1906 COLLINS LLC, ETC., ET AL.,

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL CHIBRAS ROMERO, ET AL.,

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed August 17, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D20-1047 Lower Tribunal No. 19-28425 ________________

1906 Collins LLC, etc., et al., Appellants,

vs.

Miguel Angel Chibras Romero, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R. Manno Schurr, Judge.

Dickinson Wright PLLC, and Catherine F. Hoffman and Vijay G. Brijbasi, (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants.

Law Office of John H. Schulte, and John H. Schulte, for appellees.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

BOKOR, J.

2

The lawsuit before the trial court asserts multiple claims against several defendants and involves a dispute between once-partners, owners, managers, and operators of Bâoli, a popular nightclub in Miami Beach. International partners, holding companies, big business, real estate, allegations of contractual breach and betrayal—the music stopped, the parties soured on each other, and the cold florescent lights of the Dade County Courthouse replaced the velvet ropes, bottle service, and thumping beats of the South Beach nightclub scene. But this appeal addresses none of that intrigue. Here, we just determine who gets to hear it. The operators of the nightclub, 1906 Collins, LLC and Mr. Hospitality, LLC, seek relief from the trial court’s order compelling arbitration on certain counts of the amended complaint. The operators contend that the relevant agreement permits the claims to proceed in the underlying lawsuit. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the operators.¹

BACKGROUND

Five of the eight counts of the operative complaint filed by 1906 Collins and Mr. Hospitality address the conduct of Michael Ridard, an employee of Mr. Hospitality and the chief operating officer of the nightclub. Count III

2 Ridard and Mr. Hospitality were the only signatories to the employment agreement.

ANALYSIS

We review a trial court’s order on a motion to compel arbitration de novo. See, e.g., MV Ins. Consultants v. NAFH Nat’l Bank, 87 So. 3d 96, 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Under both the state and federal arbitration codes, when considering a motion to compel arbitration, a court evaluates three factors: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration has been

The employment agreement unambiguously excludes claims described in Section 6F from arbitration. Section 6F (which references and directly follows Sections 6A through 6E, the non-solicitation and noncompete covenants allegedly breached by Ridard) allows Mr. Hospitality to seek, “in addition to all other remedies available at law or equity, injunctive or equitable relief as may be used by any court of competent jurisdiction to restrain or enjoin Ridard from breaching any such covenant or restriction, or to specifically enforce the provisions of these Sections.” This provision, specifically excluded from the arbitration provision, allows Mr. Hospitality to bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction and seek injunctive relief

Reversed and remanded.

3 Additionally, because we conclude that the contract clearly and unambiguously excluded the challenged claims from mandatory arbitration, we need not decide whether the trial court lacked a legal basis to compel arbitration as to 1906 Collins, a non-party to the employment agreement. See, e.g., Stalley v. Transitional Hosps. Corp. of Tampa, Inc., 44 So. 3d 627, 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (explaining that “[a]s a general rule, only the actual parties to the arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate,” except in limited situations where the nonparty is an authorized agent of a signatory).