JIMMIE EVANS

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed January 21, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D24-2126 Lower Tribunal No. F11-16168 ________________ Jimmie Evans, Appellant, vs. State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton Hirsch, Judge. Carlos Martinez, Public Defender, and Amy Weber, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SCALES, C.J., and EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

EMAS, J.

1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 2 In Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the Fourth District held:

[W]here a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it appear to the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court appointed counsel, the trial judge, in order to protect the indigent's right to effective counsel, should make an inquiry of the defendant as to the reason for the request to discharge. If incompetency of counsel is assigned by the defendant as the reason, or a reason, the trial judge should make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant.

3 See, e.g., C.H. v. State, 116 So. 3d 629, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“[T]o trigger a [Nelson] hearing, a defendant must do more than merely express general dissatisfaction with his or her attorney. A Nelson hearing is required only when the defendant makes a ‘clear and unequivocal’ statement that he wishes to discharge appointed counsel, the discharge request is based on a claim of incompetence, and the alleged ineffectiveness arises from counsel's current representation.” (quoting Laramee v. State, 90 So. 3d 341, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012))).⁴ The timing is noteworthy because a defendant may waive his right to a Faretta hearing if the request for self-representation is not raised prior to trial. See, e.g., Laramee v. State, 90 So. 3d 341, 345 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (noting: “While a defendant's request for self-representation may be summarily denied if not timely asserted, ordinarily, a request is timely if made prior to the trial's commencement.” (citing Pasha v. State, 39 So. 3d 1259, 1262 (Fla. 2010) (reversing conviction where trial court denied defendant's selfrepresentation request made just prior to jury selection)).

5 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) and (3) provide:

(2) A defendant shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the accused's comprehension of that offer and the accused's capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Before determining whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent, the court shall advise the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.

(3) Regardless of the defendant's legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and does not suffer from severe mental illness to the point where the defendant is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself or herself.

6 We note that the probation revocation order contains apparent post hoc language by the trial court to support its decision not to conduct a Faretta hearing in the face of an unequivocal request for self-representation. On appeal, Evans contends that several statements within the trial court’s revocation order find no support in the record on appeal and demonstrate a bias and prejudice against Evans. Indeed, Evans’ brief requests that, should we reverse, the case should be remanded for further proceedings before a different judge in light of the trial judge’s alleged bias. We decline the invitation to reach the merits of this claim in the first instance, but do so without prejudice to Evans raising the issue before the trial court on remand.