WEAVER
v.
HATFIELD
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A spouse who executes a warranty deed explicitly assigning all marital and homestead interests to the other spouse waives homestead rights in the property, allowing the recipient spouse to freely convey the property during life without homestead restrictions.
[1] A spouse may waive homestead rights by executing a written instrument that explicitly expresses intent to assign all marital and homestead interests to the other spouse,…
[2] Language in a warranty deed assigning 'all interest, of whatever kind including any marital or homestead interest' is sufficiently specific to constitute a valid waiver o…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The waiver signed by Mr. Weaver expresses an explicit intent to waive marital and homestead rights. Specifically, Mr. Weaver released 'all his interest, of whatever kind including any marital or homestead interest, in this real property to Carolyn Sue Weaver.'”
Establishes that the operative language of the warranty deed was sufficiently explicit to constitute a valid waiver of homestead rights.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Weavers executed an Agreement for Deed in December 2013. In July 2019, Kip Weaver executed a warranty deed assigning to his wife Carolyn all his i…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-2423 _____________________________
KIP ANTHONY WEAVER,
Appellant,
v.
RUFUS EUGENE HATFIELD,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. William Francis Stone, Judge.
November 19, 2025
OSTERHAUS, C.J.
Kip Anthony Weaver appeals the denial of his petition to determine homestead status of real property. The trial court concluded that Mr. Weaver waived his homestead rights when he executed a warranty deed assigning his rights and interests to his decedent wife, Carolyn Sue Weaver. Seeing no error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.
I.
Upon Ms. Weaver’s death in 2023, Mr. Weaver filed a petition to determine homestead status of real property. Mr. Weaver argued that upon Ms. Weaver’s death, the homestead Property vested in him as the surviving spouse. In response, Mr. Hatfield argued that Mr. Weaver waived his homestead rights in the Property in 2019, and that a subsequent 2022 conveyance vested the Property in Mr. Hatfield.
The trial court agreed with Mr. Hatfield. It denied Mr. Weaver’s attempt to regain a stake in the Property due to his earlier assignment of his homestead rights. Mr. Weaver timely filed a notice of appeal and challenges the denial of his petition.
II.
The trial court’s order denying Mr. Weaver’s petition involves the interpretation of statutory language and is reviewed de novo. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 380 So. 3d 541, 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
The Florida Constitution protects homestead property by providing tax exemptions, protecting against its forced sale by creditors, and restricting its alienation or devise. Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. These protections, however, may be alienated or encumbered. Id. at § 4(c). Section 732.702(1), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part that “[t]he rights of a surviving spouse to . . . homestead . . . may be waived . . . before or after marriage, by written contract, agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving party in the presence of two subscribing witnesses.” Subsection (1) states further that “a waiver of ‘all rights’ or equivalent language, in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse . . . is a waiver of all
This case involves a homestead rights waiver dispute. In deciding whether a waiver occurred under applicable law, we look, first, to the operative language of the subject waiver. The waiver signed by Mr. Weaver expresses an explicit intent to waive marital and homestead rights. Specifically, Mr. Weaver released “all his interest, of whatever kind including any marital or homestead interest, in this real property to Carolyn Sue Weaver.” The waiver expressly mentions not only Mr. Weaver’s homestead rights, but marital rights and “[a]ll the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances. . . .” This language is sufficiently specific to waive homestead rights under § 732.702(1) and leaves Mr. Weaver in a position vis-a-vis the Property that equates to having pre-deceased his spouse. Webb v. Blue, 243 So. 3d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). And so, the waiver left Ms. Weaver free unilaterally to convey the Property during her life without restriction, which she did to Mr. Hatfield.
We acknowledge Mr. Weaver’s § 732.7025 argument regarding supposed non-compliance with statutory waiver requirements. But § 732.7025 isn’t applicable here as it restricts “devises” of the homestead. Section 731.201(10), Florida Statutes, defines a “devise” as a testamentary disposition of personal property by will or trust. The deeds executed here, however, involved conveyances during Ms. Weaver’s life. The conveyance to Mr. Hatfield was not a “devise.” By the time of the 2022 conveyance to Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Weaver had already executed a clear waiver of his homestead and spousal rights in the Property. And unlike in Thayer, the case on which Mr. Weaver relies, the language of his warranty deed explicitly indicated a waiver of his homestead interests in the property and all hereditaments of the homestead. Thayer v. Hawthorn, 363 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). As such, Ms. Weaver was free to convey the Property to Mr. Hatfield during her life without regard to § 732.7025.
4
III.
For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
AFFIRMED.
ROWE and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________
John R. Dowd Jr. of the Dowd Law Firm, P.A., Destin, for Appellant.
Cristine M. Russell, of Rogers Towers, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.