TERANCE VALENTINE
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A successive postconviction motion is properly denied when the claim was previously raised and rejected, and when Hurst relief does not apply to a defendant who waived his penalty phase jury.
[1] Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being litigated in a successive motion for postconviction relief.
[2] Hurst relief does not apply to defendants who waived their right to a penalty phase jury.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTerance Valentine, a death-sentenced defendant, filed a successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, ra…
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Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC18-1102 ____________
TERANCE VALENTINE, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
June 4, 2020
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.1 P. 3.851(d)(1) (“Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within1 year after the judgment and sentence
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
become final.”); Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being litigated in a successive motion.”). This information was known to Valentine and raised during his initial postconviction proceedings. See Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44, 50 n.8, 51 (Fla. 2012).
Second, the trial court properly denied Valentine Hurst2 relief because he waived his right to a penalty phase jury. See Twilegar v. State, 228 So. 3d 550, 551 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]he Hurst decisions do not apply to defendants like Twilegar who waived a penalty phase jury.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Valentine’s successive motion for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. COURIEL, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County, Michelle Sisco, Judge - Case No. 291988CF012996000AHC Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer and Maria DeLiberato of Parmer DeLiberato. P.A., Tampa, Florida,
2. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rick A. Buchwalter, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Hurst v. Florida., 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016)
- Czajkowski v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)
- Terance Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 2012)
- State v. Kablitz, 136 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 2014)
- Twilegar v. State, 228 So. 3d 550 (Fla. 2017)