TOWER HOTEL, LLC, ET AL.
v.
CITY OF MIAMI
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Three property owners subject to compliance agreements demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on equitable estoppel claims where the City's delay in issuing building permits rendered compliance functionally impossible, warranting a temporary injunction against demolition. One owner who failed to request extensions or appeal the unsafe structures order was properly denied injunctive relief.
[1] A temporary injunction requires the moving party to demonstrate: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, (…
[2] Equitable estoppel may be invoked against a governmental entity where a property owner in good faith reliance upon the government's act or omission has made substantial c…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against a governmental entity where (1) a property owner in good faith reliance (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3) has made such a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he or she acquired.”
Establishes the three-part test for applying equitable estoppel against government entities.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFour property owners received final orders to repair or demolish unsafe structures. Three entered compliance agreements requiring permit issuance with…
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed April 24, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D23-0285 Lower Tribunal No. 22-8069 ________________ Tower Hotel, LLC, et al., Appellants, vs. City of Miami, Appellee. An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan Fine, Judge. Zarco Einhorn Salkowski, P.A., and Robert Zarco, Michael Braunstein, and Jacky Beda, for appellants. Victoria Méndez, City Attorney and Rachel S. Glorioso Dooley, Senior Assistant City Attorney, and Marguerite C. Snyder, Assistant City Attorney, for appellee. Before LOGUE, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.
2
Appellants, the owners of four properties designated as unsafe by the City of Miami’s Unsafe Structures Panel,1 appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion for a temporary injunction against demolition. The owners allege that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that they lacked a substantial likelihood of success on their claims for breach of contract and equitable estoppel, which were predicated on the assertion that the City deliberately withheld issuance of necessary repair permits and prevented them from being able to timely complete repairs and bring the buildings into compliance.
BACKGROUND
After all four property owners received final orders from the Unsafe Structures Panel directing them to repair or demolish the properties, three of the four owners entered into compliance agreements with the City, giving them additional time to complete repairs.2 See, e.g., Quirch Foods LLC v. Broce, 314 So. 3d 327, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). The party seeking the injunction must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, (3) irreparable harm absent entry of an injunction, and (4) that the injunction would serve the public interest.” Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2021). “The party seeking an injunction
4 While the City disputes the extent to which the compliance agreements impose an affirmative obligation for it to issue the building permits, it has conceded that the agreements are a binding contract that modifies the time limitations for compliance under the Miami-Dade County Code and City of Miami Code.5 See § 8-5(m)–(n), Miami-Dade County Code; § 10-101(m)–(n), City of Miami Code (providing that owners of unsafe structures may seek an extension of time from the Unsafe Structures Panel upon a written request and that an owner or interested party aggrieved by a decision of the Panel may seek judicial review by filing a notice of appeal in the circuit court within 30 days of rendition of the order).
Castro v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Code Enf’t, 967 So. 2d 230, 233–34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (granting certiorari to quash enforcement of amendments to building code that would require demolition of illegal addition to property where City had repeatedly issued permits encompassing property addition and owners relied on permits as representations that addition was allowed). Here, after the three owners subject to the agreements complied with their initial deadline for submitting repair plans, their ability to comply with the second deadline for permit issuance depended solely on the City’s approval, rendering compliance functionally impossible if the City delayed the permit issuance more than 60 days. Such a delay is exactly what the unrefuted
6 The trial court didn’t examine this factor because it determined as a matter of law that the owners’ failure to seek an extension of time barred the relief sought. We review a conclusion of law de novo, and we disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the contract as preventing equitable estoppel as a matter of law.7 Further, “a temporary injunction is based on limited evidence developed at a preliminary stage of the case,” so “the parties are not required to completely prove their cases” at the injunction stage. Hasley v. Harrell, 971 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Id. at 234 (quoting Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F. 3d 1320, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Goodman v. Metro. Dade Cnty. Unsafe Structures Bd., 480 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (granting certiorari to quash 180-day time limit for repair of unsafe structure where Board did not have competent evidence to support time limitation for “extensive” repairs). Based on the record before us, the onus was on the City after the owners fulfilled their initial obligations. The owners timely
8 The City posits in its answer brief that, “As Appellants would have it, they undertook to do no more than submit their building plans to the City and wait.” But the stipulated timeline submitted to the trial court and part of the record on appeal contradicts this assertion. The owners submitted the plans, received approval, and then timely sought permits. The record also reflects that the owners timely responded to the City at every opportunity. The record further reflects that the City often changed its approvals of certain portions of the plans to denials without explanation, and otherwise did not act in good faith. It frustrates the purpose of a mitigation plan if the City can simply fail to act and then seek a draconian remedy of demolition based on nothing more than the owners’ inability to comply with a deadline based on the City’s own (in)action.
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