JENNIFER J. EDWARDS
v.
JEREMY KYLE WILLIAMS
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A trial court's modification of a parenting plan must include explicit findings that the change in circumstances is substantial, material, and unanticipated as required by § 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, and an appellate court cannot make these factual determinations itself.
[1] A trial court modifying a parenting plan under Florida Statute § 61.13(3) must make explicit findings that the change in circumstances is substantial, material, and unant…
[2] Failure to include requisite statutory findings of a material and unanticipated change in circumstances in a parenting plan modification typically requires reversal.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.”
This quote establishes the statutory requirement under § 61.13(3) that all three elements—substantial, material, and unanticipated—must be shown before a parenting plan can be modified.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court modified the parties' August 2021 parenting plan by awarding shared parental responsibility with the father having ultimate decision-m…
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 6D2023-3077 Lower Tribunal No. 21-213DR _____________________________
JENNIFER J. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. JEREMY KYLE WILLIAMS, Appellee. _____________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County. Mary C. Evans, Judge.
December 23, 2025
STARGEL, J.
The mother, Jennifer Edwards, appeals the Amended Supplemental Final Judgment (ASFJ) modifying a long-distance parenting plan for the parties’ minor child. The father, Jeremy Williams, did not file an answer brief or otherwise participate in this appeal. The mother argues, among other things, that the trial court failed to make necessary factual findings of a material and unanticipated change in circumstances that would warrant a modification of the parties’ prior timesharing plan. We agree.
Id.1 While the trial court made findings under section 61.13(3), the ASFJ only stated that the father met his burden to prove a substantial change in circumstances and that modifying the parties’ long distance parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. But section 61.13(3) requires a “substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.” The trial court failed to make any finding that the substantial change in circumstances was “material” or “unanticipated.” See Davis v. Davis, 363 So. 3d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023); § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat.2 And “we, as an appellate court, are not in a position to make that initial determination.” Romeo, 310 So. 3d at 1065 (citing Douglass v. Buford, 9 So. 3d 636, 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“Sitting as an appellate court, we are precluded from making factual findings
1 Section 61.13 was substantially revised effective July 1, 2023, and no longer includes the requirement that the change be “unanticipated”; however, the previous version of the statute applies to this case.2 The statute does not appear to expressly require the trial court to make findings as to a “substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances.” See § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2022) (providing that a modification should not occur “without a showing of a substantial, material and unanticipated change in circumstances” (emphasis added)). However, we are bound by this Court’s decision in Davis, which, upon considering the same language, held that the trial court was required to make such findings. Davis, 363 So. 3d at 1214.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
WOZNIAK and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.
Stacy L. Haverfield, of Stacy L. Haverfield, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
No Appearance for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
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