on behalf of the selIer\developer. The Appellees later offered $400,000.00 (the seller\developers’ asking price), and the sale was consummated. The original $390,000.00 contract was amended to the purchase price of $400,000.00, and Appellant's written contract was preserved in the final purchase contract. Notwithstanding the fact that the language in the contract is clear--that Velez will pay $5,000 of the 1.75% developer’s fee--the trial court found, based on parole evidence, that this l The Appellant’ was acting as a broker through FRG Realty. Page 2 of 3 [*3] was in actuality a promise to remit a portion of the Broker’s commission in order to induce the Buyers to purchase the property. The trial court’s judgment rested, in part, on its determination that the written terms of the contract were ambiguous since the Broker never paid a developer’s fee; the terms did not make any literal sense; and the Appellant could not agree to the developer's fee being reduced. Accordingly, the trial court found that the contract between Appellant and Appellee did not intend to reduce the developer's fee by $5000.00, but instead demonstrated in unmistakable terms that Appellant would rebate $5000.00 of his broker’s cormnission to the buyer. We reverse the trial court's decision. Where a contract is clear, complete and unambiguous, a court may not rewrite or interpret the language of the contract. See Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp, 913 So. 2d 43, $0 (Fla. lst DCA 2005). In this case, the trial comt disregarded the clear, unambiguous terms in the agreement that the Appellant will pay $5000.00 of the 1.75% developer’s fee at closing. Moreover, the written addendum to the original contract contains no latent or patent ambiguity, thereby invoking the parole evidence rule that prohibits a court from receiving extrinsic evidence to interpret a contract. Id. at 52-53.

REVERSED.

LBDERMAN, J., dissents.

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