TRENTON NIVEK LAUWEREINS

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D20-239 _____________________________

TRENTON NIVEK LAUWEREINS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Meredith Charbula, Judge.

September 29, 2021

PER CURIAM.

In this direct appeal from his convictions and sentences for second-degree murder and shooting deadly missiles, Appellant seeks reversal on several grounds. We affirm in all respects and write only to address Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Appellant’s mother from testifying on cross-examination that the victim, Appellant’s father, taught the family never to call the police.

I

During its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence that Appellant was inside his bedroom at approximately 11:00 a.m. when he shot through the locked bedroom door and killed his

During cross-examination, the trial court sustained the State’s hearsay objection when defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from Appellant’s mother that the victim taught the family never to call the police. However, during the defense’s case, Appellant was allowed to testify that his father told him not to call for help after the shooting and had previously told him never to call the police. The jury returned a verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder and shooting deadly missiles as charged. This appeal followed.

II

A hearsay statement of intent or plan is admissible under section 90.803(3), Florida Statutes, when offered to “[p]rove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant.” Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1127 (Fla. 2006). Statements of intent under this exception are only admissible to infer the future act of the declarant, not the future act of another person. Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765, 770–71 (Fla. 2001). Thus, hearsay statements by the victim are not admissible to prove subsequent acts of the defendant. Bailey v. State, 419 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “However, if the statement is offered for some purpose other than its truth, the statement is not hearsay and is generally admissible if relevant to a material issue in the case.” Penalver, 926 So. 2d at 1132. Thus, if a statement is offered to show the effect on the listener rather than the truth of the statement, it is not hearsay. Pitts v. State, 227 So. 3d 674, 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

In this case, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting his mother from testifying on crossexamination that the victim taught the family never to call the police. He asserts that the victim’s announced policy to never call

During the defense’s case, Appellant was allowed to testify that the victim told him not to call for help after the shooting and had previously told him to never call the police. Once he testified, Appellant might have had grounds to call his mother as a defense witness to corroborate his testimony regarding the victim’s policy never to call the police. See Buchanan v. State, 743 So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that defendant should have been permitted to call a defense witness to testify that she had overheard the victim’s former girlfriend ask defendant to remove her belongings from the victim’s residence, which would have corroborated defendant’s testimony that he did not have the intent to commit theft when he entered the victim’s residence). Although Appellant did call his mother as a defense witness, he made no effort to elicit or proffer corroborating testimony regarding the victim’s policy never to call the police. In light of the above, the trial court’s restriction of Appellant’s cross-examination of his mother during the State’s case-in-chief did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Even if there was error, the State argues that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the fact that Appellant was allowed to testify about the victim’s “no police” policy. Appellant responds that the error is not harmless because his testimony might be viewed as self-serving by the jury and would carry less weight than the corroborating testimony of his mother, who did not

AFFIRMED.

JAY, M.K. THOMAS, and LONG, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________

Jason T. Forman of Law Offices of Jason T. Forman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey and Michael L. Schaub, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.