MCGEE

v.

MCGEE

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

KAREY ANN McGEE,

Appellant,

v.

JACQUELINE McGEE, as successor trustee for the Robert Charles McGee Revocable Trust dated July 22, 2014 as amended and sole trustee of the Robert Charles McGee Revocable Trust dated October 19, 2021,

Appellee.

No. 2D2024-1447

August 15, 2025

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; James R. Stearns, Judge.

Caitlein J. Jammo and Brandon D. Bellew of Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Clearwater, for Appellant.

Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., and Amy S. Farrior of Buell, Elligett, Farrior & Faircloth, Tampa; and Paul E. Riffel, Tampa, for Appellee.

ATKINSON, Judge.

Karey Ann McGee appeals the trial court's final judgment, which granted Jacqueline McGee's second amended petition filed pursuant to section 736.0415, Florida Statutes (2021), and reformed Robert Charles

This appeal concerns two revocable trusts that Robert created. He created the first trust on July 22, 2014 (the 2014 Trust). The 2014 Trust named Robert's wife, Jacqueline, and Robert's daughter, Karey, among others, as beneficiaries upon Robert's death. The 2014 Trust also referred to an attached schedule of assets that were transferred to the trust, but that schedule is not in the appellate record. Robert later created a second trust on October 19, 2021 (the 2021 Trust). The 2021 Trust did not reference the 2014 Trust. It named Jacqueline as the sole beneficiary upon Robert's death, and it attached a schedule listing real estate and bank accounts that constituted the "trust property." The record and the parties' briefing make clear that the trust property listed in the schedule to the 2021 Trust was the same trust property that was previously transferred to the 2014 Trust.

After Robert passed away, it was discovered that he never conveyed or retitled the trust property from the 2014 Trust to the 2021 Trust. As the trial court found, "All property listed in Schedule A attached to the 2021 Trust remained titled in the 2014 Trust at the time of [Robert]'s death." Consequently, the 2021 Trust did not own any property that could be distributed to Jacqueline pursuant to its terms. Jacqueline, in her capacity as the trustee for each trust, filed a second amended

1 For ease of reference and to avoid confusion, we refer to the members of the McGee family by their first names.

The parties "stipulated that the terms of the 2021 Trust reflect[ed] [Robert's] intent at the time he signed it." And the trial court found after a bench trial that Robert's "clear intent was that all his properties owned by the 2014 Trust be transferred to Jacqueline McGee upon his death." The trial court referred to the testimony of the attorney who drafted the 2021 Trust, who testified that he prepared the 2021 Trust based on Robert's instructions, that the 2021 Trust reflected Robert's intent based on those instructions, and that he was not aware of any mistake in the terms of the 2021 Trust. The attorney "advised [Robert] of the need to fund the trust and provided [him] with a document" explaining how to do so. That document cautioned that if Robert did not transfer his property into his trust, "the trust document will have no effect on what happens to [his] property." The attorney testified that Robert never informed him of the existence of the 2014 Trust but that he "would have prepared a restatement of the [2014 Trust]" had he known about it. The trial court concluded that Jacqueline "met her burden of proof under [section

2 Jacqueline's second amended petition asserted two other causes of action, which the trial court denied. Those causes of action are not at issue in this appeal.

Karey argues on appeal that the trial court erred by reforming the 2021 Trust pursuant to section 736.0415. Because the trial court's ruling rests on a pure question of law concerning the application of section 736.0415, this court's review is de novo. See Kelly v. Lindenau, 223 So. 3d 1074, 1076 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Megiel-Rollo v. Megiel, 162 So. 3d 1088, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

Section 736.0415 provides in relevant part that the court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the settlor's intent if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the accomplishment of the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. § 736.0415. Consistent with the principal focus of both parties on appeal, a party seeking reformation under the statute must establish that a mistake was made in the terms of the trust. But even if there is such a mistake, it must be one that affects the settlor's intent. See id. Because section 736.0415 provides courts with the authority to "reform the terms of a trust . . . to conform the terms to the settlor's intent," id., any need to do so presupposes that the terms of the trust do not conform to the settlor's intent in the first place. If the terms of the trust already conform to the settlor's intent, then the terms of the trust and the settlor's intent would not need to be conformed to one another. In that scenario, the two would already be in conformity, and the trial court would lack the authority under section 736.0415 to reform the trust. In this case, Jacqueline, as the party petitioning for reformation of the 2021 Trust, failed to prove that any alleged mistake "affected" the

LUCAS, C.J., and LABRIT, J., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.