DAVID STERLING, APPELLANT,
v.
J. ARTHUR HAWKESWORTH, JR., AND PRINCETON CONSTRUCTION CO., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1962-04-03
No. 61-428
Before HORTON, CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.
139 So. 2d 740 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1962) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Sterling, a defendant in a negligence action, appeals a directed verdict on liability in favor of plaintiff Hawkesworth. The court reversed, holding that the trial judge erred in removing the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk from jury consideration, even in a reckless conduct case.


Holding

The trial judge erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability. The affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are normally within the jury's province, and the plaintiff failed to establish that these defenses were unavailable even under the reckless conduct standard articulated in the Restatement of Torts.


Key Quotes

“In considering a plaintiff's motion for directed verdict, all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are accorded the party moved against.”

Establishes the standard of review for directed verdict motions—inferences must favor the non-moving party.

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff Hawkesworth was injured when defendant Sterling negligently or carelessly operated a motor vehicle that collided with Hawkesworth while he w…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, defendant below, seeks review of a final judgment rendered upon a jury verdict awarding the appellee, Hawkes-worth, both compensatory damages and punitive damages.

He assigns as error the granting, by the trial judge, of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the question of liability. He also assigns other errors, which are not necessary for a determination of this cause in view of the fact that we find that the trial judge committed error iii directing a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability.

In considering a plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict, all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are accorded the party moved against. Katz v. Bear, Fla.1951, 52 So.2d 903; Nelson v. Ziegler, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 780; Brady v. Kane, Fla.App.1959, 111 So.2d 472; 32 Fla. Jur., Trial, § 83. The plaintiff’s complaint in this cause alleged that the defendant “* * * so negligently, or carelessly, operate, maintain, or control, said motor vehicle that he caused the same to collide with the body and person of the plaintiff while he was lawfully standing in the drive*741way or sidewalk area of the aforesaid residence, causing injuries and damages to said plaintiff * * * ”. The defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint and urged the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the, risk. By the direction of the verdict, the trial judge removed from the consideration of the jury the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. The allowance of these defenses is normally within the wisdom of the trier of the facts. Steele v. Independent Fish Co., 152 Fla. 739, 13 So.2d 14; Martin v. Stone, Fla.1951, 51 So.2d 33; City of Williston v. Cribbs, Fla.1955, 82 So.2d 150. Counsel for the plaintiff urges that these defenses are not allowable in the instant case because of the alleged reckless conduct of the defendant, resulting in the injury. Counsel for the defendant recognizes the general rule which is stated in the restatement as follows: 2 Restatement of Torts, § 482, Reckless Conduct.

“(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a plaintiff’s contributory negligence does not bar recovery for harm caused by the defendant’s reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety.
“(2) A plaintiff is barred from recovery for harm caused by the defendant’s reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety if, knowing of the defendant’s reckless misconduct and the danger involved to him therein, the plaintiff recklessly exposes himself thereto.”

He urges that the evidence was sufficient that the jury could have found that the injured party himself engaged in a reckless course of conduct, sufficient to bar recovery under the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk [reckless conduct of the injured party being an exception to the general rule, as outlined above],

Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the party moved against on the motion for directed verdict, it appears that the trial judge abused his discretion in taking from the jury the question of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk and, therefore, this cause is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.

Reversed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Royce D. Johnson v. Rinesmith, 238 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
    …ld that appellants are entitled to a new trial limited2 to the issue of willful and wanton misconduct, to which contributory negligence is not a defense. See Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, Fla.1959, 116 So. 2d 421; Sterling v. Hawkesworth, Fla.App.1962, 139 So. 2d 740 ; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts § 22.6; Annotations, 119 A.L.R. 654; 92 A.L.R. 1367; 72 A.L.R. 1357; 38 A.L.R. 1424. We grant the petition for rehearing and adhere to our former opinion except as [*661] herein modified. Affirmed in part, rev…
  • Norman v. Mandarin Emergency Care Ctr., Inc., 490 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
    …ourt must view not only the evidence but all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. [*80] Thundereal Corporation v. Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 350 (Fla.1979); Sterling v. Hawkes-worth, 139 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). The majority states that “the type and quantity of evidence presented in this case does not present a jury question on the issue of Norman’s comparative negligence.” Ante at 79 (e.s.). The opinion nevertheless relates that ther…

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