ADAM COLE CRENSHAW

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D2023-3159 LT Case No. 2021-CF-001381 _____________________________

ADAM COLE CRENSHAW,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee. _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County. Alicia R. Washington, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, Edward J. Weiss and Brian Hyer, Assistant Public Defenders, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alyssa M. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

September 19, 2025

PRATT, J.

Adam Crenshaw appeals the judgment, and resulting life sentence, arising from his convictions for multiple counts of sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. For the following reasons, we reverse one of his convictions and remand for the trial

I.

The State charged Crenshaw with committing, between January¹ and March¹¹, 2021: sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age with his penis (count I), mouth (count III), and fingers (count V), and lewd or lascivious molestation of a person less than 12 years of age by touching the person’s genitals (count VII) and breasts (count IX). It also charged him with committing, between March 12 and December 23, 2021: sexual battery on a person 12 to 18 years of age by a person in a position of familial or custodial authority with his penis (count II), mouth (count IV), and fingers (count VI), and lewd or lascivious molestation of a person 12 to 16 years of age by touching the person’s genitals (count VIII) and breasts (count X). Finally, the State charged Crenshaw with, between January¹ and December 23, 2021, transmitting to the victim an image that is harmful to minors (count XI).¹

A child is competent to testify if she “appreciates the need to tell the truth” and “has sufficient intelligence” to observe facts and “sufficient capacity to relate them correctly.” Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 1988). On the first day of trial, Crenshaw requested “an inquiry from the Court about a truth and a lie, whether or not [the victim]’s competent to proceed.” The court asked the victim whether she knew she was there to testify truthfully and whether she knew the difference between a truth and a lie; she answered in the affirmative as to both questions. The court asked if any party wanted further inquiry, and Crenshaw requested inquiry into whether the victim knew the definition of a lie. The victim then gave examples of truths and lies and affirmed that she understood a lie to be something that is not true. The court asked twice more if Crenshaw wanted to further inquire of her competency; he answered in the negative each time.

Any failure by the trial court to conduct a more thorough competency review is due to Crenshaw’s failure to request one. He did not ask that the court inquire about the victim’s ability to observe or recollect facts or—to the extent it differs from her understanding of the difference between a truth and a lie—her sense of a moral obligation to truthfully testify. See Wade v. State, 586 So. 2d 1200, 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (refusing to equate knowledge of the difference between a truth and a lie to appreciation of the need to tell the truth); Hammond v. State, 660 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (same). As such, Crenshaw failed to preserve any alleged error for our review. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) (“[F]or an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”).

III.

Crenshaw next alleges that the State committed discovery violations when it failed to highlight portions of a forensic cell phone download it intended to introduce at trial, and that the trial

At trial, Crenshaw objected that the State did not provide him with a supplement of a forensic download of the victim’s phone until the morning of jury selection. He acknowledged the State had provided him with the entire download over a year before trial, but he claimed the State should have re-disclosed the specific messages it intended to introduce at trial. The trial court overruled the objection and did not conduct a Richardson hearing. The State later introduced text messages from the forensic download between Crenshaw and the victim confirming the victim’s story that he would text her in the middle of the night and direct her to come to his room. Crenshaw also introduced text messages from the download in an attempt to show that the phone did not belong solely to the victim but was shared among all family members.

“[A] trial court is not required to conduct a Richardson hearing” unless it first determines that a “discovery violation has occurred.” Teets v. State, 321 So. 3d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Smith v. State, 283 So. 3d 817, 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)). We review the trial court’s determination of whether a discovery violation occurred for an abuse of discretion. Whites v. State, 730 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Here, because the State had disclosed all the evidence at least once, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State committed no discovery violation. Regardless, any purported error was harmless. A trial court’s failure to hold a Richardson hearing “can constitute harmless error if the appellate court can ascertain, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no reasonable possibility that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.” Bess v. State,

2 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

IV.

In his third issue, Crenshaw contends that the trial court erred by admitting collateral crime evidence as inextricably intertwined evidence and Williams³ rule evidence. He preserved only his challenges that: (1) the collateral crimes were not inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes; (2) the State provided inadequate notice of its intent to introduce the collateral crimes; and (3) the collateral crimes became a feature of the trial.

Here, the State sought to introduce evidence that Crenshaw started sexually abusing the victim when she was six and continued to do so on a regular basis until the time of the charged crimes in 2021. The trial court allowed evidence of the prior abuse as inextricably intertwined evidence and Williams rule evidence. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. See Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 291 (Fla. 2009), abrogated on other grounds, Cruz v. State, 372 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2023).

1.

