STEPHEN GRUDENIC

v.

SUNDEEP SINGH

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed August 13, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-2130 Lower Tribunal No. 23-18664-CA-01 ________________

Stephen Grudenic, Appellant,

vs.

Sundeep Singh, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Charles Kenneth Johnson, Judge.

Stephen Grudenic, in proper person.

Weiss Law Group, P.A., and Jason S. Weiss (Coral Springs), for appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ.

EMAS, J.

Stephen Grudenic, the pro se defendant below and on appeal, challenges the trial court’s order which, following an evidentiary hearing, denied his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), seeking to vacate a default final judgment entered against him in an action instituted by the plaintiff below, Sundeep Singh. Grudenic contends that the constructive service of process by publication was insufficient because Singh (1) filed a facially insufficient affidavit of diligent search; and (2) failed to conduct a diligent search to discover Grudenic’s residence address prior to effectuating service by publication. Generally, the standard of review of an order granting or denying a motion to vacate a default judgment is gross abuse of discretion. See Rodriguez v. Falcones, 314 So. 3d 469, 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“An order granting a motion to vacate a default final judgment is reviewed for a gross abuse of discretion.”) (citing Chetu, Inc. v. Franklin First Fin., Ltd., 276 So. 3d 39, 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); Lewis v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 38 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Bequer v. Nat'l City Bank, 46 So. 3d 1199, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); and LPP Mortg. Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 826 So. 2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)).

1 Grudenic also appeals that aspect of the trial court’s order which denied Grudenic’s motion for sanctions (including dismissal of the action and monetary relief against plaintiff’s counsel). Singh contends this aspect of the order is nonfinal and nonappealable. However, in this post-decretal context, we conclude we have jurisdiction. See Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (holding: “An interlocutory order entered after judgment, post decretal order, is not to be confused with one entered during the pendency of the proceedings before final judgment. Post decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders, and perhaps the term ‘interlocutory’ is a misnomer. Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order. To the extent that it completes the judicial labor on that portion of the cause after judgment, it becomes final as to that portion and should be treated as a final judgment. . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Nat'l Equity Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 962 So. 2d 977, 978 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (treating petition for writ of certiorari from post-judgment disbursement order as a plenary appeal because it ended judicial labor on that portion of the case after judgment).

We affirm without additional discussion the trial court’s order denying this “Combined Motion for Sanctions,” which the trial court rendered following the evidentiary hearing at which both of Grudenic’s motions were scheduled to be heard.

6 transcript at which the trial court made this decision prevents any meaningful review of whether the trial court abused its discretion in this regard”) (citing Applegate, 377 So. 2d 1150); see also Scognamillo v. Jamison, 389 So. 3d 624, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“In the absence of an adequate transcript on appeal, a judgment that is not fundamentally erroneous must be affirmed.”). Affirmed.