ROY S. ELLSWORTH, PETITIONER,
v.
NASH MIAMI MOTORS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND TOBIE WILSON, JR., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court discharged a writ of certiorari and dismissed a petition challenging a District Court of Appeal decision that reversed a negligence verdict based on the inadmissibility of certain accident-related statements under Florida statute § 317.13-317.17. The Court found the issue presented was one of first impression not reviewable by certiorari absent conflict with prior decisions or other constitutional grounds.
The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the District Court's decision by certiorari because the issue presented was one of first impression that had not been addressed in any prior Supreme Court cases. The question was therefore not reviewable by certiorari absent certification by the district court or other constitutional grounds of jurisdiction.
“The court in this case was faced with the question of whether the statute makes inadmissible a statement given subsequent to initial police inquires at an accident, prefaced by direct warning of constitutional privileges and possibility of use against deponent, and in response to questioning allegedly for the purpose not of reporting the accident but determining the necessity for criminal charges.”
States the central legal issue regarding statutory admissibility of accident statements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoy Ellsworth obtained a verdict and judgment in a negligence action against Nash Miami Motors, Inc. and Tobie Wilson, Jr. The District Court of Appea…
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Writ of certiorari has issued in this cause directed to a decision 1 of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which reversed, upon appeal, a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in a negligence action because of a finding that statements by defendant were, under F.S. §§ 317.13-317.17, F.S.A.,2 erroneously admitted into evidence.
The jurisdictional issue presented by the petition3 involves, initially, a determina*734tion of conflict between the decision in the case at bar and those in earlier cases before this Court.4 The court in this case was faced with the question of whether the statute makes inadmissible a statement given subsequent to initial police inquires at an accident, prefaced by direct warning of constitutional privileges and possibility of use against deponent, and in response to questioning allegedly for the purpose not of reporting the accident but determining the necessity for criminal charges.
Upon this point of conflict we are on further consideration unable to accept petitioner’s contentions because our examination of the cited cases indicates that none involved the critical point of law now in dispute. Nor can we agree that the court reached its conclusion by attributing to any previous case an unwarranted effect as controlling precedent upon the pivotal point.5 The question decided in this case was therefore one of first impression not reviewable by certiorari in this Court in the absence of certification or other constitutional ground of jurisdiction.6 The writ should accordingly be discharged and the petition dismissed, disposition of issues raised by respondent being, in this situation, unnecessary.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, THORNAL, O’CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION
The concluding sentence of the opinion herein is hereby stricken and the following language substituted therefor:
“The writ should accordingly be discharged and the petition dismissed. The errors alleged by respondents concerning certain instructions by the trial court present no tenable ground for review here upon a conflict theory.”
In all other respects the petition for rehearing of respondents is denied.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, DREW, THORNAL, O’CON-NELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
PER CURIAM.
The concluding sentence of the opinion herein is hereby stricken and the following language substituted therefor:
“The writ should accordingly be discharged and the petition dismissed. The errors alleged by respondents concerning certain instructions by the trial court present no tenable ground for review here upon a conflict theory.”
In all other respects the petition for rehearing of respondents is denied.
ROBERTS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, DREW, THORNAL, O’CON-NELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1968)…sults were inadmissible, the judgment of conviction was: reversed by the appellate court under the authority of Cooper v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 183 So. 2d 269, and Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, Fla.App.1961, 129 So. 2d 704, writ disch. Fla., 142 So. 2d 733. We agree with the petitioner that, in so doing, the appellate court misconstrued the effect of the cited cases insofar as the controlling point of law is concerned. Accordingly, we have direct conflict jurisdiction of the cause. See Pinkerton-Hays…
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Coffey v. State, 205 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)…From the viewpoint of the person interrogated there is little difference.” Subsequent to the above decision of the District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court in dismissing a petition for writ of certiorari in Ellsworth v. Nash Miami Motors, Inc., 142 So. 2d 733, 734, identified the question decided affirmatively by the Court of Appeal in the following language: “The court in this case was faced with the question of whether the statute makes inadmissible a statement given subsequent to initial police inqui…
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Mitchell v. State, 227 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…ourse of his duty investigates such a motor vehicle accident, whether at the time of and at the scene of the accident or thereafter”. (Emphasis supplied). And Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, Fla.App.1961, 129 So. 2d 704, writ disch. Fla. 1962, 142 So. 2d 733, held that the immunity also applies to evidence so given, not only to the officer first investigating the accident for purpose of making the report aforesaid, but also to evidence so supplied by such person to a subsequent officer or officers. And…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., Inc. v. Doyle Pope, 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1961)
- Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1949)
- McBURNETTE v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962)
- Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 129 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1955)
- Ippolito v. Brener, 89 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1956)
- Kaplan v. Roth, 84 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1956)