Inextricably intertwined evidence is not Williams rule evidence. Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994). Whereas Williams rule evidence “is limited to ‘similar fact evidence,’” inextricably intertwined evidence does not have to be similar to the charged crime. Id. (quoting § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991)). To be admissible, inextricably intertwined evidence need only: “(1) adequately describe the charged act, (2) provide an intelligent account of the crime charged, (3) establish the entire context out of which the charged crime arose, or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crime.” Barry v. State, 264 So. 3d

3 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).

The evidence that Crenshaw had been abusing the victim for six years leading up to the charged acts was inextricably intertwined to establish the entire context out of which the charged crimes arose. Crenshaw alleged that the victim fabricated the abuse allegations, so the State used the collateral crime evidence to explain why she waited six years to report the abuse. The collateral crime evidence was not isolated instances of abuse but rather evidence that Crenshaw groomed the victim. Thus, the trial court properly admitted the collateral crime evidence as being inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes.

2.

The evidence also was admissible as Williams rule evidence. See § 90.404(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023) (when a defendant is charged with child molestation, evidence of other acts of child molestation “is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant,” including to show propensity). When the State seeks to introduce Williams rule evidence, it must, at least¹⁰ days before trial, give the defendant “a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information.” Id. § 90.404(2)(d)1. Thus, the notice must “contain dates, locations, [and] details of the uncharged sexual conduct that” the State seeks to introduce. Sabine v. State, 58 So. 3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

The State met those requirements here. It provided Crenshaw notice of its intent to introduce the collateral crimes well over¹⁰ days before trial. The notice supplied the dates of the prior acts by providing the victim’s date of birth and alleging that the uncharged acts began when she was six and continued up until the charged time period. It included the locations where the prior abuse occurred when it stated that the family lived in Duval, Alachua, and other Florida counties before moving to Putnam, where the charged crimes occurred. Finally, the notice contained details of the sexual conduct, noting that Crenshaw touched the victim’s breasts, vagina, and buttocks; forced her to engage in oral

3.

“[S]imilar fact evidence . . . cannot become [a] feature of the trial.” Whisby v. State, 262 So. 3d 228, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Williams rule evidence becomes a feature of the trial “when inquiry into the collateral crimes ‘transcends the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried’ and the prosecution ‘devolves from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant.’” Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1960)).

The collateral crime evidence did not become a feature of Crenshaw’s trial. The prosecutor mentioned the collateral crimes briefly in opening and closing arguments to combat Crenshaw’s theory that the victim fabricated the abuse allegations. The prosecutor also emphasized to the jury that it was there to consider the abuse that occurred in Putnam County. Moreover, when the victim testified, she mentioned the collateral crimes only in vague terms, but she described in detail the charged instances of abuse. And finally, the trial court instructed the jury on the proper scope of its consideration of the collateral crime evidence. Accordingly, the Williams rule evidence did not become a feature of the trial.

V.

We now turn to Crenshaw’s argument that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support multiple convictions. “We review the record de novo to determine whether sufficient evidence supports the verdict.” Bufford v. State, 844 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). We consider only Crenshaw’s contentions that: (1) the State did not present competent, substantial evidence that counts I, V, VII, and IX occurred between January¹ and March¹¹, 2021; (2) his conviction for count X constitutes fundamental error because the State did not introduce competent, substantial evidence that the touching occurred between March 12 and December 23, 2021; (3) his conviction for counts II and VIII

1.

“If the State presents competent evidence to establish each element of the crime, a motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied.” Bufford, 844 So. 2d at 813. But “[i]f the evidence of an element of the offense charged does not conform to the date of the offense alleged in the information, the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted.” Cox v. State, 764 So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Crenshaw claims only that the State did not present sufficient evidence that counts I (sexual battery with penis), V (sexual battery with fingers), VII (touching of victim’s genitals), and IX (touching of victim’s breasts) occurred between January¹ and March¹¹, 2021. At trial, the victim testified that while the family lived in Putnam County, Crenshaw touched her “private parts” with his “private part,” hands, and mouth and forcefully inserted his “private part” into her “private parts.” The victim clarified that she used “private part(s)” to refer to “vagina” and “penis.” She stated that the abuse was ongoing and happened almost every night. The State introduced evidence that the family’s lease in Putnam began January¹, 2021, and the victim lived with Crenshaw until December 2021. This is sufficient evidence to support that counts I, V, and VII occurred between January¹ and March¹¹, 2021.

However, the victim did not testify that Crenshaw touched her breasts while they lived in Putnam. The only evidence that Crenshaw touched her breasts came from child hearsay statements introduced through two individuals who interviewed the victim. Both witnesses acknowledged that the victim provided no timeline or dates of when that touching occurred. Accordingly, sufficient evidence does not show that Crenshaw touched the victim’s breasts in a lewd or lascivious manner between January¹