ROBERT A. HARRIS

v.

MICHAEL DAZZO

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed August¹³, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0825 Lower Tribunal No. 24-17931-CA-01

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Robert A. Harris, Petitioner,

vs.

Michael Dazzo, Respondent.

A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Day Pitney LLP, and Andrew R. Ingalls and Alfredo E. Dally, for petitioner.

Berkeley Law, P.A., and Lorne E. Berkeley (Cooper City), for respondent.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

GOODEN, J.

2

Petitioner Robert Harris seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an order denying his motion to dismiss asserting arbitral immunity. Finding Harris established the elements for certiorari relief, we grant the petition and quash the order.

I.

Respondent Michael Dazzo is a Class A owner of Alternative Global Management, LLC. He and the other Class A owners of Alternative Global Management, LLC agreed to dissolve the company. Their agreement required all disputes be resolved by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) before a three-member panel where each party selects one arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators select the third neutral. The third neutral acts as the chairperson of the panel. It further provided that the arbitrators would be bound by the company’s agreement.

Through a ranking selection process administered by the AAA, Harris was offered the position as the third neutral and chairperson. AAA required Harris to complete a General Arbitrator Oath Form, which provided, I further affirm that consistent with the applicable Rules of the American Arbitration Association, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, the parties’ agreement, and applicable law: • That I am fit to serve on the above-referenced arbitration and able to fully execute my responsibilities during all phases of the case;

After issues arose in the arbitration process, Dazzo lodged a formal objection with the AAA and sought to remove Harris. In October 2024, the AAA’s Administrative Review Council removed Harris from the arbitration panel, stating, On October⁸, 2024, the AAA’s Administrative Review Council (“Council”) considered the Claimant’s objection to the continued service of Arbitrator Harris and any response received. After careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, the Council has determined that Arbitrator Harris shall be removed in this case. This decision will be made a part of our administrative file.

The AAA’s rule on disqualification provides that an arbitrator shall be subject to disqualification for partiality or lack of independence, inability or refusal to perform his or her duties with diligence and in good faith, and any grounds for disqualification provided by applicable law. The Council has carefully reviewed and considered the parties’ submissions in this matter. Based upon the Council’s Review Standards available at https://www.adr.org/arc, to which the parties were previously referred, the Council is removing Arbitrator Harris.

1 Dazzo’s first party-appointed arbitrator resigned, citing Harris’ “extreme prejudice and bias against Claimants.” Dazzo’s second party-appointed arbitrator also resigned, stating that Harris’ actions prevented reasonable and meaningful time to evaluate rulings and may unfairly prejudice Dazzo and other claimants.

5

Citing section 682.051, Florida Statutes, Harris moved to dismiss asserting arbitral immunity. He maintained that the allegations relate entirely to his decisions and conduct as an arbitrator. Dazzo responded that his claims are based on Harris’ pre-arbitration representations in the AAA oath, and therefore, arbitral immunity does not apply.

After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court accepted Dazzo’s arguments and denied the motion. In support, it relied upon cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Greenspan v. LADT, LLC, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding arbitral immunity barred an investor’s civil suit against the arbitrator alleging that arbitrator failed to issue a timely award as required by arbitration provider’s rules); Baar v. Tigerman, 211 Cal. Rptr. 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (superseded by statute) (rejecting claim of arbitral immunity where arbitrator breached his contractual obligation to render a timely award; under California law, arbitrator loses jurisdiction if award not timely made). Harris timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.

II.

The common law writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary remedy.” Broward Cnty. v. G.B.V. Int’l., Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2001). It “allows a superior court to direct a lower tribunal to inform it of the events below in a

A.

Arbitration is a “process whereby a neutral third person or panel, called an arbitrator or arbitration panel, considers the facts and arguments presented by the parties and renders a decision which may be binding or nonbinding.” § 44.1011(1), Fla. Stat. (2025). It is “an alternate forum for litigation where the competing parties have the chance to present evidence to a finder of fact.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Broward Ins. Recovery Ctr., LLC, 322 So. 3d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). The proceedings are quasijudicial in nature. Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102, 106 (Fla. 1951). “Although not conducted with the same degree of formality as a judicial

10 (1) An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity.

(2) The immunity afforded under this section supplements any immunity under other law.

(3) The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure required by s. 682.041 does not cause any loss of immunity under this section.

(4) In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and may not be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity. This subsection does not apply:

(a) To the extent necessary to determine the claim of an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of the arbitration organization against a party to the arbitration proceeding; or (b) To a hearing on a motion to vacate an award under s. 682.13(1)(a) or (b) if the movant establishes prima facie that a ground for vacating the award exists.

(5) If a person commences a civil action against an arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization arising from the services of the arbitrator, organization, or representative or if a person seeks to compel an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organization to testify or produce records in violation of subsection (4), and the court decides that the arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of an arbitration organization is immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or representative of the organization is not competent to testify, the court shall award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation.

B.

Next, we must determine whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by denying the motion to dismiss. To do so, we need to examine the complaint’s allegations and determine whether they show that Harris was acting in the capacity of arbitrator. See generally Henry v. City of Mount Dora, 371 So. 3d 386, 390 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“To determine whether conduct constitutes a ‘judicial act’ for purposes of immunity, the court should consider (a) whether the precise conduct was performed as a normal judicial function; (b) whether the event occurred in the courtroom or in chambers; (c) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge; and (d) whether the confrontation arose directly or immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.”).

III.

Dazzo warns this Court that if we grant certiorari we will be setting “dangerous precedent.” Quite the opposite. If we were to follow Dazzo’s reasoning, all arbitrators and judges would be opened to litigation. A disgruntled litigant would simply need to cite their oath of office. This simply cannot be. See Harris, 645 So. 2d at 97–98 (citing Sparks v. Duval Cnty. Ranch Co., Inc., 604 F. 2d 976, 979–80 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“[T]he absolute immunity that judges enjoy exists for the benefit of the judicial system and of the public, not for that of the judge. Only a hero could exercise an unfettered judgment while facing, day after day and case after case, the prospect of personal ruin implicit in permitting every losing party to sue him for damages.”); New England Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, 199 F. 3d