LINA BESADA BROCHE

v.

JUAN PABLO BROCHE

2 See Tercier v. Univ. of Miami, Inc., 383 So. 3d 847, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“[W]e note that ‘Florida law does not prohibit the adoption, verbatim, of a judgment that has been proposed by a party to the litigation.’” (quoting Smith v. Wallace, 249 So. 3d 670, 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) and citing In re T.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 924 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (observing that no “post-Berg-Perlow decisions of this court requires reversal solely on the ground that a trial court has adopted a judgment prepared by one of the parties”))); Kendall Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. Madrigal, 271 So. 3d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (rejecting appellant's argument “that the trial judge failed to exercise his independent judgment merely because he adopted verbatim [appellees’] proposed order”); Flint v. Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217, 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“[W]hat is critical for a reviewing court is that a final judgment reflect the trial judge's independent decision on the issues of a case, not that the judge used words drafted by one of the parties to express that decision.”); see also Kasm v. Kasm, 933 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“The trial court must not only determine that one spouse has a need for suit money and the other has the ability to pay, but also that the temporary attorney's fees and costs awarded are reasonable.” (quotation omitted)); Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“The ‘appropriate inquiry and standard to be applied is the same

3 whether the fees requested are temporary or final.’” (quoting Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 622 (Fla. 1988))).