GREATER MIAMI EXPRESSWAY AGENCY, ET AL.

v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, ET AL.

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed August 21, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0747 Lower Tribunal No. 21-24025-CA-01 ________________

Greater Miami Expressway Agency, et al., Petitioners,

vs.

Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority, et al., Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lisa S. Walsh, Judge.

Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, and Alan Lawson, Paul C. Huck, Jr., Jason Gonzalez, Jessica Slatten and Raymond Cordova (Tallahassee), for petitioners.

Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., and Eugene E. Stearns, Glenn Burhans, Jr., and Melanie R. Leitman (Tallahassee); DeLeon & DeLeon, and Kirk D. DeLeon, for respondent Miami-Dade Expressway Authority; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Michael B. Valdes and Miguel A. Gonzalez, Assistant County Attorneys, for respondent Miami-Dade County.

2

Ryan Newman, General Counsel, and Nicholas J.P. Meros, Deputy General Counsel (Tallahassee), for Governor Ron DeSantis; David Axelman, General Counsel, and Hannah DuShane, Deputy General Counsel (Tallahassee), for The Florida House of Representatives; Carlos A. Rey, General Counsel, and Oliver Lawrence Thomas, Deputy General Counsel (Tallahassee), for The Florida Senate, as amici curiae.

Before SCALES, LOBREE and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners Greater Miami Expressway Authority, Marili Cancio, Richard Blanco, Stacy Miller, Rudolfo Pages, and Fatima Perez (collectively, “GMX”) seek certiorari relief from an April 25, 2024 trial court order that denied GMX’s motion in limine and for protective order to prohibit discovery related to an act adopted by the Florida Legislature in 2023, that the underlying litigation seeks to void.¹ GMX’s principal argument is that, because the underlying dispute involves purely legal questions, no discovery

3 in this case is necessary; and yet, the trial court’s discovery order purportedly grants respondents MDX and the County carte blanche discovery of irrelevant material.

“To prevail in its petition for a writ of certiorari, a party must demonstrate that the contested order constitutes (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment appeal.” Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). While GMX’s argument may have bearing on the issue of whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law, on certiorari review, we do not reach that prong of the analysis unless and until GMX first establishes certiorari’s jurisdictional prong: whether the challenged order results in irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on appeal. Id. (“Under the high standard for issuance of certiorari, the first and necessary condition is demonstration of irreparable harm. Mere legal error without irreparable harm, even a departure from the essential requirements of law, while appealable at the end of the case, is not a basis for the issuance of a writ of certiorari.”). Although GMX casts all or most discovery here as irrelevant in that there need be no inquiry into the Legislature’s objective in enacting the

2 This opinion decides the narrow issue of whether the denial of the motion in limine and protective order triggers certiorari relief under the circumstances present here. We take no position as to the propriety of any protective order or other such relief aimed at specific discovery requests once those requests are made.