CHAROLETTE L. ALEXANDER VS NORTH FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION BUILDERS, LLC, A FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
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A judgment is not void under Rule 1.540(b) merely because the trial court allegedly erred in determining facts or law; it is void only when the trial court lacked subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. A defendant who defaults admits the allegations in the complaint and may thereafter contest only the legal basis for recovery and the amount, not the underlying facts.
[1] A defendant who fails to answer a complaint and is defaulted admits all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and thereafter may contest only the legal basis…
[2] A judgment is void under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4) only when the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or failed to acquire personal jurisdicti…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The default, in turn, operates 'as an admission by [the appellant] of the truth of the definite and certain allegations and the fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from the allegations' in the complaint, and 'the allegations as to the [appellee's] right of action are taken to be true.'”
Establishes that a defendant's default admits all factual allegations in the complaint, limiting subsequent challenges to legal and damages issues.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharolette Alexander was defaulted for failing to answer a foreclosure action brought by North Florida Construction Builders on a construction lien. A…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2022-1322 _____________________________
CHAROLETTE L. ALEXANDER,
Appellant,
v.
NORTH FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION
BUILDERS, LLC,
Appellee. _____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.
May 7, 2025
TANENBAUM, J.
At the heart of this appeal is a summary foreclosure judgment on a construction lien, the appellant having been defaulted for failure to answer the suit against her. The appellant obtained counsel only after rendition of that judgment, and at that point, through counsel, she filed a timely notice of appeal. Simultaneously, counsel filed a motion with the trial court, on the appellant’s behalf, seeking to set aside the judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). The motion asserted the just-rendered judgment was void because the underlying construction lien was void. Because this appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the judgment, the appellant requested that we “relinquish jurisdiction” and allow the lower court to dispose of the motion, its disposition then possibly “obviat[ing] the
2 necessity of [this] appeal.” There being no opposition, we granted the request and directed the appellant to report the outcome when the relinquishment period ended. Once the trial court denied the motion, the appellant advised us of that fact and “request[ed] this appeal proceed in due course.” The appellant did not file a notice of appeal attaching the order denying relief from the judgment, but on its own, this court ordered the trial court clerk to transmit the latest order as a record supplement. A motion seeking relief from judgment is a separate proceeding, one that can produce a “final post decretal order” that is a “final and distinct adjudication of rights” not originally adjudicated and can “be treated as a final judgment,” an order separately appealable. Cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976). An appeal from the original final judgment and one from a subsequent final order (e.g., on a request for relief from that judgment) in turn are distinct proceedings, so if we authorize a trial court to rule on a postjudgment motion like we did here, review of the latter final order ordinarily must be invoked by the filing of a new notice of appeal, thereby opening a new case with us. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5), (b)–(c) (providing for review of post-judgment relief orders and requiring that jurisdiction be “invoked by filing a notice” with the trial court clerk that attaches “a conformed copy of the order” being appealed); see also id. (e) (setting abbreviated deadline for serving the initial brief); cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (allowing for review of “multiple final orders” under “a single notice, if the notice is timely filed as to each such order”). Out of concern, however, that our sua sponte order to supplement the record may have caused confusion on this point, we review both final orders within this singular appeal, noting in doing so that both parties have fully briefed the subsequent order’s reversibility. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(d) (allowing the appellate court to “disregard any procedural error or defect that does not adversely affect the substantial rights of the parties”). Turning to the first final order on appeal—the foreclosure judgment—we see that the appellant’s initial brief does not argue the default entered against her was in error. Any argument for reversal on that front is abandoned. See City of Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1959) (“It is an established rule that
AFFIRMED.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________
Adrian S. Middleton of Sword & Shield Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Frank S. Shaw, IV, of Smith, Thompson, Shaw, Colón & Power, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
* Judge Ray was substituted in as a panel member after oral argument in this appeal, the video recording of which she has reviewed in full, along with the parties’ briefs.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Malone v. Meres, 109 So. 677 (Fla. 1926)
- City OF Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1959)
- Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1976)
- Wilds v. State, 79 Fla. 575 (Fla. 1920)
- Watson v. Seat & Crawford, 8 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1859)