ERIC SANTIAGO
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR BANC OF AMERICA FUNDING CORPORATION MORTGAGE PASS-THRU CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-B
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A voluntary dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a) does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider a motion for release of original documents that a party placed in the court file. A separate lawsuit is not required for a party to seek release of documents it caused to be placed in the court records.
[1] A voluntary dismissal of an action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a) divests the trial court of jurisdiction to grant substantive relief on the merits…
[2] The right of a party to have original documents released from court records is independent of and not relevant to whether that party has the right to enforce the underlyi…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The voluntary dismissal serves to terminate the litigation, to instantaneously divest the court of its jurisdiction to enter or entertain further orders that would otherwise dispose of the case on the merits, and to preclude revival of the original action.”
This quote from Pino v. Bank of New York establishes that voluntary dismissal divests jurisdiction over substantive relief, but the court distinguished this from jurisdiction over document release.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSantiago was the sole signatory on a promissory note secured by a mortgage. Bank of America originally sued to foreclose in 2009, filed the original n…
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
ERIC SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5D18-2470
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
AS TRUSTEE FOR BANC OF AMERICA
FUNDING CORPORATION MORTGAGE
PASS-THRU CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-B,
Respondent. ________________________________/
Opinion filed October 25, 2018
Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Heather L. Higbee, Respondent Judge.
Christopher M. Sprysenski, of The Florida Family Firm, Altamonte Springs, for Petitioner.
David Rosenberg, of Robertson, Anschutz & Schneid, P.L., Boca Raton, and Sara F. Holladay-Tobias, Emily Y. Rottmann, and C.H. Houston, III, of McGuireWoods, LLP, Jacksonville, for Respondent.
LAMBERT, J.
Eric Santiago petitions this court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from holding a hearing on Respondent’s, U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for Banc of America Funding Corporation Mortgage Pass-Thru Certificates, Series 2007- B (“U.S. Bank”), motion for release of the original promissory note and mortgage from the
Santiago is the sole signator of the promissory note at issue. Bank of America was the original lender. In August 2009, Bank of America sued Santiago to foreclose on the mortgage that secured the indebtedness evidenced by this note. Four months later, Bank of America filed the original note and mortgage in the court file. The note, ironically, contained a sole, undated, specific indorsement to the present respondent, U.S. Bank. In September 2011, Santiago and Bank of America settled their litigation and the action was dismissed. The original note and mortgage remained in that court file.
In October 2017, U.S. Bank filed the underlying foreclosure action seeking to foreclose on the same note and mortgage that was the subject of the 2009 case. U.S. Bank alleged that it held the note and mortgage and that Santiago had defaulted on his payment obligations under this loan on December 1, 2012, and all subsequent payments. U.S. Bank attached a copy of the note, containing the same and sole indorsement, and a copy of the mortgage to its complaint. Additionally, U.S. Bank filed a certification pursuant to section 702.015(4), Florida Statutes (2017), that the original note was located “at the Orange County Courthouse [in the 2009 court file], on behalf of [U.S. Bank].” U.S. Bank thereafter filed a motion in this case to direct the clerk of court to transfer the original note
On February 26, 2018, U.S. Bank filed a notice with the clerk of court that it was voluntarily dismissing the underlying foreclosure action without prejudice “due to a settlement” and cancelling the notice of lis pendens previously recorded on the subject mortgaged property. U.S. Bank then moved for a court order directing the clerk of court to release the original note and mortgage to it. Santiago objected, and the trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion. Santiago filed the instant petition to prohibit the trial court from conducting this hearing.
“Prohibition is an extraordinary writ, a prerogative writ, extremely narrow in scope and operation, by which a superior court, having appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over an inferior court or tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial power, may prevent such inferior court or tribunal from exceeding jurisdiction or usurping jurisdiction over matters not within its jurisdiction.” English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1977). Santiago argues that pursuant to Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013), and Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978), once U.S. Bank filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, the trial court lost jurisdiction in that case to consider the motion for release of records. See also Katke v. Bersche, 161 So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“In a matter where the court loses ‘case’ jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition is the proper claim for relief.”).
Santiago’s reliance upon Pino and Randle-Eastern is misplaced because those decisions each addressed the trial court’s authority to grant substantive relief in an action after a plaintiff files a voluntary dismissal. See Pino, 121 So. 3d at 32 (“The voluntary
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION DENIED.
TORPY and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Carey English v. McCRARY, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977)
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)
- Pino v. The Bank OF NEW York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013)
- Katke v. Bersche, 161 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)
- Kajaine Ests., LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n & David Williams, 198 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)