PATRICK CAMPBELL,

v.

HARPER'S AIR INC.,

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 19, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-0750 Lower Tribunal No. 18-20304 ________________

Patrick Campbell, Appellant,

vs.

Harper's Air Inc., Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto Diaz, Judge.

Campbell Legal Group PLLC, and Debbie R. Campbell, for appellant.

Robb, Coulombe, Buschman, Charbonnet & Bartell, and Marc S. Buschman; Russo Appellate Firm, P.A. and Elizabeth K. Russo and Paulo

R. Lima, for appellee.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

BOKOR, J.

2 Patrick Campbell appeals summary and final judgment in favor of Harper’s Air Inc. The issue hinges on the scope of a release entered between Campbell and Steve Simm, a Harper’s Air employee at the time of the accident referenced in the release. Specifically, does the release’s reference to “employer” cover Harper’s Air, a nonsignatory to the agreement, where, as here, Simm left Harper’s Air’s employ before the effective date of the release? Based on the plain language of the release, we conclude that there is no latent ambiguity requiring parol evidence and the trial court correctly granted final judgment in favor of Harper’s Air. On June 18, 2014, Simm, while driving a work truck for his thenemployer, Harper Air, collided with a vehicle driven by Campbell. In 2016, Campbell sued Simm for negligence. The parties settled the matter and executed a release of Simm on March 18, 2018. Importantly, the parties agree that, in exchange for the settlement amount:

[T]he undersigned Releasor [Campbell] hereby releases and forever discharges STEVE SIMM, his heirs, executors, administrators, agents, assigns, employers, employees, firms and corporations (hereinafter all referred to as ‘Releasees’) liable or who might be claimed to be liable, non[e] of whom admit any liability to the undersigned by all expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever resulting from and/or arising out of all bodily injury, known and unknown, which has resulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred on or about the 18th day of June,

3 2014, at or near the intersection of US 1 and SW 152 Street, Miami Dade County, Florida.

(Emphasis added).

On April 3, 2018, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the action between Campbell and Simm based on the settlement. On June 14, 2018, Campbell filed a second lawsuit (which results in this appeal) against Harper Air, based on the same accident. Harper Air moved to dismiss, which was denied, but then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the release barred this action. The trial court agreed with Harper Air and granted summary and final judgment in favor of Harper Air. This appeal ensued. Campbell argued that because Simm’s employment with Harper Air ended before the date of the release, Harper Air could not benefit as a released “employer.” Or, at least, the term “employer” constituted a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence and a determination of what the parties actually meant by “employer.” Campbell’s position defies a common sense understanding of the word “employer” in the context of the entire agreement. Here, Harper’s Air, the employer at the time of the accident, constituted the only “employer . . . liable or who might be claimed to be liable” for “any and all claims” resulting from the subject accident. See Rivercrest Cmty.

When the language of a release, as with any contract, is clear and unambiguous a court cannot entertain evidence contrary to its plain meaning. [Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1980)]. Accordingly, having found that the release in question is clear and unambiguous, and having concluded that a general release discharging agents and employees releases those who were employed at the time of the tort, we quash the district court's decision and remand with instructions to reinstate the summary judgment in favor of petitioner.

Sheen v. Lyon, 485 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1986) (emphasis added). Because the release contains no ambiguity, the trial court correctly excluded any extrinsic evidence, gave the words their plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the entire agreement, and granted summary judgment in favor of Harper’s Air. Affirmed.