HOYT
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A defendant who freely and voluntarily enters into a plea agreement that includes a sexual predator designation cannot subsequently seek relief from that burden.
[1] A defendant who voluntarily enters into a plea agreement that includes a sexual predator designation as a bargained-for component and accepts the benefits of that agreeme…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is apparent from the record that appellant's agreement to a sexual predator designation was a bargained-for part of the plea agreement. Having freely and voluntarily entered into the agreement and accepted its benefits, appellant may not now seek to be relieved of one of the burdens imposed upon him pursuant to the agreement.”
Court's reasoning citing Kingry v. State, 28 So. 3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
Justin T. Hoyt appealed a circuit court decision regarding a sexual predator designation imposed as part of his plea agreement.…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
JUSTIN T. HOYT, Appellant,
V.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
No. 1D2025-2223
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. James Matthew Colaw, Judge.
June 17, 2026
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. See Kingry v. State, 28 So. 3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“It is apparent from the record that appellant's agreement to a sexual predator designation was a bargained-for part of the plea agreement. Having freely and voluntarily entered into the agreement and accepted its benefits, appellant may not now seek to be relieved of one of the burdens imposed upon him pursuant to the agreement.").
BILBREY, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.