EUGENE MAURICE BATIE
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Sentencing conditions that are not general conditions cannot be imposed in a written sentencing order unless they were orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing.
[1] A sentencing condition that is not a general condition cannot be imposed in a written sentencing order unless it was orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBatie was convicted of lewd or lascivious exhibition. The trial court imposed a four percent surcharge on supervision costs and a condition requiring …
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BFIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-0681 _____________________________
EUGENE MAURICE BATIE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. David P. Kreider, Judge.
January 14, 2026
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Eugene Maurice Batie, appeals his conviction and sentence for lewd or lascivious exhibition and the trial court’s denial of his rule 3.800(b)(2) motions. We write only to address the portions of Appellant’s motions that requested the trial court to strike special conditions from the written sentencing order.
In its amended sentencing order, the trial court imposed a four percent surcharge on Appellant’s cost of supervision and imposed a condition requiring Appellant to pay his costs “[t]hrough the defendant’s probation officer over the probationary period.” Appellant challenges these conditions, arguing that they could not
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be imposed in the written sentencing order because they were not orally pronounced at his sentencing hearing.
The State correctly concedes error on the four percent surcharge. That condition must be stricken. Similarly, the requirement to pay “[t]hrough the defendant’s probation officer over the probationary period” is not a general condition and cannot be imposed without oral pronouncement.
For these reasons, we REMAND this matter to the trial court for it to strike the conditions imposing a four percent surcharge and requiring Appellant to pay his costs “[t]hrough the defendant’s probation officer over the probationary period.” We AFFIRM in all other respects.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and ROWE and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Miranda Lee Butson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.