N.B., THE MOTHER,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ET AL.,

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed June 5, 2019. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D18-2525 Lower Tribunal No. 18-15189 ________________

N.B., the Mother, Appellant,

vs.

Department of Children of Families, et al., Appellees.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Cindy S. Lederman, Judge.

Law Offices of Roger Ally, P.A., and Roger Ally, for appellant.

Karla F. Perkins, for appellee the Department of Children and Families; Akerman LLP, and Tracy Tatnall Segal (West Palm Beach); Thomasina Moore (Tallahassee), and Laura J. Lee (Tallahassee), for appellee the Guardian ad Litem Program.

Before SALTER, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

N.B., the mother, challenges a final judgment terminating her parental rights. On appeal, she argues that the lower tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction failed to comport with the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), thus rendering the final judgment void ab initio.¹ For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm the final judgment under review. In January 2017, the mother gave birth to a son in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Although the mother was unmarried at the time of the child’s birth, she remained involved in an amorous relationship with D.M., the child’s biological father. In September 2017, the mother and father temporarily traveled to California with the child to escape the forecasted path of destruction of Hurricane Irma. Upon their arrival in California, the parents left the child in a short-term vacation rental without air conditioning. The child was restrained in a car seat, without care or supervision, for an indeterminate number of hours. The child’s cries eventually alerted neighbors to his plight. Law enforcement officers were summoned, and the child was medically evaluated and placed in emergency foster care in California.

2 See Cal. Fam. Code § 3424(a) (2018).

4 probationary terms were imposed. The parents subsequently returned to Miami- Dade County and received probationary transfers under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision.³ On January 5, 2018, the California court convened a status conference in the temporary emergency proceedings. The court was informed that the paternal grandmother, residing in Florida, was willing to foster the child. On January 12, 2018, the child was adjudicated dependent, and the court ordered the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services “to contact its counterpart in the State of Florida” in order to facilitate an executive transfer. On March 29, 2018, the Florida trial court rendered a written order, accepting the transfer of jurisdiction of the California case. The child was returned to Florida and placed in the care of his paternal grandmother. The mother subsequently relocated to Michigan and ceased contact with the child. On November 28, 2018, following a lengthy adjudicatory hearing, the mother’s parental rights were terminated.4 This appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

3 See § 949.07, Fla. Stat. (2018). 4 The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents, however, only the mother has appealed.

ANALYSIS

The mother contends that Florida did “not have [subject matter] jurisdiction to terminate [her] parental rights.” “Subject matter jurisdiction–the ‘power of the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs’–is conferred upon a court by constitution or by statute.” Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994)). The term jurisdiction must be used precisely and only when apposite: “Jurisdiction” refers to “a court's adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S. Ct. 906, 915, 157 L. Ed. 2d 867 (2004). Accordingly, the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)” implicating that authority. Id.; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (“subject-matter jurisdiction” refers to “the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1503, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994) (“[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’”) (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100, 113 S. Ct. 554, 565, 121 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)) . . . [W]e have encouraged federal courts and litigants to “facilitate[e]” clarity by using the term “jurisdictional” only when it is apposite. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455, 124 S. Ct. at 915.

5 Section 3402(g), California Family Code (2018), contains an identical definition.

6 The UCCJEA defines “abandoned” as “left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.” § 61.503(1), Fla. Stat. (2018); Cal. Fam. Code § 3402(a) (2018).

7 Section 61.503(4), Florida Statutes (2018), defines “[c]hild custody proceeding” as “a proceeding in which legal custody . . . with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for . . . abuse, dependency, guardianship . . . in which the issue may appear.”

10 (defining “transfer” as the action “to convey or cause to pass from one place, person, or thing to another.”). Moreover, as the purpose of a temporary order under emergency jurisdiction “is to protect the child until the [s]tate that has jurisdiction [as the ‘home state’] enters an order,” a vast body of jurisprudence dictates that emergency jurisdiction is intended to be impermanent and transient. UCCJEA § 204 comment (1997); see § 61.517(2), Fla. Stat. (2018); see, e.g., In re Gino C., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“Emergency jurisdiction [can] be exercised to protect a child only on a temporary basis until the court with appropriate jurisdiction issue[s] a permanent order.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, “[i]f there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced . . . and a child custody proceeding has not been commenced [in the ‘home state’],” then temporary emergency jurisdiction only lasts “until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction [as the home state of the child].” § 61.517(2), Fla. Stat. (2018); Cal. Fam. Code § 3424(b) (2018); see also In re Gino C., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 198 (“[T]he UCCJEA provides for ‘temporary emergency jurisdiction, that can ripen into continuing jurisdiction only if no other state with grounds for continuing jurisdiction can be found or, if one is found, that state declines to take jurisdiction.’”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, by exercising jurisdiction, following California’s temporary emergency exercise of jurisdiction, Florida fulfilled the

11 purpose and intent of the UCCJEA, as it remained the state endowed with home state jurisdictional priority. Finally, the mother asserts that California procedurally erred in relinquishing jurisdiction,⁸ effectively depriving her of her right to procedural due process and divesting the Florida court of jurisdiction.⁹ Subject matter “jurisdiction does not depend on procedural rules.” Dougherty v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 76 P. 3d 1183, 1185 (Wash. 2003) (citation omitted). “If the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.” Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 BYU L. Rev. 1, 28. Thus,

8 The mother also asserts the Florida court procedurally erred in accepting jurisdiction, however, we find no merit to this claim. First, the mother conflates the statutory burdens encumbering a court declining to exercise jurisdiction with the duty of a home state to accept transfer absent a reasoned determination that it is an inconvenient forum. See § 61.520(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). Second, it is axiomatic that the Florida court acquired personal jurisdiction over the mother, as she appeared during the Florida proceedings and stipulated to the entry of a case plan. See C.J.L- M. v. Dep’t Children & Families, 248 So. 3d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding “the mother's personal appearance at the shelter hearing obviated the need for service of process [of a subsequently filed dependency petition]”) (citation omitted).⁹ We note the mother’s arguments are incongruous, as she first contends that California continued to exercise jurisdiction, and then asserts that California improperly relinquished its continuing jurisdiction. These arguments do not represent arguments in the alternative based on varying interpretations of the law, but rather constitute contradictory presentations of the facts that leave us to grapple with the record “in an effort to ferret out the dispositive issues.” Auto World Body & Paint, Inc. v. Sun Elec. Corp., 471 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

12 any failure by the California court to adhere to procedural requirements, as alleged, is not within the purview of our review. See Krebs v. Krebs, 960 A. 2d 637, 643 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (Appellant “makes her argument in the wrong court . . . if [she] was aggrieved by [the sister] court’s declination of jurisdiction, the appropriate review would be in the appellate courts [of the sister court’s jurisdiction] . . . our conclusion is also consistent with other decisions applying the UCCJEA . . .”) (citing Ramsey v. Ramsey, 995 So. 2d 881 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008); Cole v. Cushman, 946 A. 2d 430 (Me. 2008); Fickinger v. Fickinger, 182 P. 3d 763 (Mont. 2008); Griffith v. Tressel, 925 A. 2d 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); Horgan v. Romans, 851 N.E. 2d 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Shanoski v. Miller, 780 A. 2d 275 (Me. 2001)).

CONCLUSION

As California exclusively exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction, and Florida remained the child’s home state, the exercise of jurisdiction by the lower tribunal, following the court-ordered transfer and subsequent acceptance of the case, was in substantial conformity with the requirements of the UCCJEA.¹⁰ Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment under review.